Claude F. Finney, et al., v. Harley A. Hawkins by unknown
Record 
r,;, :Lo-
{i;.,t~. 
No. 3501 
In the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
at Richmond 
CLAUDE F. FINNEY, ET ALS. 
v. 
HARLEY A. HAWKINS 
BR<HI THE CIRCrIT COT'RT OF ELIZABETH CITY COUNTY. 
RULE 14. 
,:5. NUl\lll .• R OF COPIES '1'0 UE ]'ILF.D AND DELIVERED 'l'O 0PPOS-
1NO Coum;i,:1,, 'l'wenty copies of each brief shall be. filed with 
the clerk of the eourt, and at least two copies mailed or <le· 
livere<l to opposing counsel on or before the day on which tl.ie 
brief is filed. 
~-6. SrzE AND TYPE. Briefs shall be nine inches in length and 
six iHehes in width, so as to ronfo ... 1y in dimens ions to the 
printed reeord, and shall be pri11ted in type not less in size, 
as to height an<l width, than the typl? in which the record is 
printed. The record numbc>r of the case and names of coun-
sel shall be printed on the front cover of all briefs . 
~I. B. "\V ATTS, Clerk. 
Court opens at 9 :30 a m.; Adjourns a.t 1 :00 p. m. 


. 
i 
INDEX TO PETITION 
Record No.' 3501-
· · · . . . . . . Page 
P,reliminary Statements . ~ ·. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 1 • 
Statement of Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . 2• 
Grounds of Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . .. . .. . .. . . . 5• 
Summary of Argmrient . . . .. . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 7• 
Argument . . . ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10• 
. ; 1 l ', ! , I l, . 
. I. The enactment herein has the effect of. uncondi-
tionally prohibiting.,_ not merely_ regulating, the 
m~king of_ contracts or other arrangements for 
union membership as a condition of~: employ-
ment, and thus involves not only rights of con-
tract but. also more fo.ndamental rights, pro-
tected under the First Amendment as a concomi-
tant of the rig·ht of assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,.. 
II. Statutes flatly prohibiting. union membership as · 
a condi_ti(?n _of employm~nt ;in~ any form d~ny 
fundamental. rights in. :violation of, the guaran-
tees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15• 
.. 
A. The right to form unions and to carry on es-
sential union activities is an exercise of. the · 
right of , associati'~n· conjointly with the 
other rights guaranteed . by . the First 
Amendment . . . . ...... : .............. .- . 15"' 
B. · Union membership as a · condition of. em-
ployment is i~clispensable. to the exercise 
of the right of workmen to assemble in . 
union . . . . ................ : . . . . . . . . . . . . 20" 
l. Proof of indispensability by experience 
and economic necessity .............. 20-it 
2. Proof of indispensability: by analysis of 
the nature of unions · and · analogy of 
duties of a worker in, an industrial unit 
: to those of a citizen in a political unit .. 29* 
3. The proof of indispensability by legal 
doctrines . . . . ..................... ·.~. · 31 • 
. 1 
n Index to Petition 
Page 
{a) Recognitjon of the right to self-
organization precludes the view 
that labor organizations, in requir-
ing union membership as a condi-
tion of employment, are engaged 
in unlawful assemblies · .......... 31 • . 
(b) The right to self-organization for 
pu:rposes of coll~ctive bargaining 
nec.essarily includes right to en-
force common rules of employment 
as against individual employees. . 34 • 
I 
C. The statute prohibiting unjon memfiersbip 
as a condition of employment in any form 
cannot be justified · as a protection of an 
alleged '' right to work'' or as a means .of 
preventing an alleged '~ monopoly of labor'' 
or · on other grounds ............. _. . . . . . . 45 8 
1. The enactment here involved does not 
protect or create a "right to work" in · 
the abstract; union-shop agreements do 
not deny the right to work in any abso-
lute sense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46* 
2. The right to refuse to join a union is not 
the constitutional parallel of the right to 
join labor organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49• 
3. The State cannot create a right not to 
join a union where p~otection of such 
right involves. denial to labor organiza-
tions of the right to insist on union mem-
bership as a condition of employment. . . 53"" 
4. The enactment cannot be justified as 
protecting against an· alleged monopoly 
achieved by union-security agreements 57'• 
5. The enactment cannot be justified as 
mere regulation of contracts .......... 59• 
D. Since fundamental rights finding protection 
under the First Amendment are here in-
volved, the State may not support the pro-
. hibitions by a showing- of some rational 
basis in exercise of police power . . . . . . . . . . 61 • 
E. The prohibition can be supported only by a 
showing of compelling public necessity un-
I 
1/ 
Index to Petition 
Page 
-der the clear and present danger test; such 
a showing is not even attempted .......... 64* 
. . 
III. Even assuming that rights of a less funda-
mental nature are here involved, nevertheless 
the absolute union-security prohibition must 
fall as being ·demonstrably arbitrary, discrimi.:.' 
natory and without rational ;bas~s; $uch abso-
lute prohibition of so important a right is 
clearly excessive where regulation would accom-
plish all possible objectives ............. -·· ... 68• 
A. Principles applicable to a determination. of 
-whether legislation is. arbitrary or without 
rational basis . ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,68• 
B. The nature of the activity proscribed and 
the impact of such _prosGription ......... 75• 
C. The inadequacy of the claimed justifications 
for complete prohibition of union-shop 
agreements .. t • • •••• • •••• ~ ••••••••••• • • • • so• 
1. Correction of abuses ............. ·· ... · 81 '* 
2. Prevention of stril<es for union-security . 
agreements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . s4• 
3. Prevention of unions becoming over-
powerful . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . g5• 
I 
D. Total prohibition rather than regulation is 
excessive and arbitrary .................. 86• 
E. Discriminatory aspects of prohibition. . . . . . 93• 
1. General .................. : .......... 93"" 
'Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99• 
PraY.er and Concluding· Stateme~ts ..................• 100" 
1v· Index to Petition 
Tabie ~or: cases -Cited 
. . . Page 
Adams v. Tannef/244 U. S. 590 ......... 9., 73'\ ss•, 89•, gs• 
Allgeyer v. LO'Uisi"ana, 165 U. S. 578 ................... 71 • 
.Amalgamated Utility TI1 or·kers v. Consolidated Edison 
Co., 809 U .. S. 261 ............................ 15*, 42*' 
American Federat'ion of Labor v. Watson, et al., 60 Fed. 
Supp. 1010, reversed, 327 U. S. 582 .......... ~ . . . . 94 *· 
American. ..Steel F01.i11:dries v. Tri-City Central Trades cf: 
Lab<Jf'· Co1Mioil, 257 u~ S. 184 ...... .-.............. 19* 
Amerioain Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U. S.106 ... 58*' 
Apea; Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 .... 8'\ 25*', 5s•, 59~ 
.Associated Press v. Un·ited State.c;. of 4merica, 326 U. S. 1 67.-
Borden's -Fann Products v. Baldwin, 283 U. S. 194 .. 74*, 82* 
Bowe v. (J ommonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 69 N. E. ( 2d) 
. .115 • • . • .••.•...... · ...... ,• .. · .••...•..•• ·. ·. . . .. • . . 54 ... . 
Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U .. S.426 ............ · .. .'., .- ..... 74* 
Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U. S. 504 ............... 74.-
Carlson v. California, 310 U. S.106 ................... 17*" 
J. I. Case Co. v. N. L. R. B.; 321 U. S. 
. . 332 . ...................... 7•, 35*', 42'r\ 43•, 53"', 5g•, 59*' 
Ohaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 ........... 64* 
Commonwealth v. Hinit, 45 Met. (Mass.) 
111 ................... : ..... 7*, 23\ 31*, 34*, 61*, 66*" 
Cotting v. Godard, 183 U. S. 79 .................... 90*, 96*' 
DeJonge v. Oreg.on, 299 U. S. 353 ..................... 64*' 
DeMille v. American Federation of Radio Ar.tists, 187 
Pac. (2d) 769· (Calif. Appeals, 1947),. aff'd. 31 Cal. 
(2d) 137, cert. denied, 333 U. S. 876 ............... 54~· 
East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 330 .... 70* 
Elgin, Joliet <Ii Eastern. Ry. Co. v. Burley~ 325 U. S. 711, 
rehearing, 327 U.S. 661 .............. : .... 61*., 3t*, 39* 
Ea; Parte Milligan, 71 U. S. 281 . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . • . . . . . . 72:1:: 
Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496 ......... ; .....•. : ...... 17*' 
H. ,J. Heinz Co,. v. N. L. R.R., 311 U.S. 514 .......... 21.., 60* 
Holden v. Ilardy, 169 U. S. 366 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19"" 
Home Biiillling <Ii Loan Co. v. Blaisdell" . ............. 9•, 70'"" 
Hotel <Ii Restaurant Empl011ees Int'l. Alliance Mul Bar-
tenders Leagiie of .America. v. Greenioood, 30 So. 
(2d) 696 ...................................... 78* 
Honse v. Mayes, 219 U. S. 270 ....•.... ~ ~: ... ; .... : ... 87* 
Inland Steel Co. v. N. L. K B. (C. C. A. 7), .... Feel 
(2d) ............ · ...................... 15~\ 18*, 42~ 
Index to Petition V 
· Page 
Integration of Bar Case, 244 '\\Tis. 8, 11 N. W. (2d) 604, 
151 A. L. R. 586 ......................... ·. . . . . . . 48• 
International Shoe Co . . v. Washin,qton, 326 U. S. 310. . . . 15~ 
,Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N. Y. 207, 76 N. E. 5 .............. 23"' 
Ke-mp v. Division, 241 255 Ill. 213, 99 N. E. 389 ....... ~. 27'' · 
Levy Leasing Co. v. Sie.qel, 258 U. S .. 242 ............. _. 74• 
Liggett v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105 ................ 82~\ sa• 
Lincoln Federa.l Labor Union #191.2.9, et al. v. N ortk-
'western Iron <t- Metal Co., et al., 149 ;Neb .. 507, 31 
N. W. (2d) 477 ............................... _.. 55• 
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Railroad Commission; 
19 Fed. 679 ... ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97• 
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 ........... : . . . . . . . . . . . 64• 
Maryniont v. Nevada State Bankin.g Board, 33 Ne"tr~ 333, 
111 Pac. 295, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 477, Ann. Cas. 
1914A, 162 . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90• 
McKay, et al. v. Union, 16 Calif, (2d). 311, 106 Pac. (2d) 
373. . . . ................................. : .... : . 2s• 
McLean v. 4rkansas, 211 U. S. 539 ................... 74• 
Meclo Photo Supply· Corpomtion, v. N. L. R. B., 321 U. · 
s. 678 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 35'*' 39•' I 53• 
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412 ............... 21 •;12~,, _74~ 
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 ................ 64* 
Mutual Loan Co. v. IJ1a.rtell, 222 U. S. 225 ............. '. 72• 
National Maritime Un,-ion v. 11 erzog, 334 U. S. 854 ...... '. 4811=. 
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. .' · · 
502. · ........... ; ......... 9*, 55", 69*, 73*, 74*, 80'1!1, 9g• 
New State Ice Co. v. Diehm.an, 285 U. S. 262 ........... · 74• 
N. L. R. B. v. Budd "JJ!ifg. Go. (C. C . .A. 6), .... Fed. 
(2d) ......................... : ......... 15*, 18»>, 42• 
N. L. R. B. v. Jones ~ "Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U. S. 
1 ......................... 7*, 8'\ 15'"', 18*, 42*, 52•, 93• 
North' Carolina v. Iiarris, 216 N. C .. 746, 6 N. E. '(2d) 
854, 128 A. L. R. 658 .................. r • • • • • • • • • 90~ 
O'Keefe 1. Local 463, 277 N. Y. 300, 14 N. E. (2d) 77 ... : 43• 
Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10• 
Order· of R. R. Telegraphers v~ Railway Express .Agency, . 
321 u. s. 343 ...........•.. ~35\ 38., 42•~ 53*, 58*, 59~ 
Oyama v. Cal-ifornia, 332 U. S. 633 ................... 20* 
Payne Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S. 459. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58* 
Pennsylv(l!fl,ia Cool Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 .... 9•, 76•, 92# 
People v. HT einer, 271 Ill. 74, 110 N. E. 870 ........... - 90• 
. People v. Ritige, 197 N. Y. 143, 90 N. E. 451, 27 L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 528, 18 Ann. Cas. 474 .................... 90• 
VI Index to Petition 
Page 
Phelps-Dodge Corporation v. N. L. R. B., 313 U. S. 
111 .. ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8· 
Pollock v. Williams, 322 U. S. 4 .................... 24'\ 26• 
Price ·v. Illinais, 238 U. S. 446 ........................ 74• 
Railway Mail .Association v. Corsi, 326 U. S. 88 .... 35•, 41 • 
R~ynolds v. Milk C onvniission., 163 Va. 957. . . . . . . . . . . . 69" 
Salisbury db Spencer R. R. Co. v. Southern Power Co., 
C . • 179 N. . 18, 101 S. E. 593, 12 A. L. R. 304 ......... 97 
Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 ..................... 64• 
Ben,;i v. :l'ile Layers Protective Ass'n., 301 U. S. 4468. . 46• 
State v. Whitaker, et al., 228 N. E. 352, 45 S. E. (2d) 
860 ..... · ...................................... 50• 
Steele v. Louisville db Nashville R. Co .. 323 U. S. 
192 ............................ : ... 35+, 40"\ 4341<, 95• 
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 
516 ..................... r•, rn•, 18•, 30\ 64"\ 84·, 99* 
Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corv., 300 U. S. 
55 ............................................ 74• 
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 ............ 17~~ 65•, 99• 
Tolliver v. Blfazard, 143 Ky. 773, 137 S. W. 509 ........ 87• 
Trei.qle v. Acme Homestead .A.ssociation, 297 U. S. 
189 .................................... . 9e, 94~, 98• 
Truax v. Corrigan,., 257 U. S. 312 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 74• 
Twnstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 323 
u. s. 210 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35• 
United States v. Congress of Indnstrial Organ.izatioru~, 
335 u. s. 106 .•.............................. 54·, 56411 
_Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077, 35 
L. R. A. 722, 57 Am. St. Rep. 443 (1896) .......... 33~ 
Wallace Corporation v. N. L. R. B., 323 U.S. 248 .... 25., s5• 
Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 270 U. S. 402 ............. 9~\ g9• 
Webber v. City of ScotsblitO-', 141 Neb. 363,3 N. W. (2d) 
635 ........................................... 90,ii. 
West boast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 ...... 55•, 69• 
West Virginia· v. · Baniette, 319 U. S. 
624 ................. 15'1\ 16•, 41\ 50'"', 62*, 65"\ 69·, 70• 
Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of. Industrial RelaNons, 262 
u. s. 522 . : .... .' .................... 9*, 69(,!I, 75•, 84· 
I' 
Index to Petition 
Statutes Cited 
Vll 
Page 
Maine, Ch. 25, Sec. 41-A., as added by Ch. 395, L. 1947, 
approved May 13, 1947, effective August 13, 1947. . . s7• 
Massachusetts State Labor Relations .Act, Ch. 150-.A, 
Sec. 4, subsec. (6) .....••................... . s1•, 88• 
National Labor Relations .Act, 49 Stat. 
449 ....•.................. 35 •, 89~, 42•, 44 '", 78·, 79• 
Railway Labor Act, 48 Stat. 1185 ...... 38., 40*, 42•, 45:l,l, 79• 
Taft-Hartley Act (Labor-Management Labor Relations 
Act of 1947), Act of June 23, 1947, C. 20, 80th Cong., 
1st Sess. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97• 
Virginia Anti-.Closed Shop Law (Acts of Assembly, 1947, 
Extra Session, P. 12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 • 
Miscellaneous 
43 American Jurisprudence 683 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96• 
Bikle, ''Judicial Determination of Questions of ract Af-
fecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative . 
.Action," 38 Harv. Law Rev. 6 .................... 74• 
Braden, "Empire to tl1e Federal System,'' 10 Univ. of · 
Chicago Law Rev. 27 ............................ 71• 
Brown, '' Due ProGess of Law, Police Power and the Su-
. ·preme Court," 40 Harv. Law Rev. 943 ............ 74• 
Brown, ''Police Power-Legislation for Health and Per-
sonal Safety," 42 Harv. Law Rev. 866 ........ · .... 74• 
Final Repo~rt of Industrial Commission (1902), Vol 
XIX, p. 817, H. Docket No. 380, 57th Cong. 1st Sess. 
1901-02) ............. : ......................... 48" 
Frankfurther, "Hours of Labor and Realism in Consti-
tutional Law," 29 Harv. Law Rev. 353. . . . . . . . . . . . 74• 
Frankfurter & Greene, "The Labor Injunction," p. 205 .. 25• 
Freund, "The Police Power,'' Sec. 62 ................ 90• 
National Labor Relations Board, ''1\fonthlv Statistical 
Summary, August, 1947-September, 1948, inclusive.'. 47• 
Note, 49 Harv. Law Rev. 631, '' The Presentation of 
Facts Underlying- the Constitutionality of Statutes," 74• 
Nelles, "Commonwealth v. Hunt/' 32 Col. Law Rev. 1128, 
1159 ................................... 22•, 31"", 669 
Nell es, "The First American Labor Case," 41 Yale L. · 
J. 165 . . . . ...................... :-.'. . . . . . . . . . . . . 22• 
..J,',-~ 
VIII Index to Petition 
Page 
Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 788 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78• 
U. S. Department of Labor, '' Extent of Collective Bar-
gaining and Union Recognition (1946). . . . . . . . . . . . 24• 
Webb~ ''Industrial Democracy" (London, 1897), p. 214 .. 21 * 
Witte; '"Early American Labor Cases,'' 35 Yale L. J. 
875 ... ~ ........................... •·• .......... 22* 
Wyzanski, ''The Open Window and the Open Door,'' 35 
Calif. L. Rev •. 336, 350 .......................... 50* 
IN THE 
Supreme Court. of Appeals of Virginia ·. · 
AT RICHMOND 
Record No. 3501 
CLAUDE. F. FINNEY, MINNIE B. FLINT AND NJ!tW~ 
PORT NEWS BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION 
TRADES COUNCIL, AN UNINCORPORATED,' AS-
SOCIATION, Plaintiffs in Error, ' 
vers'U,S 
HARLEY A. HAWKINS, Defendant in Error· 
From the Circuit Court of Elizabeth City 
County, Virginia. 
PETITION FOR WRIT ·oF ERROR .. 
PRELIMINARY ST.l1.TEMENTS. 
I • 
To the Honorable Jiu,tfoes of the Siipreme Court of Appeals 
of .Virginia.: · 
Your petitioners, Claude F. Finney, Minnie B. Flint, and 
Newport News Building and Construction Trades Council, 
an unincorporated association, respectfully represent that 
2 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
th~y are aggrieved by a final judgment of the Circuit Court 
of the County of Elizabeth City, Virginia, entered ag·ainst 
them on the 14th day of July, 1948, in the case, wherein the 
said Claude F. Finney, Minnie B; Flint, and Newport News 
Building and Construction Trades Council, an un~ncorpo-
rated association, were defendants,. and Harley A. Hawkins 
was plaintiff. 
2• *Transcript of the record of the judgmen.t complained 
of is herewith presented · as a part of this petition. 
STATE:MENT OF FACTS. 
On the 6th day of Februa~y, 1948, the plaintiff below, Har-
ley A. Hawkins, filed a Notice of Motion for judgment against 
petitioners, defendants below, seeking damages allegedly suf-
fered by plaintiff when he lost his employment for x .. e.fus.ing 
to become a member of a lab_Qr_. org;mizafio.n .. J!~ ~ Qonclition 
of .such employment. The ·act.ion was broug·ht under Sec-
tion 6 of the Virginia '' Anti-.Closed-Shop'' law1 referred to 
hereinafter. Petitioners are Claude F. Finney and Minnie 
B. Flint, co-partners operating a printing ·establishment 
known as· the Brickey Print Shop, in Newport News, Vir-
ginia., and the. Newport News Building and Construction 
Trades Council, an unincorporated association of local labor 
unions functioning in Newport News. The plaintiff, H~v 
A. Hawkins -alleged that the said petitioners had entered into 
a union-shop agreement under which the Brickey Print Shop 
agreed to employ none but members _in Jm.Qd ~tandiny;.......of 
local unions affiliated with the American-Fede:Pation-··of-L~ 
bor, the said print shop hemg··-e:ng·aged in printing· a labor 
publication and desiring such union-shop relationship not 
only for more ha:rmonious employee relationships but for the 
more successful operation of its business. The plaintiff went 
on to allege that the said partners, after having employed 
the said plaintiff as a printer, thereafter inquired wl1ether 
h~ was a member of an A. F. of L. printers' union, and when 
said plaintiff, Harley A. Hawkins, said he was not, and 
3• that he would not joint one, 8 Said petitioners, Claude F. 
. Finney and Minnie B. Flint, discharged him, stating· that 
he could not maintain his employment unless he became a 
union member. The plaintiff, Harley A. Hawkins, alleged 
t~at said action in discharging him, together with the union-
shop agreement itself, was illegal under the Act of the Gen-
eral Assembly of Virginia, approved January 21,. 1947., in 
extra session of the General Assembly, commonly known as 
the '' Anti-Closed Shop'' law. This law reads as follows: 
\_ 
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4* .*AN ACT 
To declare the public policy of Virginia with respect to 
membership or non-membership in labor organizations as af-
fecting the right to work; to make unlawful and to prolµbit 
combinations or agreements which require membership: in 
labor organizations as a condition of employment; to provide 
that membership in or payment of money to any labor organi-
zation shall not be necessary for employment; and to author-
ize suits for damages for violations of certain provisions 
thereof. ~ 
APPROVED JANUARY 21, 1947 
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia: 
1. Section 1. It is hereby Qeclared to be the public policy 
of Virginia that the right of persons to work shall ·not be 
denied or abridged on account of membership or non-mem-
bership in any labor union or labor organization. 
Section 2. Any agreement or combination between any em-
ployer and any labor union or labor organization 'Whereby 
persons not members of such union or organization shall be 
denied the right to work for said employer, or whereby such 
membership is made a condition of employment or continua .. 
tion of employment by such employer, or whereby any· such 
union or organization acquires an employment monopoly in 
any enterprise, is hereby declared to he against public policy 
and an illegal combination or conspiracy. 
J . Section 3. No person shall be reguired by an employer to become or remain a member of any labor union or labor or-
ganization as a condition of employment or continuation of 
ceniployment by such employer. 
Section 4. No person shall be required by an employer to' 
abstain or refrain from membership in any labor union or 
labor org~nization as a condition of employment or continua-
tion of employment. · . 
Section 5. No employer shall require any person, as·· a con-
_ dition of employment or continuation ·of employment, to pay 
any dues, fees or other charges of any kind to any labor. union 
or labor organization. . 
Section 6. Any person who may be denied employment or 
be deprived of continuation of his employment in violati~n of 
sections three, four or five or of one or more of sucli sections, 
shall be entitled to recover from such employer and from any 
o~her person, firm, corporation or association acting in con-
4 Supreme Court of Appeals of 'Virginia 
cert with him by appropriate action in the courts of this· Com-
monwealth such damages as he may have sustained by reason 
of such denial or deprivation of employment. 
Section 7. The provisions of this act shall not apply to any 
lawful contract in force on the effective date hereof but they 
shall apply in all respects· to contracts entered into there·after 
and to any renewal or extension of an existing .contract. 
Section 8. If any one or more sections, clauses, sentences,. 
or parts of- this· ac.t · shall for any reason be questioned in any 
court, and shallJ>e -aajudged unconstitutional or invalid, such 
judgment shall.not affect, impair or invalidate the remaining 
provisions theteof but shall be confined in its operation to 
the specific provisions to be held unconstitutional or invalid~ 
and the inapplicability or invalidity of any section, clause or 
provision of this act ~n any one or more instances or circum-
stances shall not be taken to affect or prejudice in any way 
its applicability or validity in any other instance. {Acts of 
Assembly, 1947, Extra Session, P. 12.) · 
5* *The plaintiff below alleged t~at he was damaged in 
the sum of $350.00 by reason of his allegedly unlawful 
fu~~~ . 
The petitioners, the defendants below, filed a demurrer to 
such Notice of Motion for Judg·ment in which the constitu-
tionality of the enactment in question ( on which plaintiff's 
complaint rested) was challenged. After hea1ing arguments,. 
the Circuit Court overruled the demurrer in a. decision which, 
however, indicated doubt as to the constitutionality of the 
law in question. Thereafter, the case went to trial and evi-
dence was presented which supported the allegations of the 
plaintiff. In addition, it was shown that after plaintiff ob-
tained membership in a printers' local union, he regained his 
employment. The petitioners :filed a motion to strike the evi-
dence, which again raised the constitutional issues, and after 
all the evidence was in moved to set the judgment aside. 
These motions were both overruled, and a judgment was en-
tered for· plaintiff, Hai·ley A. Hawkins, in the sum of $330.00 
with interest and costs. 
G:ROUNDS OF ERROR. 
1. The court erred in overruling ( 1) defendants' demurrer,. 
(2) defendants' motion to strike, and (3) defendants' motion 
to set aside the judgment. Each of said motions as made by 
defendants was predicated upon and rai~ed the following con-
stitutional grounds or issues: . 
( . . :, 
r 
5 
. . . 
6* ~ (1.), .'th~ .iill~ge_<f law. p~~yents. any erpp,loyer or, labor 
organization, includi'ng ~Jie de·f~.ndants herein, from en-
tering into or rel).ewjn.g !llutu~!ly ~gr~eapl~ c~llect~ve ~argain-
~ng agr~e.mel}-ts cQnta1ml).g .umon.-shop or union-security pro-
yisions or requiring" e~ployce~, as i11 the present case, tQ be-
~ome anq remain a .member of a ,labor. or.ganJzati9n as. a con-
dition for .. employment, and ther~by d~prives Jabor. organiza~ 
tions al}.,d th~fr me;mbers arid enmloy~rs,.inc;Jµding the defend-
t1nts herein,, of property rights,. and liabilities,. in p~rticular, 
the right and libe_rty fre~Jy to .contrac~ .a~d the liberty of an 
employer, h;icluding the def enq.l}.nt employers herein, to. con-
duct their .~nvn busine~~ ~nd , to select t:µeii;. own employees 
free from undue interference by the state, all ih violation of 
~rticle I, Section 11 of _the Constitu~i.on. of Yirgi~ia, and of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-r 
tion. · ·· : · .. · · · 
. The alleged law is arbitr~ry, U"Qrea!:!'onable __ and excessive 
and in violatio11 of the constitutional guarante·es as aforesaid 
against the impairment of the oblig~.tion of and freed om to 
~nter into contracts as protected under the state and federal 
'Constitutions as aforesaid. . . ., . 
(2) The alleged law constitutes class legisla.tion and is 4is.:. 
criminatory a~d, therefore, is vQid. und~r ~rticle I, 'Sections 
l and 11 of the Virginia Cons.titution a11d 1J:iide.r the Four~ 
teenth Amendment to the United States 'Constitution~ . . · 
. (3) The all~ged law imp~irs and previou~ly restrains the 
~xercise by the union def e11da~ts. of their .ciyil rights of as-
sembly and speech, all in violation of Article· I, Sections 1, 11 
and 12 of t~e Vi~ginia Constitution,. an<J, . of. the fi~st ~d 
Fourteenth Amen_dment~ to the lJnited S.t~tes Constitution.· 
, 2. The Court eri:ed in failing to hold the .so-called '' Anti..: 
Closed-Shop'' law unconstituti<:>nal, null and void. 
. ' . I 
- The law iiwolv~d· herein flatJy 'pr'ohibHs, do~~ not regulate, 
~my agreement or arrangem,ent pet.ween labor., orga'nizations 
and employees whereunder union ~embership is made a con-
ditioJ1 of employ111ent, a:µd, thif$. without ,proyidi~g. any substi-
tute or equivalent for the Junction perfprmed. ~y such agree-
ments. in ,protectii:\g laboi: nrg_aniza~ion~ and making them ~f-
fectiv_e'.. -1\~: s~~li, it ~dvet's~!Y affects not only contract rights 
and liberties 'protected under the Fourteenth Amendment and 
the contract clause, but also impairs the fundamental right of 
assembly as exercised by workingmen when they seek to f.or~ 
6 §upretHe tfourt t>f A ppcals or Virgiflltt 
anti piain~ain, ~~fon~- ..71 .. L. lt_ -~·- ~- i_o,t~~ ·t1? ~wupli~hi ~t~ei 
cu~; MOi u .. ~- l; !tlit:Jmtts y. OrJlh1t~, 323 u .. s_. 5m .. Fdr .h1s-
t6fif!al ext}erieHc~,. €!t'!tJttoipifl ri;@c~ssHy, tuUtlysis .6£ ~ the ~Ulhtrij 
csf ttnl6hs, i1ie li1Ut1ogy of tlitHr furtetiort itt an iiidusititt1 ~ti= 
cl@ty t~ govet'iililetit. h1 a ptJlitli!ai ~mc~~iv3 .artd l~gal dMb;lne tffim. Uiint1n_iJ}i~~t1,Jt~_ v.)i11.nt, 45 1\iet. LMa~s.). 111, t6 J. I. 
fJfi§ff Ga. v. N. L. R. B; ~21 tl. §. 3g2, all indi~ate that absent 
sifittlt6ry tn'titt!~tiott .df tiie right bf ofg;attiiaHofi artd an ~x=-
tilm1lV@ bargaitti.ng status, uhiofi tnerttbetship tts a corttliHtJtt 
of @mpibyµient is itidi$pettsfibie io the right of stdt-drgat1iza= 
Hon and the a~so~ia Hbh of wtwkers iht.6 urt1otts. Withtmi sttt!ii 
·tmmgni.Hon of tht! l·ight Bf unio11 tticftiber§ to refuse to worli 
with n.oii~llieftlb~fs; fis forrtJ.all_zetl ln a tf hiofi-shop agreetneht+ 
thefe is no '\Vay· t6 ettf dre iidhereMe to the ~thrtfiiort rttle of · 
efflf}l~yttieftt, which is the very 'basi!:3 tit tthiortistrt, no hteans . 
of eliminating the co~petitiop of t11e non--µnion worker,. no 
wlif 6f µi~i11taifljflg ftill ~tttla.lity b(b~rgairiihg powef ahd of 
tl@fisoliaatittg gaiti§ tt~hiev~t1 tllrtlttgli th~ prtic~ss fif MllecHv~ 
biif!f&ifllpg. It is .ho lUtpptmstaflce tliai. uttiott rflerfiber~hip a§ 
11. fl6iitlition at ~ttrploytrt~nt is M~vnL,yJth JN\t1e tlhitmism it= 
self; hr that today it embraces over 75% of fill wtlrkers uhd~r 
c6Uecil.ve agr~ettltmis. fi~strti~~imi (jf that prit1ciple jrl States 
wh@fe no eqttWhieht st~thttltt fi·a~tleWorJr t1f tWotectioh is at= 
f6fd@a means tfost11ttt!titm of th~ right of self.:tfrgattizatioii it:. 
self. 
81 . ¥~Jghts s6 es§efttia1 tb th~ pt~sctvaHon tJf a free so-
ciety a§ the right of ~mpitly~es tt1 ttsscmble irttb tt.rtd as:: 
soolate togetlter t1tr5tigh l~btlr ot·ga11izati6rts Mtirtdt be 
iliffl.atene~ oi-- impaifi~d By b\i.fiawihg· an irt~1ispehs.ap1e con= 
coffiiiani t:lierMt sa.ve und~i· cii·~utttstattc~s of (Wertitling ancl 
ifi1p1eaiate p-qblic neeessity. . No such j~1stification . ~ither 
exlf:li§ or caii be asserted. nit be tl$s~rttR1 that p~~te¢ti~n qf 
an :alleged right to Wdrk as a fltltt-tlnith1 m~mber afrtlrds justi= 
fitJation, the answer.is1 .first, tba,t a ho.ped for jo'b is not a prop-
er~y right protected iihtlei· Uie ·Ctinstittititm, prtd, in any event; 
ttnjon ~emb.ership as a cqnditiol':l of emplofment does not de-
PflY@ _6f .a. ri~lit_ ~~ -~~!~tr .. tn .~~ ~l?s~l~t~ ~~hse ,~her~i tis_.~ere, 
membership 1s open _to ali quahflt!.d app~ic~nts; anct, secohd, 
tha\ the right to Work ~s a rtpn-tii]iori.ist is ih no _way equiva:.. 
len.b to oi· the pafa11e1 of Hie right to 1-~tirk ~s a union rttembet; 
Umi there exists iio constitutional i-ig-ht to wtWk a§ a n(jn:: · 
Ufii@ftist dh tlie otje llfina w~ile the rig·lit to t11=~itltaih employ~ 
m.ijftb tree lrom tliscdmhiaHott be~artse tlf urtion membership 
t~ ~~ns_HtuHpp~}1t__protect~c1: N._ t. ~- B .. v:._ {v17:~s ~ L?ittiJ1tli,i 
Bt@ijl Op.3 ~01 1J. g_ J; PhelfJs-l)vdye Corp,tJt~tion v. N. L. R. Jl, ~13 u. s. 177. Finaliy, t16 right to wotk as a rttlh-uttitihist 
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ctlh ~e cr~at~t1 ami pNltect~ti by- tlie st.ate where Jt~ . exercil:;~ 
lropaifs th~ ~xercise by 6t~ers df fuht~himental right~ of as-
~~~i~ti~h Jind~~~ ~he Ct>nstittiiion! _ if it ijij asserte(l .that pre-
venti~n of a Hmofitlpdlt. af hfl}tlr'~ aliegetlly created br :union-
se~i.1fity agfe~rfi~iits Mf(ortfa jiisHflcation, the answer is that 
the labor of tt biillian being i!:3 rtot an article of commei~ae with-
in ibe ustia1 13ondet,t of in6.nopoiy festricHons, and that white 
industry in a free-enterprise society- may thrive on competi-
tion between business, laUtH: ~a:ti h11i die on competition be-
tween workers. It is the necessary object of any union to 
eliminate the competitiort of non-union workers (Apez 
9" Hqsiery (J_o. v. Leµder, «=310 U .. S. 46~),,so that to outlaw. 
. tlii~ object ,vouitl be to drttlaw tlie principle of se1f-argan-
1zation itself. 
. Even if rights 6:f contract, prbtectea solely under the Jrour-
te~nth .Ame:~i_dnieiit or iii~ coiibfict claiis~, ,yere alorj.e deemed 
*fleeted by th~ enacirtierits her~ih, hevertlieless the laws must 
fall as being demonstrably arBiiraif, excessive and <itsqtimi-
natory. There is no real basis for the absolute pfoliiBiHons 
in eitper existing conditions or conflitions .reasonably to be 
feared; jrt~tifica.Hoii~ such as pr<;>tecHoµ of fight to wo.rit1 pre-
v~ntioh of ¢onepoly, pteven#<)ii ~f sti'ikes ari:d internal 
abuses by tinlons undifr closed-shop coiitfiicts, alt prove iii~ 
-adequate upon. anaiysis. The prohibitions beiri · · \VHlioui 
rational basis, they are in vi61atioti ~f the.:frou~teen~ 4-~end-
¢.~nt and~~¢ cqntract clause .. Neb~ia v. Ne'ljl .Y.Pr.k, ~9i u. S •. 
502;, Wolff _Packing ().~. v. C,,oiirt of Jilidustruil Relrt,iions, ~g~1 tr .. s. Q~2; llome Bitildini} J; Lpa.n. Co .. v. Blaisde~l, 290 tf. $. 
398. Whatever abuses may aiise ,by -Virtue of ~.tr~iorl-sectiritf 
ag·foenjents cart an~_ sh9111d be reached by regulatipii afi~ i;i,ofi 
proscription; coiisiqeriiig the nature and fiihctiori of. tlift 
mi.ion-security principle, tota1 pro,liibition thereof is entirety 
i;ncommensurate wtth any possiple public. good thereby ef-
fected a~d is therefore.an exce~_sive and arbitr~ry exercise of 
state police powe.r. )dains v. f djiner, .. 244. tJ. S .. 59tl; Weaver 
v. Palm(!~ Jfro_iher*· Compiiiiy, 270 lJ. S; 4_02; Ligjjett v., JJalJ-
rid.(je, 278 U. S. 105; Penrzsyl11a1iia tJoai Co. v:. Mahon, 26Q tf. $ .. 3~3. Iµd¢ed, total prohibition, far fr9m b~iiig iii. tli~ ptiblW 
interest, is in. fact at public expense and. s~.lely in th~ interest 
of a private few; namely· the n6rl-tiriionist~ who desir~ to ¢ii"". 
joy the bep.efits of collective hargainiiig without coniribttiit,ig 
t9 the costs thereof, and as .. such is equally te:Piighant io the. 
F1ourteentli Aniendrilerit. Treigte v. Acme it 01nestead li.sslJ-
ci~tion, 297. u .. s. i$.9. ;rt, under the circumsiances shpwn to 
exist and. tlie· jlistificatioµs. ac1vail_eed, tota\ proscription; _as 
distinguished from regulation, of tlie tiriiori-soourity pfift-
8 . S~~~m~. Uo.~r.t ~f .4-P.~Js _ ~ .~irginim 
ciple is no.t v~o.,ative ,Qf tlie .. feder~J C9.~s.titµtjQn, theI;J. no in;. 
'. . stitution, no enterprise, no act~vity is safe from legisla-
10• tive 8 abolishment u11-der a c:J}ain.of public intere.st. To: 
. ~c~o17d ~~~ .~ta~e.~ lee':7ay -~ so~ja~ exp~rim~n~ati.on. is ~ot' 
to sanction license; 1f any md1vidual freedoms are to remam; 
the Constitution must s,and :as a ~b&nier against gTatuitous 
and entirely unnecesary ·ae·structio11 ··of traditional activities. 
j 
ARGUMENT. 
I. 
The enactment herein has tlie effect of unconditionally pro:..· 
hlbiting, not ·merly re,qula.ting, the making of contracts 
or other arrarJ,g,~met?,ts.for u,1nio~. nj_erµ,b<;,r.c,hip .as ~ condi.:. 
~io~ of e1J1,ployment, 'and 'thu,s invo'lves not 'only rights of 
contract but ·also more fundamental rights protected itn-
der the first a~endm.err,.t. as a conco1n,it~n( of the right of. 
assembly. 
' As seen fi:oin the statem.~nt .of the case herein, tlle St.ate ot: 
Yirgi~ia has .completelYi outlawed, :n,ot :n;ierely regulated, the 
union-security principle~ N op.e of. the. prohibi.tions . against 
making union-:-security arrange~ents is. condition~d upon the 
desires of the ,parties ( including the individual employees)· 
affected thereby, or l~pon conditions in any particularly in-: 
dustry, including the extent to .. which employees in an in-: 
dustry are organiz~_d, or upon the manner in which the unio~ 
parcy to the contract may function internally, a~ in ;i.7egard to 
adniissions and expuisio11s Qr th_e furnishing of labor or other 
p:r;actices which may affect .. an: ~.mpl9ymen~. st8;tus under a 
union-security contract. The prohibition is at>solut~ no mat-
ter what the circumstances. · 
1i * en is clea.r, from the language of the ~nactment, tba.t 
employers cannot, with Qr wit4out. formal .. contrU;ct, as-
sent to a union's request to disch~rge non::ur;tion. employees; 
and unions cannot attempt fa;> en{or~e .rul~s requiring mem . ..: 
l;>ers to work only ·with fellow _:qi.emb~rs. For the law in ques..: 
tion not OI;J.ly proscribes ,the making and ~nforcing· Qf union_: 
secutj.ty agre~ments as sucb1 it ~Iso pJo4i1:Jits any loss of e~..: 
ployment status because of_ non-µ1e:rµber_ship in a labor organ~ 
ization. Thus, t,he on~ method-. union iµenibership .. as ~ con..: 
~.ition of e~ployme~t-thl:lt ~~soci~t~oµs of w9rkjp.gm~n~ 
wherever·forined, have from the first days of trade umon his-
tory found not only effectiv~ but indispensable for the pro-
tection Qf their organization and the consolidation of their 
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gains has been removed, and this without the substitution of 
an equivalent protection of the basic right of self-organiza-
tion. Virginia has not enacted any statutory scheme similar 
to the National Labor Relations Act, the Railway Labor Act 
or the Norris-LaGuardia Act for the protection of labor's 
fundamental rights; unions in this State must, at least in in-
trastate industries, rely now as in the past on traditional 
practices to secure theh existence. 
In order to determine whether the propibitions embodied 
under the law contravene constitutional protections, it is 
necessary first to determine the nature of the constitn-
1213 tional rights *involved and the impact of the prohibi-
tion upon these rights :1 · 
Some aspects of the importance and value of the right· of 
labor organizations, or of employees acting collectively 
through labor. organizations, to enter into mutually satisfac-
tory ag-reements with employers embodying conventional 
union-security arrangements vaiiously termed "closed 
shop," "union shop," "preferential shop" or "maintenance 
of membership' '2 are set forth in the Economic Brief which 
discloses that the union-security agreement constitutes the 
most effective, indeeq an indispensable, means of securing 
and maintaining for union organizations and their members 
''Job security and protection from employer discrimina-
tion by removal of motives to discharge or ,demote because of 
,union activity~ . · 
"Equality of barg·aining power, with consequent better- · 
ment of working conditions by insuring labor a united front 
in the contest for a fair share of the joint products of capital 
and labor. · 
'' Protection of working standards by preventing cut-throat 
wage competition by non-union employees. · 
''Equality of sacrifice -by insuring that all who enjoy union 
1An adequate presentation of this aspect of appel1ants' arguments, as well 
as of the argument that the prohibitions are arbitrary, discriminatory and 
without rational basis, requires examination of certain economic data and r& 
lated factual material of which this Court can take judicial notice, whicll, 
material has been incorporated in an Economic Brief which appellants have 
flled along with their principal brief and to which reference will be made 
when relevant. For the Court's convenience there is also attached to the 
Economic Brief as "Appendix E" an article entitled, State Legi8latio1J, Banning 
Union-Security Ag1·cenients: Tlle Due Process Issue and Judicial Bel/-
Restraint, written by Joseph P. Witherspoon, Jr., appearing in the Texas Law 
Review, Vol. XXVI, for November, 1947, No. 1, page 47. This article con-
tains additional economic material and much helpful legal analysis to which 
reference will also be made hereafter. 
2. For some standard definitions of the various types of union-security 
agreements, see Economic Brief, pp. 2-4. · 
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wages and working conditions, achieved through years of 
struggle and deprivation, share in the costs .z=of such 
13" . benefits as members of the union rather than as 'free 
. riders.' 
· "An increased measure of union responsibility for their 
obligations under collective barg·aining agreements by pro .. 
viding a means of imposing disciplinary action, and an abil-
ity effectively to police coUective barg·aining agreements to 
the end of obtainine; full compliance on the part of the em-
ployees embraced thereunder, it being· impossible to secure 
such full compliance where some employees are not union 
II!embers and thus not subject to union laws and discipline. 
"Elimination of jurisdictional strife by safe-~·uarding 
against raids and other disruptive tactics of rival labor or-
ganizations. · 
"And, finally, security and maintenance of organization 
once it has been achieved thereby promoting labor-manage~ 
ment cooperation by elimating the susp~cion and- hostility 
which often characterizes the initial stag·es of employer recog-
nition and freeing union energies and resources for construc-
tive cooperation rather than defensive sparring." 
Another. obvious right herQ involved is that of employers 
to enter into union-security agreements with lahor organiza-
tions and to employ or retain in employment such employees 
as are deemed most conducive to harmonious and productive 
relationships. That it is very often to the employer's best in-
terests to retain in his employment union members only has 
been made clear in the record. 
14° *From the facts in the instant case and the decisions 
of other. state courts construing similar laws, it is ap-
parent, therefore; that, at a minimum, rights of contract which 
have many times been held to constitute a liberty or property 
right protected directly under the Fourteenth Amendment or 
under the contract clause are here involved. But, as will be .1 
shown in the next portion of this brief, the right of associa-
tions of workingmen, through the device of the union-security 
agreement, to seek protection for the existence of their asso-
ciation, to obtain an ·equality of bargaining power, to rell).ove 
the competition of non-union labor, to enforce common rules, 
and to obtain consolidation of their gains involves a great 
deal more than the bare rig·ht to make a contract. It embodies 
the exercise of a right which all experience has demonstrated 
is a necessary and indispensable concomitant of the right of 
workers to assemble into labor organizations in the first place;-
and without which the right of association would be useless .. 
\ 
\ 
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It ·embodies the exercise of a . traditional basic principle of 
any uni<m member-that of refusing to work with employees 
not members of the association as a means of maintaining and 
improving w9rking rules common to all. 
*IL 
Stat·utes fla.tly prohibiting union membership as a condition 
of employment in any form deny fundamental rights in 
violation of the guq,rantees of the First and Fourteenth 
.1hnendments to the Constitution. 
A.. The .Right to Form Unions and -'to Carry on EssentiaJ 
Union Activites i~ an Exercise of The Right of Ass.ocia-
tion Conjointly with the Other Rights Guaranteed by the 
First Amendment. 
In the case at.har, the right to form and maintai~ a union 
is necessarily in issue when an indispensable element of that 
right-union membership as a· condition of employment-is 
proscribed. That union membership is an indispensable ele~ 
ment of the right will be demonstrated in the next portion of 
this brief. For present purposes, it is necessary to determine 
the nature and status of the riglit of workers to form and 
maintain unions. That we assert to_ be a fundamental right. 
· It is not a concept of natural justice. Cf. dissenting opinion 
of Mr. Justice Black in International Shoe. Co. v. ·Washing-
ton, 326 U. S. 310, 32_2. It is a specific exercise of the right 
of assembly, This Com-t, without specifying the precise right 
involved, has positively decided that '' the r.ight of employees 
to self-organization is a fundamental right." It is not de-
•pendent upon statutory creation, though it may be given 
statutory protection. N. L. R. B. v. Jones ~ Lo;ughlin, 301 
U. S. at 33; .A.rnal.gamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated 
Edison Co., 309 U. S. 261 at 263. · See also N. L. R·. B. v. Budd 
Manufacturing Co. (C. C. A. 6) .... Fed. (2d) .... , decided 
.August 16, 1948; Inland Steel Co. v. N. L. R. B. ( C. C. A~ 7) 
. . . . Fed. ( 2d) .... , decided September 23, 1948. 
A fundamental right is one protected by the Constitution. 
West Virginia v. Barnette; 319 U. S. 624, at 638. And the 
right in the case at bar is an exercise by workmen of the 
~ 16* 0 right to assemble and to petition for redress of griev-
ances in the field of economic interests. It is not a co-
incidence of language that the complaint of an employee 
against the denial of the fair application of job rules by the 
cemployer .is in legal and popular language a ''grievance.'' Se~ 
Elgin, Joliet <t Eastern R.R. v. Burley, 325 U.·S. 711. 
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The First Amendment to the Constitution of' the,· United! 
States guarantees the :liW1damental rights of individuals in a 
democratic society: 
'' Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting· the free exercise ·thereof; or 
abridging- the freedom of speech or of the press ; or the. right 
of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for the re~ 
dress of gTievances.',. 
By the Fourteenth Amendment, these guarantees are als0> 
barriers to any infringement by the State.. West Virginia vp 
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639. 
These rights are exercised by workmen when they organize 
themselves i_nto a union and carry on its esse~tial activities. 
It ~as b?en .a .~<!Ilg journeyi but the constitution~l gro.und for 
umon rights _1~; now firm y secured. Once this pomt was 
readied, the· eonfusions of the past were lifted. To reach it· 
required on~ the recog11ition that constitutional rights are 
exercised by people in their everyday affairs. This principle 
was given full' ·expression in Thomas v. Collins~ 323 U. S. at 
516 .. 
' ' Great secular causes, with small ones,. are guarded. The 
grievances for redress of which the right of petition was in- -
sured, and with it the dght of assembly, are not solely relig~ 
ious or political ones. And the rights of free speech and a · 
free press are not confined· to any field of human interest. 
"The idea is not sound therefore that the First Amend-
ment's safeguards are wholly inapplicable to business or eco-
nomic activity." (323 U. S. at 531.) 
There was no disagreement on this principle in the 17i01nas-
,case. Mr. · 1Tustice Jackson, who concurred, arg11ed 
17* · -'that the principle had not been consistently applied, and 
should be extended to include the employers' freedom of 
speech. The dissenting minority divided only because, in 
their judgment, a statute requiring registration of union or-
ganizel·s did not prevent freedom of speech and assembly, 
but merely required identification of those whose vocation in-
cluded speaking .. 
The safeguards of the First Amendment were applied in 
the Thomas case to a siriglc union meeting. In the Hague 
case (Hague v. G. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496), they had earlier been 
applied to protect the right to hold a series of meetings to 
organize unions. In the Thornhill and Carlsoti cases (Tliorn-
Claude F. Finney, et als., v. Harley A-.·Hawkins 13 
hill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, and Carlson v. California, 310 
U. S. 106) the Court" had agreed that "in the circumstances 
of our times'' the guarantee of free speech embraced the 
peaceful dissemination of "the facts of a labor dispute by a 
labor organization through peaceful picketing". 
\Vorking men exercise their right of assembly in a _V~!Y 
real and very practical sense when they form unions; .anq1 
participate in their affairs. A union is an assembly of .indi-' 
viduals into an association for the government of their com-
mon affairs for the improvement of their conditions and ad~ 
vancement of their welfare. It is a contiil:uing and perma-
nent assembly and conducts its affairs in an organized way; 
it is, the ref ore, usually ref erred to as an associati_on or an 
organization; but this form of social action is derived from the 
primary action of all associations and organizations, the as-
sembly or meeting of a group of individuals to promote their 
common interests. Indeed, union activities consist, pr~arily; 
of a series of mecting·s of the individual members. It, is in 
either committee meetings, local union meetings or meetings 
of the national union that common problems of employment 
are discussed and decisions made. In the meetings grievitces 
. are disposed of, subject matters of collective bargaining 'are 
determined, working agreements made by union agents ·are 
accepted, and matters of local and national policy are decided 
upon. Labor organizations, like religious organizations and 
political associations, are simply groups of *individuals 
18• gathered and assembled together for the more effectiv~ 
exercise, through joint action, of the constitutional rights 
to which each individual is entitled and may lawfully exer-
cise. 
Thus, it was that this Court, in N. L. R: B. v. Jones&; Laugh-
lin Steel Co., 301 U. S. 1, at 33, was able to say that"'the right 
of employees to self-organization is a fundamental right", and, 
more specifically, to say in Thomas v. Collins, supra: 
"Lawful public assemblies, involving no element of grave 
and immediate danger, to an interest the state is entitled to 
protect, are not instruments of harm which require previous 
identification of tho speakers. .And the right either of work-· 
1n,e1i or of itnions u,1u.ler these conditions to assemble and dis-
cuss their own aff a-irs is as fiilly protected by the Constitution 
as the right of bitsiness men, farmers, educators, p.olitical 
vartv n£embers or others to assemble (JfJ1,d discuss their affairs . 
wnd to enlist the supvort of others." (323 U. S~ at 539.) (E;m-
phasis supplie~.) 
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·And' thus it was that the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have 
bath concurred in the proposition that the right of workers 
to assemble into labor organizations is a right protected under 
th~ First Amendment. N. L. R. B. v. Bitdd Manufacturing Co., 
supra; Inl(J,IJ'l,d Steel Co. v. N. L. R. B., siipra. 
T.he true value of this right of working men to assemble 
into labor organizations for purposes of mutual aid and pro-
tection is best seen when it is realized that. under the Con-
stitution the founding fathers created a society of free men. 
As- applied to working men, this concept of freedom, as dis-
tinguished from slavery, elevates to the highest constitu-
tional level the right of working men to assembly into labor 
associations. As applied to the right of busines.s me.n to as-
semble, the concept of freedom has no such ~plications (see 
pp. 2~-26, infra). The facts· of economic. life and the condi-
tions of industry, which made recognition of this right of 
workers the indispensable prerequisite to the existence of a 
society dedicated to the ideal of "completely free *and 
19~ voluntary labor'' as opposed to slavery and involuntary 
servitude, had early been noted in the decisions. In 
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 397, the Supreme Court ob-
served· that individual employees had, as a practical matter, 
no voice in determining the terms and conditions -of their em-
ployment. '' The employer simply notifies the worker what 
wages he [is] to get and the hours he [is] to work." The 
employees, in turn, the court saw, '' are practically constrained 
to obey''. By 1921, in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City 
Central Trades & LQibor Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209, the Court 
observed: 
'' A single employee was helpless· in dealing with an em-
ployer. He was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for 
the maintenance of himself and family. If the employer re-
fused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was 
nevertheless un_able to leave the employ and to resist arbi·-
t_rary and unfair treatment.'' 
The· fact that employees acting individ}.mlly and alone are 
helpless to deal on a basis of equality with their employers 
concerning the _terms and conditions of their employment; the 
fact, that only by organizing for the purpose of collective 
bargaining can employees obtain a voice in fixing the wages 
and hours and other conditions of work; the fact that "When 
the master can compel and t11e laborers cannot escape the obli-
gatio'n to go on, there is no power below to. redress and no 
incentive above to relieve a harsh overlordship or unwhole-
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some conditions of work." (Pollock v. Williams, 322 U. S. 4, 
18), a condition characteristic of a slave, not a free, society; 
these facts dictated that no government, under the Constitu-
tion, could be deemed to have power to preclude employees 
fro1:1 ~ombinin~; in labor ?r~anizations for the ..P'!trpose -f)f 
· :achievmg equality. of bargammg power and bargammg collec-
tively with employers. 
V{ e believe, ·therefore, that the right to form and maintain 
unions is a fundamental right specifically prptected under the 
guarantee of the right of as~embly in the First * Amend-
20* ment. The question in this case is whether union mem-
bership as a condition of employment is, in the ~bsence 
-0f some equivalent statutory protection of the right of union 
organization, an essential and necessary element of that right. 
If it is, then it is indispensable to the exercise of the con-
.stitutional right to form unions. If it is, then the statutes 
.at bar are unconstitutional abridgments of that right under 
the principle, "You take my. house when you do take the 
prop that does sustain my house; you take my life when you 
do take the means whereby I live''. We propose to prove 
that it is, by experience, analysis and legal doctrine. When 
considering such proof, it should be remembered that ''In 
approaching cases, such a.s this one, in which Federal con-
stitutional rights are asserted, it is incumbent on us to in-
quire not merely whether those rights have been denied in 
express terms, but also whether they have been denied in 
substance and effect". Oyama v. Oali/ornia, 332 U. S. 633, 
636. 
B. Union Membership as a Condition of Employment Is In-
dispensable to the Exercise of the Right of Workmen to 
Assemble in Union. 
1. Proof of Indispensability by Experience and Economic · 
Necessity. 
Historical experience demonstrates that the refusal of"union 
members to work with non-members, and the consequent mak-
ing of union membership a condition of employment, were 
and are at the heart of workmen's associations.8 
Constitutional rights are not derived from abstract doc-
trines but from the concrete experience of our people. The 
Constitution protects the vital perso:µal liberties necessary 
to our form of government. Experience is the proof. of 
· sA full account of this history is presented in the Economic Brief of the 
American Federation of Labor, pp. 6-9. 
Supreme· Cwrt of Appeals of Virginia, 
necessity. If a body of Americans has peYsistently, in the 
face of the greatest obstacles, legal, social and economic-,. 
remained attached to certain practices in the exercise of 
•their freedom, then these practices may claim consti-
21 * tutional protection. We do not say that fixed habits and . 
ways of exercising rights a:re- beyond legislative· regula-
tion simply because they are ancient, but that there is in 
established practice an expression of fundamental right which,, 
though it may be regulated, cannot be destroyed or abridged. 
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, at 110. This Court 
decided there that the free distribution of religious leaflets 
was indispensable to freedom of religion because it was an 
"age-old'' religious practice. 
"The hand distribution of religious tracts. is an age-olcl 
form of missionary evangelism as old as the his_tory of print-
ing presses. It has been a potent force in various religious. 
movements down through the years. This f 01·m of evangelism 
is utilized today on. a large scale by various sects * * • . '' 
"We hold only that spreading one's religious beliefs or 
preaching the Gospel through distribution of religious litera-
ture and through personal visitations is an age-old type of 
evangelism with as high a claim to constitutional protection 
as the more orthodox types." (319 U. S. at 108, 110.) 
Cf. Hr J. Heinz Co. v. N. L. R. B., 311 U. S. 514, where this 
Court relied upon the l1istory of the collective bargaining 
process and experience under it as showing that the obtaining 
of a written, signed agreement was indispensable to bona fide 
collective bargaining. 
The refusal to work with non-union employees is '' coeval 
with trade unionism itself". Webb, Industrial Deniocrac.lJ 
(London, 1897), p. 214. Historically, unions were local clubs 
or societies of workmen who joined in an association and 
agreed to certain common rules under which the member:;; 
of the society would offer their services to employers. The 
crux of the association lay in the elimination of competition 
among its memb~rs. Formerly, unions were outside the law; 
they did not secure collective agreements from employers, 
nor were there any statutes protecting collective bargaining. 
The common rules, governing wages and *conditions 
22$ of work, were enforced through the disciplinary powers. 
of the association, and in order to make them effective 
it was obviously necessary that all wo1·kmen who could com-
pete with association members should belong to the associ-= 
ation. To secure this end, to induce_ competing workers to. 
\ 
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. join the association, and thereby to protect their society and 
to enforce its rules, it was the unfailing usage of the society 
to agree that members would not work with non-members 
and that they would notify employers accordingly.4 
We quote from our Economic Brief (pp. 7-11): 
'' The Cordwainers of Philadelphia, who set up their first 
permanent organization in 1794 and other cordwainers' so.: 
cieties at the outset adopted a rule that the employer should 
retain none but society men in his shop • ., • . By 1840 it be-
came quite common for unions to adhere to rules whereby any 
union members were prohibited from working with non-union 
workers regardless of what wages the latter might be paid.· 
This is illustrated by the following clause in the constitution. 
· of the Baltimore Typographical Society of 1842 : 'Every per-
son working at the business will be required to make appli-
cation to join thjs Society within one month from the time 
of his commencing work in any office in the city * • * on the 
refusal or neglect to comply with the regulations contained 
in the foregoing sections, or in the case of the rejection of 
the applfoation,.. • «= the members of this Society shall refuse 
to work in any office where such person 'may be· employed.' 
• (II e In addition to the printers, Dr. Stockton's thorough study 
lists the following unions which adhered to this practice be.: 
fore the Civil War: 
''Journeymen Cordwainers, Journeymen Carpenters, Cigar 
Makers, Journey Tailors, Hollow Ware Glass Blowers, 
Iron l\folders, Journeymen Hatters, Shoe Makers, Benevolent 
and Protective Association of United Operative Mule 
Spinners of *New England, Carpet Weavers, Stone ·Cut..: 
23* ters, the Potters, the Iron, Steel and Tin Workers, and 
the Longshoremen. · 
''Summing up, Dr. Stockton states: 'If the available evi_; 
dence is summed up, it may be said that practically every 
trade union formed prior to the Civil War was in favor of ex-
cluding non-members from employment.'' 
Thus, unionism in its primitive state of local associations 
of craftsmen reveals the basic elements necessary to the exer-
cise by free workers of their right to assemble into economic 
associations. The refusal to work with non-unionists is one 
of these indispensable elements. 
4See the collection of early judicial records providng the universality ot 
this usage. E. E. Witte, Ear~y American Labor Cases, 35 Yale L. J. 876; 
Nelles, Commonwealth v. Hunt, 32 Col. L. Rev . .U28; Nelles, The First Ameri-
can Labor Case,· 41 Yale L. J. 165. 
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The subsequent history of the American trade union move-
ment has elaborated upon this element but never obscured 
its essentiality. (See Economic Brief, pp. 4-19:) The first 
national unions were formed after the Civil War. B'eginning 
about 1870, according to Dr. Stockton: ''The National Unions, 
or a very large part of them, made the maintenance of the 
closed shop a national rule, and required the local organi-
zations to enforce it as effectively as possible." ( Cited in 
Economic Brief at p. 19.) 
In these early days, unions did not enjoy the benefit of 
contracts with employers. The practice was to give the em-. 
ployer notice of the union rule against working with non-
unionists. See Oornmonwealth v. Hunt, discussed infra. But 
as contracts came to be executed to avoid disputes, the em-· 
ployer recognized the union rule and agreed to hire only 
union members. See Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N. Y. 207, 76 N. E. 5. 
The older the union, the more secure was the provision in 
the contract with the employer, because the rule of common 
union membership had been already established prior to the 
agreement. Old craft ~unions which, in the course of time, 
had made union membership a part of learning the trade, 
as common as the fools of the trade or its work habits, en-
forced their rule by a '' closed shop'' contract with employers. 
This contract provision obligates the employer to hire through 
the uriion or to hire only persons who are, at the time of hir-
ing, union members. 
· *Preferential hiring is a minor variation, requiring 
24° the employer to prefer union members. Industrial 
unions were satisfied to secure a ''union-shop'' agree-
ment under which the employer is free to hire whom he 
wishes, but all employees are obliged to become membe1·s of 
the union shortly after hiring, and to remain members in 
good standing thereafter. During World War II, a new con-
tractual arrangement was devised, namely, maintenance of 
~nembership. In this arrangement, an employee is free not 
to join the 1mion, but if he does, he is to remain a member 
for the life of the collective agreement between the union and 
the employer. See Economic Brief, pp. 1-4, for an explana-
tion of the foregoing· terms.) 
In one of these four f orms--closecl shop, preferential hir-
ing, union shop, n1aintenance of membership-union- mem-
bership has becoine a condition of employment for twelve 
million workers. (See U. S. Dept. of Labor, Extent of Col-
lective Bargainin.q· an,d Union Reco.gnition, 1946~ reproduced 
in No. 34, at R. 51.) 
This number represents 75% of all workers covered by 
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union agreements. Idem. Thus, union membership ,as .a con-
dition of employment in some·form lms been a characteristic, 
.age-old element of union 1organization; it is today an integral 
part of our industrial .society.. · 
. Like the principle of self-organization itself, the principle 
of union membership as a condition of employment arose out 
of the necessities of the situation; economic factors induced, 
indeed compelled, adoption of the principle as an indis-
pensable concomitant, an integral vart of effective unioniza-
tion. A.s this Court pointed out in Pollack v. W-illiams, 322 
U. S. 4, woon a single person labors for wages and under 
conditions which he lacks adequate bargaining power to im~ 
prove, the '' resulting depression of working. conditions and 
living standards affect not only the laborer under the system, 
but every other with whom his labor comes in competition.'' 
So it is with the single non-unionist employed in a shop 
4 , 25• where the remainder of the employees •are members of 
the union. The refusal of the non-unionist to lend sup-
port . to the union's demands, to assist in maintenance of 
union conditions, to participate · in its activities, effects not 
\ alone his own working conditions but those of every union 
member in the plant. The demand of unionists that, as a 
condition to their employment the employer hire only union 
members, is not an offensive measure directed at restriction 
of the liberty of the non-unionist but rather a defensive 
measure directed at the preservation of equality of bargain-
ing power and attainment of the very objectives which the 
g·uarantee of the right to organize is intended to promote. 
A.11 history and experience teaches that the obtaining of 
union-security agreements is the only practicable means 
:available to workers for maintaining bargaining power an~ 
hence labor standards within single shops or within indus-
·: " \ '-· 
tries. · 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "in 
order to render a labor combination at all effective it must 
~liminate the competition from non-union made goods." 
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 502-504. It is for 
this and other reasons discussed herein that ''A closed shop 
is the ultimate goal of most union endeavor.'' ,Justice Jack-
son dissenting in Wallace Corp v. N. L. R. B., 323 U. S. 248, 
at 267. To deny to those employees who seek to obtain a 
voice in their industrial life tbroup;h organization the essen-
tial means of making the voice and power of their organiza-
tion effective, i. e., by requiring common union membership, 
is to deny them the right to organize itself. Compare Frank-
furter and Greene, The Labor Injunction, p. 205, where it 
is stated '' • • · • the right of combination by workers [fqr, 
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inter alia, union security] -is it~elf a corollary to ·the dogma 
of free competition, as a mean~ of equalizing the factors that 
determine bargaining power e • *.'' 
It is at precisely this point that distinciion exists between 
the protection accorded by the Fir~t Amendment's gmrran-
tee of freedom of assembly as it applies to business associa-
tions on the one hand and· to labor organizations on the-
other. The guarantee of freedom of assembly protects: 
26\l •the right of businessmen to form associations for law-
ful purposes. Bnt it does not guarantee or protect the 
right of businessmen to utilize their association for pur:.. 
poses of price fixing or 'of eliminating competition between 
business managers. Those purpoRes need not be deemed law-
ful because ·price fixing is not, itself, an objective to which 
the Cons ti tu lion lends sanction in a free enterpr_ise society. 
Business tlirives or can thrive under competition between 
businessme~f; workers cannot thdve but can only die under · 
competition between themselves. For workers. throughout ~ 
trade or i11:dustry are, as a group, en!!,'aged in competition 
with business for a fair share of the products or industry. Un-
less workingmen are free to combine and eliminate competi-
. tion among· themselves, they cannot q:ff ectively engage in 
competition with employers. The objective of our society 
that labor be free requires that workers be permitted to take 
collective action necessary to enable them to attempt to im-
prove wages, hours and working conditions. Pollack v. Wil-
liams, supra. Therefore, the objective of workers to elimi-
nate non-union competition cannot be made unlawful. On 
the other hand, no constitutional objective exists which, re-
quires that businessmen l1e permitted to combine effectively 
for the purpose of maximizing profit. Thus, the exerciso 
by workingmen of freedom of assembly,, to have real mean-
ing; must comprehend the right to eliminate wag~ competi-
tion between individual employees and to require adl1erence 
to the common rule through the device of union membership 
as a condition of employment, whereas in the case of busi-
nessmen it will not include the rig·ht to combine to eliminate 
· price competition~ 
A historical proof of Hie inseparability of uni.on-security 
agreements to effective exercise of the right to self-organi-
zation is offered by the fact that the attack ·upon unions al-
ways centers on this element. Employer resistance to unions: 
was first organized at the turn of the century and its rally-
ing cry was the "Open Shop." The "Open Shop" permits 
. the employment of non-union men who are not *bound 
27• to work at union terms and through whom the em-
ployer can defeat the objective of org.anized workers to 
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achieve equalty of bargaining power by pitting the unio~{and 
non-union wo·rkers against each other. Since the 1900s the 
attack on unionism has continued to center on this element. 
During times of national crises, in the First and Second 
World Wars, when it was necessary to secure the confidence 
of workers, and·when external danger to the Nation enforced 
a truce to domestic quarrels, the resistance to membership. 
as a common term of employment was reduced. But. after 
the First World War, employers resumed their attack upon 
the closed shop5 Today, the right of workmen's associatiQns 
to make membership a necessary and common incident of 
employment is again under attack. The. attack this time has 
taken the form of laws enacted in several States, where, it 
can. fairly be said, union members -are a minority of the civil 
population. The enactment of tl1ese laws in several States 
does not prove their validity; it proves im;;tead that the long 
uphill struggle of workmen to exercise constitutional rights 
is not at an end. 
Judicial recognition of this indispensability of the union-
security principle to the very existence of labor organiza-
tions has many times been made. The Supreme Court of 
Illinois states in Kemp v. Division 241, 255 Ill., 213, 99 N. E. 
389, at 394: 
2s• *" * * * If it is proper for workmen to organize them-
selves into such combination as labor unions; it must 
necessarily follow that it is proper for them to adopt any 
proper means to preserve that organization. * a • '' * * • To 
deny them the right to determine whether their hest interests 
required that they should be associated in their work only 
with members of their organization would imperil their very 
existence." (At 396.) · · 
And in McKay, et al. v. Union, 16 Calif. (2d) 311, 106 Pac. 
r.It is the plain and demonstrahle fact that the open shop means low wage~ 
and insecurity for workers, and the union shop high wages and security; 
there is a direct and positive correlation between the incidence of union-shop 
agreements and wage rates. The results of the great open-shop drive of the 
1920's in lowering wage rates and eliminating purchasing power, leading 
directly into tQ.e great depression of the 30's, fs a classic example. Similar 
results obtain no matter what the era (Economic Brief, p. 13, et seq.). Avail-
able studies in every field, of which the study of the relationship between 
wage rates and union-shop conditions in the coal industry and the indis-
pensability of the union shop in removing the traditional north-south wage 
differential, is the most strildng, indicates this close correlation. See Eco-
nomic Brief, pp. 21-37. Time and again it bas been demonstrated that only 
tbrough eliminating. the wage competition of the non-union workers can 
wage standards be maintained, and it is only by the use of union-security 
agreements that such elimination can, as a practical matter, be accomplished. 
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(2d) 373, at 381~ the California Supreme Court described ap-
plication of the union-shop principle as follows : 
',.• • • 'The defendants were seeking, in all they are shown 
to have done, to secure employment by the plaintiff for them .. 
selves, to the exclusion of those not ass~ciated with them, 
and .to secure that employment upon terms deemed satisfac-
tory or advantageous to them. That is the effort of every 
dealer in goods. It is the struggle of competition, and is no 
more. frowned upon where the subject of trade is labor than 
where it is a specific commodity.' * • * 
HThe interest of the defendant unions in the present con-
troversy. is direct a1id obvious. The closed union shop is an 
important means of maintaining the combined bargaining 
power of the workers. l\foreover, advantages secured 
through collective action redound to the benefit' of all em-
ployees whether they are members of the union or not, ~nd 
members may resent non-members sharing in the benefits 
without liability for the obligations. Hence a closed shop 
policy is of vital importance in maintaining not only the bar-
gaining power but also the membership of trade unions. 
The_se consiQerations serve to justify the defendants' con-
duct as much against the complaints of non-member em-
ployees as against complaint of an employer.'' 
See also cases set forth in Appendix F to Economic Brief. 
The present status of union·membership as a condition of 
employment, its ancient usage., the economic factors giving 
rise to the institution in the first place, all denote that it is 
indeed an indispensable constituent of the right of workers to 
self-organization and deserves equal protection if that right 
is fo be effective. 
29• *'2. Proof of Indispensability by .Analysis of the Nature 
of Unions a11id Analo.qy of Ditties o.f a Worker in an 
Industrial Union to Those of a Citizen in a Pol-itical 
Unit. 
An analysis of the nature of unions will confirm the fact 
of experience; that union membership must be permitted to 
be a term of employment, unless, perhaps, the collective regu-
lation of working conditions is supervised by law. It is the 
nature and function of unions to establish common rules for 
the employment of. workers in like 1employments. Vl e have 
· come to call this function ''collective bargaining," hut collec-
tive bargaining is only one phase or aspect of the relation-
ship. Historically, there was a period when unions did not 
.! 
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~ecure contracts, and the common rules were enforced aolely 
through the power of their .association. 
The need for common rules of employment is. not created 
.by unions; it is created by the nature of any economic enter-
pris-e which employs a number of individuals in a joint effort. 
The work of a number of persons must be governed by rules 
which determine the part of each individual in the joint ef-
fort. There is a government of some nature in any eco~ 
nomic enterprise. Some work rules have been fixed by the 
State, such as maximum hours, minimum wages and other 
measures of health and safety; more rules are fixed by em-
ployers ; a few by unions alone; and many by negotiation 
between unions and employers. If the union does not fix c;>r 
help fix common rules of wages., hours and other working 
eonditions, the employer will and does alone. The employer 
may wish to vary the rules in his discretion to suit his nee~ 
or advantages, but this arbitrary power of variation and dis-
'Criminatory application of the common rules affronts the 
sense of justice and spurs men into forming unions. The 
common rule and its fair and uniform application provide · 
the foundation of law and justice in the relations between 
employer and employees. Participation by unions in the 
· formulation and administration of the common rules is 
:m"" essential to democracy in economic life: 8 When th.e 
State :fixes all the rules, there is no freedom for either 
cemployers or employees; the State is then a totalitarian au-
thority excluding· any private organizations having powers 
of self-government. When the employer fixes and admini~-
ters the rules in his uncontrolled discretion, the employees 
are like subjects of an absolute monarch. · 
The individual worker, except in rare casea, does not fix 
terms of employment to suit himself. He is, almost always, 
employed under the common rules fixed by the State, the 
employer or the union. · 
Because collective bargaining involves transference from 
each individual worker to the group as a whole of the right 
to determine the wages, hours and working conditions which 
shall obtain in the particular employment, and because in 
collective bargaining the wages, hours and working concli ... 
tions which obtain apply equally to all who are employed in 
the enterprise, the rights of the individual worker under col-
lective bargaining · become· analogous to those of a citiz~n 
in a political unit. The worker becomes a member of an 
~conomic society when he takes employment. The necessity 
of viewing the problem of the individual ·workers in relation 
to union membership as a problem characteristic of the so-
ciety' of workingmen as a group rather than as a purely in-
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dividual matter was foreshadowed bv Mr. Justice ,Jackson in 
lus concurring opinion in Thomr.&S v. Collins, 323 U. Sr 516~ 
at 546. He pointed out that: 
'' The necessity for chossing collective bargaining rep re~ 
Rentatives brings the same nature of problem to groups· of 
organizi_ng workmen that our representative demo<~ratic 
processes bring to the nation. Their smaller society, too,. 
must choose betwe·en rival leaders and competing policies.'" 
It ls the society of his fellow workers in a mine, mill or 
shop, in a craft or calling. The union is the organization or · 
· government of this society, formed by. the exercise of the· 
right of associatio11. It is essential to the nature of this 
organization that it include every individual wllo· is a 
31 • •member of.·tJ;ie society which it governs. Union mem-
bership as a condition of employment is thus itself a 
common rule of employment, insuring· equality and non-dis-
crimination, as does a uniform wage rate or :fixed work day. 
It is, however, unique because it is essential to the mainte-
nance of these other rules. At least in the absence of a 
statute which protects 't.I1e common ·rule, conimon union mem-
bership is indispensable to a democratic society of workers, 
based on law and justice. ·when union men, ~dnce the days 
of their pioneer organizations, made the refusal to work with 
non-unionists a cardinal point in their philosophy, they were. 
responding to the necessities of their situation. Their right 
to free association is abridged and threatenecl with destruc-
tion when this connection with reality is outlawed. 
3. The Proof of Indispensability by Legal Doctrines. 
(a) Recognitfon of the right to self-organization precludes 
the view that labor organizations, in req'u,iring union. 11ie1nber-
ship as a condition of employment, are engaged in 1.tnlawful 
assemblies. 
Oorwmo'l1!Wealtli v. Hunt, 45 Met. (Mass.) 111, decided· in 
1842, is one of the great landmark decisions in American labor 
law. Nelles, Connnonwealth v. Hunt, sitpra. The ruling· ac..: 
quitted unions of the charge that they were an unlawful con-
spiracy. It is especially relevant here because the gist of the 
case was the legality of a union rule that members of a so-
ciety of craftsmen would not work with non-members. The 
prosecution charged" that this rule and its effect as a condition 
of employment were proof of an unlawful assembly. The de-
fendants, the indictment read, i 
I • 
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''being workmen and journeymen in the art and manual oc-
cupation of bootmakers, unlawfully, perniciously and deceit-
fully designing and intending· to continue, keep up, form and 
ti.nite themselves into an unlawful club, society and combina-
tion, and make unlawful by-laws, n-iles and orders among 
themselves, and thereby govern themselves and other work-
men in said art, and unlawfully and unjustly to extort 
32* great sums *of money -by means thereof, did unlawfully 
assemble and meet tog·ether, and beig sq assembled, did 
then and there unjustly and corruptly combine, confederate 
and agree together, that none of them should thereafter and 
none of them would, work for any master or person whatso-
ever, _in the said art, mystery or occupation, who should em-
ploy any workman or journeyman, or other person, in the said 
art, who was not a member of said club, society or combina-
tion, after notice gi.ven to discharge such workman from the 
employ of such master ; to the great damage and oppression, 
not only of their said masters employing them in said art and 
occupation, but also of divers. other workmen and journey.:. 
men * * * to the evil exam·ple of all others in like· cases offend .. 
ing, and against the peace and dignity of the Common-
. wealth." (45 Met. at p. 112-113.) 
Chief Justice Shaw characterized this charge : 
. '' Stripped then. of tl1ese introductory recitals and alleged 
injurious consequences, and of the qualifying epithets· at'.'" 
tached to the facts, the averment is this; that the defendants 
and others formed themselves into a society and agreed not 
to work for any person, who should employ any journeyman 
or· other person not a member of such society, after notice 
-given to him to discharge such workman.'' (45 Met. at p~ 
128.) 
That a union seeks to be all-inclusive is "manifest." The 
Chi~f Justice wrote: 
·, 'The manifest intent of the association is, to induce all 
those who engaged in the same occupation to become mem-
bers of it. Such a purpose is not unlawful. It .would give 
them a power which might be exerted for useful and honor"' 
able purposes, or for dangerous and pernicious ones.~' ( 45 
Met. at p. 129.) · 
It is the abuse of this power which alone may be con-
demned, not the power itself, the opinion holds. The asso~ 
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ciation and its .rule, making union membership: a condttion of 
employment, are legal on '' established principles'': . 
"• • • that every free man, whether skilled laborer, me-
chanic, farmer or domestic servant, may work or not work, 
or work or refuse to work . with any company or i»in-
33• dividual, at his own option except so far as he is bound 
by contract.'' (45 Met. at p. 133.) 
The prosecution relied heavily on the fact that the union 
had procured th~ discharge of a workman, one Horne, by his 
master, Wait. This was, the indictment charged, unlawful 
compulsion upon others. It was not, the Court held: 
"But whatever might be the force of the word 'compel,' 
unexplained by its connexion, it is disarmed and rendered 
harmless by the precise statement of the means by which such 
compulsion was to be effected. It was the agreement not to 
work for him, by which they. compelled Wait to decline em-
ploying Horne longer." ( 45 Met. at p. 133.) 
Horne, it will be noted, "had been a member; his troubles 
with the society seem to have commenced when he did extra 
work on a pair of boots .without charging for it." Nelles, 
op. cit., supra, 32 Yale L. J. at 1132. He was expelled for vio-
- lating a common rule of the society. . 
Many years later but still long before the· right of self-or-
ganization was found to have any co11stitutional sanction, 
Justice Holmes, when sitting as a member of the Supreme 
Judicial Court . of Massachusetts, found occasion to espe-
cially concur with the reasoning of Chief Justice Shaw in 
Cormnonwealth v. Hunt. In his dissent in V egelahn v. Gunt-
ner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077, 35 L. R. A. 722, 57 Am. St. 
Rep. 443 (1896), he restated the principles of the Hunt case 
as follows: 
"One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up 
is that between the effort of every man to get the most he 
can for his services, and that of society, disguised under the 
name of capital, to get his services for the least possible re-
turn. Combination. on the one side is patent. and powerful. 
Combination on the other is the necessary and desirable 
counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a fair and equal 
way•• 9 
"If it be true that workingmen may combine with a view, 
among other things, to getting as much as they can for their 
I 
' I 
( 
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labor, just as capit 1 may combine with a view to getting 
34 * the g~eatest possib e return, it must ebe tr~e that, when 
combined, they ha e the same liberty that combined 
capital has to support eir interests by argument, persua-
sion, and the bestowal r -refusal of those advantages which 
they otherwise l~wful1y ontrol. I can remember when many 
people thought that, ap rt from violence or breach .of con-
tract, strikes weire wick d, .as orga.niood refusals to work. I 
suppose that intelligent . onomist~ and legislators have··given 
up that notion today. I eel pretty confident that they equally 
will abandon the idea t at an organized refusal by working-
men of social intercour e with a man who shall enter their 
.antagonist's employ: is rong, if it is dissociated from any 
threat of violence, and i made for the sole object of prevail-
ing if possible in a conte t with their employer about the rate 
of wages. The fact, tha the immediate object of the act by · 
which the benefit to the selves is to be gained is to injure . 
their antagonist, does n t necessarily make it unlawful, any 
more than when a grea house lowers the price of certain 
goods for the purpose, a d with the effe,ct, of driving a smaller 
antagonist from the bus ness. Indeed, the que·stion seems t~ 
me to have bQen decide as· long ago as 1842 by the good 
sense of Chief Justice haw, in Co·nimonwealth v. Hunt, 4Q· 
Met. 111. ''. 
Today, when the right to self-organization is recognized to 
have constitutional sa tion', when the function of labor 
unions in making and e forcing common rules is deemed in-
dispensable to exercise f that right, when the collective ac-
tion of workers to imp ove their material conditions is no 
longer deemed constituf nally on a parity with collective ac-
tion of businessmen to x prices, the decision in Common-
wealth v. H'lt'nt could be predicated on constitutional as well 
.as common law grounds. 
, (b) The right to self-organizatio,i for purposes of collective 
bargaining necessarily incl'ltdes right to enforce CO'YM11,0t1, 
rules of employment as against individital employees. 
In modern times, the society of bootmakers involved in Oom-
monwealth v. Hunt, supra, is a shoeworkers' union, and it 
formulates the common rufos in collective bargaining 
35-* ·*with employers. As has been indicated above, it is in-
herent in the nature of collective bargaining, and a con-
dition of its success, that the common rule shall govern all in-
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dividual employments. The National Labor Relations Act,. 
while it supports this view, does not elaborate on its nature ; 
but this Court has· done so in a series. of decisions. J. I. Case 
Co. v.N.L.R.B.~321 U:.. S. 332~0rder of R.R. Telegraphers v .. 
Railway Express Agency, 321 U. S,. 343; Medo Photo Supply' 
Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 321 U.S. 678; Steele v. Lo'll,isville & Na.sh-
ville R. Go., 323 U. S. 192; Twnstall ·v. Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Engineet·s, 323 U. S. 210 ( companion to Steele case; 
Rail,,way Mail .Ass'n. v. Corsi, 326 U. S . .88; Elgin, Joliet d!; 
Eastern Ry~ Co~ v. Burley, 325 U .. S. 711, rehearing1 327 U. S .. 
661. . . 
The analysis. wb.ich we have endeavored to set out in this 
portion· of our brief is1 we think, fully recapitulated in the: 
opinion-in J. I. Case v. N. L. R. B., supra. In that case, it will 
be recalled, the Jmployer had entered into individual con-
tracts with each:-· employee. The contracts clid not forbid 
union membership, nor were'they, it was conceded, procured 
through unfair practices by the·· employer. Subsequent to 
their execution, a union won an N. L. R. B. election ancl with it 
the statutory right to act as exclusively representative of all 
employees and to bargain collectively with the employer. The 
_latter insisted that it could not make any bargain with the 
union which in any way altel'ed the individual contracts, and 
that it would bargain with the union only on matters not 
covered by these agreements. But the Court held that these 
individual contracts had no effect, once the majority of the 
employees had decided in favor of collective bargaining. It 
was not a matter of contract, the Court explained, but of cer-
tain peculiar features of common action by a group of em-
ployees: . 
'' Collective bargaining between employer and representa-
tives of a unit, usually a union, results in an accord as to terms 
which will govern hiring and work and pay in that unit. The 
result is not, however, a contract of employment except in rare-
cases ;'no one *has a job by reason of it and no obligation· 
36* to any individuals ordinarily comes into existence from 
it alone. The negotiations between union and manage-
ment result in what often has been called a trade agreement,. 
rather than in a contract of employment. Without pushing the 
analogy too far, the agreement may be likened to the tariffs 
established by a carrier, to standard provisions prescribed 
by supervising authorities for insurance policies, or to utility 
schedules of rates. and rules for· service, which do not of them-
selves ·establish any relationships but which do govern the· 
terms of the shipp~r or insurer or customer relationship when-
Claude F. Finney, et als., v. Harley A. Hawkins 29 
ever and with whomever it may be established. Indeed~ in 
some European countries, contrary to American practice, the 
terms of a collectively negotiated trade agre-ement are sub-
mitted to a government department and if approved become 
a governmental regulation ruling employment in the unit. 
'' After the collective trade agreement is made, the indi-
viduals who shall benefit by it are identified by individual 
hirings. The employer, except as restricted by the collective 
agreement itself and except that he must engage in no unfa~r 
labor practice or discrimination,° is free to select those he will 
employ or discharge. But the terms of the employment al.ready 
have been traded out. There is little left to individual agree-
ment except the act of hiring. 
'' * c, * An employee becomes entitled by virtue of the-
Labor Relations Act somewhat as a third party beneficiary 
to all -benefits of the collective trade agreement even if on 
his own he would yield to less favorable terms. The indi-
vidual hiring contract is subsidiary to the terms of the trade 
agreement, and may not waive any of its benefits, any more 
than a shipper can contract away the benefits of filed tariffs, 
the insurer the benefits of standard provisions, or the ¢ility 
.customer the benefit of legally established rates.'' . ( 321 U. S., 
at 334-336.) 
The Court then went on to explain that there are situa- · 
tions in which individual contracts are operative and gives 
ta:as examples ·situations where there is no collective bar-
37• g-aining ag·reement. But once the void is filled, the in-
dividual contracts lose their force. 
"Individual contracts, no matter what the circumstanc~s 
that justify their execution or what their terms, may not be 
availed of to defeat or delay the procedures prescribed by 
the Nat~onal Labor Relations Act looking: to collective bar-
gaining, nor to exclude the contracting employee from a duiy 
ascertained bargaining unit, nor may they be used to forestaU 
bargaining or to limit or condition the terms of the collective 
agreement. The Board asserts a public right vested in 1t as 
a public body, charged in the .public inte1·est with the duty 
of preventing unfair labor practices .... Wherever private 
contracts conflict with its function, they obviously must ·yield 
or the Act would be reduced to a futility*«-•. ·· 
"It is equally clear since the collective trade agreement 
aUnion membership is not discrimination but a common uniform term 
like rates. · 
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is to serve the purpose contemplated by the Act, the in~ 
dividual contract cannqt be effective as a waiver of any benefit 
to which the employees otherwise would be entitled under the 
trade agreement. The very purpose of providing by statute 
for the collective agreement is to supersede the terms of 
separate agreements of employees with terms which reflect 
the strength and bargaining power and serve the welfare 
of the group. Its benefits and advantages are open to every 
employee of the represented unit, whatever the type or terms_ 
of his pre-existing contract of employment. 
"But it is urged that some employees may lose by the 
collective agreement, that an individual workman may some-
times have, or be capable of getting, better terms than those 
obtainable by the g1·oup and that his freedom of contract 
must be respected on tl1at account. We are not called upon to 
say that under no circumstances can an: individual enforce 
an agreement more advantageous than collective agreement, 
but we find the mere possibility that such agreements might 
be made no ground for holding that individual contracts may 
survive or surmount collective ones. The practice and philoso-
phy of collective bargaining looks with suspicion _on such 
· individual advantages. Of course, where *there is great 
388 variation in circumstances of employment or capacity of 
employees, H is possible for the collective bargain to 
prescribe only minimum rates or maximum hours and ex-
pressly leave certain areas open to individual bargaining. But 
except as so provided, advantages to individuals may prove 
as disruptive of industrial peace as disadvantages. They are 
a fruitful way of interfering with organization and choice 
of representatives; increased compensation, if individually 
deserved, is often earned at the cost of breaking down some 
other standard thought to be for the welfare of the group, 
and always creates the suspicion of being paid at the long-
range expense of the group as ·a whole (t e • • The workman 
is free, if he values his own bargaining portion more than 
that of the group, to vote against representation; but the 
majority rules, and if it collectivizes the employment bargain, 
individual advantages or favors will generally in practice 
go in as a contribution to th~ collective result. We cannot 
except individual contracts generally from the operation of 
collective ones because some may be more individually advan-
tageous. Individual contracts cannot subtract from collec-
tives ones • • • . We know of nothing to prevent the em-
ployee's, because he is an employee, m~king any contract 
provided it is not inconsistent with a collective agreement 
.. • • . · But in so· doing, the employer may. not incidentally 
Claude F. ·Finney, et als., v. Harley A. Hawkins SL 
exact or obtain any diminution of his own obligl!,tion. or any. 
iiucrease of those of employees in the .matters covered by the 
icollective agreement." {321 U. S., at 337-'339.) 
In the cas·e of Order -0f R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Ex-
press Agency, supra, the individual contracts were made after 
a collective agreement had been reached. The employer,in 
this case, notified certain of its employees of a new wage rate . 
llnd requested their consent to it. They gave it under pro-
test, but their union brought action under the Railway Labor 
Act to set aside these individual contracts and the Court held 
them invalid, even assu~ing, it said, that they were voluntarily 
1reache.d: 
'' The Company contends that special voluntary individual 
wage contracts as to rates of pay, rules and •conditions 
39• of employment may validly be made, notwithstanding 
the existence of a collective agreement, and that the 
terms of the individual agreements supersede those of the 
eollectively bargained one. If this were true, statutes requir-
ing collective ·bargaining would have little substance, for what 
was made collectively could be promptly unmade individually. 
·«< * ,:.,, Collective bargaining was not defined by the statute 
1,0hich provided for it, bitt it has generalJy been. consider el 
to absorb and give statutory approval to the philosophy of 
ibarga-ining as worked out in the labor movement in the United 
Btates. Froni the first the position of labor: with. reference 
to the 'Wage structure of an industry has been much like that of 
t(Jarriers about rate structures.n (321 U. S., at 346.) (Em-; 
phasis supplied.) 
The decision in Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. U. L. R. B., 
:supra, reached the same result .·under the National· Labor 
Relations Act. · 
The doctrine of ·these decisions is that the union establishes, 
through collective bargaining, the common rules which govern 
'°'ll employees in a given unit. These c.ommon rules prevail 
over any individual agreements. In Elgin,-J oliet and Eastern 
R. R. v. Burley, su,pra, the Court. held that though individual 
employees each secure vested rights under the common rules,. 
the union sees to their uniform administration and interpreta-
tion. The majority in that case held that individual members 
,could choose their own representative in prosecuting an '' ac-
crued monetary claim"; the minority held that the union was 
the exclusive representative for this purpose. But this Court 
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unanimously agreed that there must be a uniform application 
of the common r~es. The majority said: 
"' To leave settlements ultimately to the several choices of 
the members, each according to his own desire without regard 
to the effect upon the collective interest, would mean that each 
affected worker would have the right to choose his own terms 
and to determine the meap.ing and effect of the collective-
agreement •for himself. Necessarily, the carrier would 
40* be free to join with him in doing so and thns to bargain 
with each employee for whatever terms its economic-· 
power-, ·pitted against his own might induce him to accept. 
The result would be to make the agreement effective, not to all 
alike, but. according to. whatever varied interpretations in-
(lividual workers, Jrom equally varied motivations, might be 
willingr to 'ac.ce;llt To give the collective agent power to 
make the agt~e"fuent, but exclude it from any voice whatever 
in its interpfoita~ion would go far toward destroying its uni-
form applicati'4i." ( 325 U. S., at 737, n. 35.) 
The minority was emphatic : 
"To permit any member of the union to pursue I1is own 
interest under a collective agreement undermines the very 
conception of a collective agreement." (325 U.S., at 758.) 
·· The common rule of collective bargaining carries with it 
the legal doctrine that the union is the common authority 
or government of a society of workers. It has the powers: 
and responsibilities of a government. It must treat all mem-
bers of the soci~ty it governs as if they were members and 
deal with them fairly under common rules. 
That is the decision of this Court in Steele· v. Louisville 
and .Nashville R. Co.r supra. In this case, the union was the 
statutory bargaining- agent of a craft or class under the Rail-
way Labor Act. Negroes were members of the. class, though 
they were denied membership in the union. The union en-
tered into agreements with several carriers assigning jobs 
to white workers 'by depriving Negroes of their seniority 
1·ights secured by prior collective agreements. The State 
court bad held that the union was free to make any bargain,. 
but said this Court~ 
"We think that the Railway Labor Act imposes upon the 
statutory representative of a craft at least as exacting a duty 
to protect equally the interests of the members of the craft 
as the Constitution imposes upon a legislature to give equal 
I 
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protection to the interests of those for whom it legislates~ • • 0 
Congress has seen >!tfit to clothe the bargaining repre-
41 • sentative with powers comparable to those possessed by 
a legislative body both to· create .and restrict the rig];i.ts 
of those whom it represents, see J.1. Case Co. v. Labor Board, 
supra, but it has also imposed on the representative a cor-
responding duty e $ 0 to exercise fairly the power conferred 
upon it * <>' 0 • ·wherever necessary, to that end, the union 
is required to consider requests of non-union members of 
. the craft and expressions of their views with respect ~o col-
lective bargaining with the employer and to give them notice 
of and opportunity for hearing upon its proposed action.'' 
. (323 U. S., at 202-204.) 
Whether an individual is a member or not, he is bound 
by the. common rules, but the union owes him the duty of 
fair and equal treatment. It must, this Court said in the 
Steele case, afford him the opportunity to participate .in 
the· formulation of the common rules. It follows that mem-
bership is a right as well as a duty. That is the legal doc-
trine of the Ra#wa.y Ma.il Ass'n. v. Corsi~ s1.6pra, upholding 
the legality of a state statute prohibiting a union, not froll\: 
requiring membership, but from denying it on account of 
race, color or creed: 
"To deny a fell ow employee membership because of race, 
color, or creed, may operate to prevent that employee from 
having any part in the determination of labor policies to be 
promoted in the industry and deprive him of all means of 
protection from unfair treatment arising out of the fact that 
the terms imposed by a dominant union apply to all employees, 
whether union members or not." (326 U. S., at 94.) 
We can summarize the nature of union membership as 
a common condition of employment irt. an industrial society 
by again comparing it to citizenship in a political. society .. 
Both are compulsory upon individuals. In each case the· 
compulsion is justified because it is assented to by most of 
the members. Cf. West Virginia State Board of Education 
v. Barnette, 319 U. S., at p. 641. And it has been found by 
human experience to be indispensable to the preservation 
*of any society. The liberty of the individual is not 
42• the right to license, but participation in a social organi-
zation founded upon equality, justice and law. The union 
is that organization for employees. .It is the product of the 
exercise of their right of assembly, and it is essential to. the 
exercise of their right, to secure ~quality of bargaining powe:r; 
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with employers, that membership in the union be a common 
. condition for all who are in fact members of the group gov-
ernecl by the union. . To deny labor organizations the right 
to require adherence tq the common rule and to require par-
ticipation in the making of such common rules through the 
device of the union-security agreement whereunder union 
membership is made a condition of employment is to ignore 
the nature of our industrial society, to disregard the philoso-
phy of the J. I. Case Co. case, supra, and the related decisions 
of this Court discussed above, and to destroy the very foun-
dation of modern unionism. · 
It will be argued that the comparison of t.nion~ to gov-
ernment hangs upon statutes which empower the majority 
union to be the exclusive representative of all the employees 
in a unit. Thus it will be pointed out that the decision in 
J. I .. (Jase Co. v. N. L. R. B. rested upon the National Labor 
Relations Act; and the Steele case upon the Railway Labor 
Act. But these statutes did not create the rig·ht of workers 
to self-organization for purposes of collective bargaining. 
They merely gave it statutory protection. N. L. R. B. v. 
Jones <t Laughlin Steel Conipany, supra; .Amalgamated, 
Utility Emvloyees v. Consolida.t,ul Edison Co., S'ltpra. Order 
of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Expre.c:s Agency, .rmpra. 
The incidents of the right are precisely the same whether 
-it is being protected against governmental or against pri-
vate interference. N. L. R. B. v. Budd Ma-nufactu,ring Co., 
supra; Inland Steel Co. v. N. L. R. B., s11pra. 
It will be further argued that the statutes which protect 
the right to self-organization do not make union fbmem-
43il: bership a condition of employment; that, on the con-
trary; this condition was permissive only under the old 
National Labor Relations Act; it is restricted nnder the 
amended National Labor Relations Act, and it has been pro-
hibited altogether under the Railway Labor Act. One an-
swer to this argument, which was made by the State Courts, 
is that the statutory scheme protecting the right of organiza-
, tion and granting exclusive representation to the majority 
union established in these Acts affords at least a near equiva-
lent of union membership as a condition of employment. 
Under the doctrine of J. I. Case. Co. every term and condi-
tion of employment is governed by the common ntles. Un-
der the doctrine of the Rteele case., each employee mus.t be 
given an opportunity to participate in the making of the 
rules. These conditions are the essence of union membership 
as a. condition of employment. · 
We are not called upon here to weigh the exact equiva-
lence o:f a statutory scheme and e.xercise of consti.tutional 
'-._ . 
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rights unaided by statute. Even when the collective agree-
ment is legally enforceable as in New York State, the en .. 
lforcement of the common rules depends upon the power of 
union discipl~ne. During the depreRsion years, wage stand .. 
ards of plumbers in New York City were being under-cut by 
certain union journeymen. Several enforcement measures 
were tried in vain; the union's disciplinary powers proved 
to be the only effective means of enforcement. O'Keefe v. 
Local 463, 277 N. Y. 300, 14 N. E. (2d) 77. 
The original National Labor Relations Act left union mem: 
bership permissive, as it did the making of other terms, and 
eonditions of employment. Under that Act, union member-
ship became a condition of employment in the course of col-
lective bargaining protected by the Act. The amended Act 
~t least permits a restricted form of union membership as 
a condition of employment. The Railway Labor Act 
44 ~, ""'prohibits an employer· from making any change in any 
existing condition of employment without negotiation 
with the exclusive representative of the employees involved. 
It contains a more comprehensive system for the protection 
:and regulation of common rules than it is .to be found in 
either tlrn old or new National Labor Relations Act. Hence, 
its prohibition of union membership as a conditfon of em-
ployment was accepted by unions in return for its stringent 
protection of their organizations and common rules. 7 The 
State statutes before this Court offer no such protection; 
they flatly p1·ohibit any form of union membership as a con-
dition of employment; and in none of these states is there 
.any statutory protection for union organization or common 
rules of employment. 
These statutes are defended as independent exercises of 
the powers reserved to the States to deal with labor re}a .. 
tions. Their only oonnection with federal law is that in .so 
far as they may regulate labor relations affecting interstat.e· 
commerce, the amended National Labor Relations Act by 
Section 14 (B) interposes no bar to the exercise of independ .. 
ent state regulation. Moreover, statutes regulate purely local 
labor relations to which tbe rig·ht of self-organization is just 
as fundamental and as well promoted by the First and Four"': 
teenth Amendments as in the case of labor employment in 
interstate COllllllerce. 
These statutes, therefore, stand on their own; within their 
respective states they are the only statutory regulation of 
the right of workmen to self-organization. It ~annot be de-
TThat even this protection has not proved a real substitute for the union· 
:security principle ls shown in Economic Brief, pp. 1>6-80. 
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nied that these statutes trench upon a vital element of 
45'"' "union organizations. Union membership as a condi-
tion of employment is proved by experience, by th~ 
nature of employment, by legal doctrine, to be essential to 
unions. A statute which flatly prohibits this element seri-
ously and adversely affects the exercise of the right to self-
organization. It eliminateR (absent protections afforded by 
such enactments as the Railway Labor Act) the only known 
means for enforcing the common rule:, inherent in any asso-
ciation of workers. It destroys the power of employees to 
achieve, by collective action, equa~ity of bargaining power 
with employers. It can be justified only by the existence of 
a clear and pres-ent danger to the public welfare, and -not by 
attempting to recognize or create and protect an alleged 
rig·ht to work as_ · a non-unionist, or by claiming· to ,prevent. 
alleged ''monopolies'' in labor said to arise from union-shop 
agreements. The inadequacy of the union-security justi-
fications for the outlawing· of the union-security principle 
will be discussed in the next portion of this brief. 
C. The Statute Prohibiting Union Membership as a Condi-
tion of Employment in Any Form Cannot be Justified 
as a Protection of an Alleged "Right to W rirk" or as a 
Means of Pr<wentin,q an Alleged "Monopoly of Labor'" 
or on Other G'Founds. 
This law, it is said in its support, re8fores equality be-
tween union and non-union worke1·s. An individual has a 
right not to join a union equal to his right to join. If it is 
constitutipnal to prohibit an employer from making non-
membership a condition of employment, it is equally con-
stitutional to forbid making membership a condition of em..:. 
ployment. In any event, the right to work is a proper sub-
ject of state protectio~. Proponents of this enactment rely 
heavily on the foregoing reasoning. It is necessai·y to de-
termine whether these arguments are. sound and what are 
their implications .. 
46• i»l. The Enact'l11,ent Here Involved· Does Not Protect or 
Create a, "Right to ·work', in the .Abstract; Union-Shop 
.Agreements Do Not Deny the Right to 1York in Any 
Absoliite Sense. 
· The enactment outlaws union-security agreements under 
the guise of aocording protection to the '' rig-ht to work.'' 
But, of course, the enactment neither protects nor creates 
any such right. The Constituti~n, which does not even pur-
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port to regulate the conduct of private individuals, imposes 
no duty upon any private employer to give employment to 
anyone. Certainly, absent contract, no man has a "1·ighl; to 
work'' for a.ny specific employer, or at any specific job. .As 
~tated by Justice Brandeis in 8enn v. Tile Layers Protective 
Union, 301 U.S. 468, at p. 482, "A hoped for job is not prop-
erty guaranteed by the Constitution, and the diversion of it 
to a competitor is not an invasion of a constitutional right." 
Nor has it yet been held that the States are, by the Consti-
tution, required to provide employment opportunities for 
all who are willing and desire to work. No such rights are 
created by the enactment in question. The law does not re-
quire any person to employ anyone. No employee is g11aran .. 
teed any job, much less any specific job. Nor is the law con-
cerned with . expansion of employment opportunities f o:r 
workers as a group, or for workers· possessing any particu-
lar skills. This law does not undertake to deal with any 
practices by either employers or by labor organizations 
which· restrict the number of employees in industry. It ap-
plies despite the fact that the same number of *jobs 
47• are and will be available to qualified applicants nnder 
this law, as were available prior to its enactment. 
The statute may well be applied to situations where the 
contractual condition that each employee shall be a union 
member is a rule agreed to by the workers involved; where 
no one has been "'forced'' to joiri a union as a condition of 
employment. 8 
There can be no pretense that the enactment is directed 
at the l1ypothetical situations in which qualified and willing 
applicants are denied the opportunity to become union mem-
bers by virtue of arbitrary or unreasonable membership 
qu~li:fications or excessive initiation fees. For the law ap-
plies regardless whether membership in the union is open to 
all applicants. on reasonable terms or not.0 
Since opportunity to . accept or continue employment in 
enterprises covered by closed-shop contracts is denied 
4g• only to those who voluntarily choose to refuse to . join 
the union, it cannot be said. that these contracts impinge 
upop. the right to work in any absolute sense. Where the en-
su ls extremely interesting to note with respect to the oft repeated C()D-
tention that, under union-security agreements, workers are forced to join 
unions, that experience in the holding of union-shop elections under Section 
9(e) of the Taft-Hartley Act shows that workers voted for a union-shop agree-
ment in 97% of an elections and by a 93.5o/o majority. See Monthly Statistical 
Summary, National Labor Relations Board, August, 1947-September, 1948, in-
clusive. 
owe are, therefore, not concerned in this case with statutes which, by 
regulating union admission ·or expulsion ruies and practices, seek to pro-
tect the right of employees to join labor organizations. 
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joyment of rights is conditioned upon compliance with rea-
s~:mable conditions, individuals who voluntarily refuse to 
comply with such conditions are not being deprived of those 
rights. National Maritime Union v. Herzog, 334 U. S. 854. 
A ·situation parallel to that existing under closed-shop con-
tracts is that which exists in States which have adopted the 
system of an integrated bar, under which membership is a 
cond~tion to employment as attorneys. In rejecting the con-
tention that to condition the right t.o practice law upon mem-
bership in the integrated bar is to deny the right to practice 
law itself, the SupremQ Court of vVisc.onsin stated: 
" • * • assuming that failure to pay dues as prescribed 
by the order operates to suspend an attorney's membership 
in the association, his delinquencr is the cause of his suspen-
sion. He may comply with the order and continue his prac-
tice of the law at any time he chooses. Membership in most 
associations is made dependent · upon compliance with the 
conditions of membership which usually include the payment 
of a small fee • '"' :» No lawyer will be or can be suspended 
except as a consequence of his own delinquency.'' (Inte,gra-: 
tion of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 11 N. '\V. (2d) 604 at 620, 151 
A. ·L. R. 586.) · 
A United States Industrial Commission recog·nized many 
yeara ago that a similar pi·inciple is applicable with respect 
to closed-shop agreements. It said: · 
"If the union is willing· to reeeiye any competent person 
into its ranks, no man can complain of being absolutely de-: 
prived of work because union men refuse to work with him 
so long. as he fails to join the organization." (Final Re-
port of the Industrial Commission (1902), Vol. XIX, p. 817, 
H. Dock, No. 380, 57 Cong. 1st Sess. (1901-02).) 
What the State has done in this case is to decree that the 
condition imposed upQn employment in particular *en-
49• terprises by closed-shop contracts, i. e., union member-
. ship; is per se unreasonable. But to so single out one 
condition and condemn it as unreasonable is not to protect 
the opportunity to secure employment or the right to work 
as such. The State's declaration of· "unreasonableness'' 
must, therefore, turn on_ an appraisal of the interests af-
fected by the presence of the condition and by it~ abolition, 
and it is in the light of these considerations that the validity 
of the enactments must be judged. 
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2. The Right to Refuse to Join a Union is Not the Constitu-
tional Parallel of the Right to Join Labor Organi~ . 
zations. · 
Si}!ce, as we have indicated above, the objective of these 
amendments cannot l)e to protect the "right to work" as 
such, or in the abstract; it mu.st be to protect an alleged· right 
of employees to refuse· to become or remain members of. 
labor organizations. The state· courts upholding similar laws. 
l1ave in effect conceded in their opinions that the objective of_ 
the enactments is to protect what they and the· sponsors of. 
the enactments conceive to be the right of employees Jo re-
fuse to join a union-the right to work as a non-unionist with 
no obligation to adhere to the common rule of· his fellow 
workers.10 And, in seeking support for state authority fo 
so protect that alleged right, the courts, as do political spon ... 
sors of anti-closed shop legislation, purported to find analogy, 
in legislation which, to protect the. right to join labor organi-. 
zations, prohibit employers from cliscriminatorily denying 
employmen,t to union members. Thus the Supreme Court of· 
North Carolina stated in its opinion: 
50.:. *"If the State may say to the employer, ~you cannot 
deny work to anyone because of his membership in a 
union,' we-think it follows a fortiori that the state may say 
to the parties 'you cannot deny work to anyone because he 
is not a member of a union.' " (State v. Whitaker, 228 No-. 
Car. 352; 45 S. E. (2d) 860.) 
. . 
Only verbal parallelism between the ''right to join .a labor 
organization'' and the '' right not to joj_n'' lends color to the 
contention that constitutional sanction extends impartially 
to both and that the state may the ref ore protect the one as 
it may protect the other. But to rest content with a delusive 
verbal parallelism., as did the ·other state courts, amounts. 
to abnegation of the judicial function. '' Such oversimplifi-
cation, so handy in political debate" here as in West Vir-
ginia Board of Edit.cation v. Barnette, 319 U. S .. 624, 636; 
101t should be noted, parenthetically and apropos the bona ftdes of a claim 
that a right to work as a non-unionist is the primary object of the legislation, 
that the anti-closed shop laws make no distinction between ·types of union-
. security agreements, but include, under the broad prohibition, all provisions 
requf ring memtiership in the union as a -condition of employment. Thus, there 
are included maintenance-of-membership agreements under which employees 
have from fifteen to thirty days to decide whether they wish to become union· 
member$, and those who decide not to join may continue to work as non-
unionists for the remainder of the term. 
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''lacks the precision necessary to postulates of judicial rea-
soning.'' · 
As Judge Charles E. Wyzanski, rJr., pointed out in his ar-
ticle "The Open Window aM the Open Door,17 35 Calif. L. 
Rev. 336, 350: 
.· 
. '' The issue of the 'open shop' turns on the rig·ht of men 
in particula:r-employments not to join an organization. De-
spite verbal similarities, 'the right not to join' is not the 
precise pra~tical converse of 'the right to join.' And the 
history and implication as well as the values of the two as-
serted rights -are best considered separately.'' 
Only in .the light of the reasons for and the scope of the 
right to join labor organizations can there be meaningful dis-
cussion of the so-called right of. employees ,in a particular em-
ployment not to join the labor organization to which their 
so~workers a'dhere. As we have seen in the cliscussiori earlier, 
the existence of the constitutional right to form and join labor 
organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining is at-
. tributable, in_ large part, to the necessity of permitting work-
ingmen to achieve equality of barg·aining power with 
51e employ_ers and to participate •effectively in determin-
ing the common conditions under which they work. The 
purpose of the guarantee of the right to join labor organiza-
tions is served by the exercise of the right-its. purpose is 
not served by the failure to exercise it. Just as a man cannot 
be said to exercising a corollary of the right not to be com-
pelled to give self-incriminating testimony by voluntarily tes-
tifying against himself, so a man cannot be said to be exer-
cnsing a corollary of the right to join labor orga11izations by 
refusing to join. 
If refusal by employees to join a labor _organization had 
no effect upon the effective exercise by others of their con-
stitutional right to join and maintain labor organizations, 
it might be said that the right to refuse to join, though not 
a corollary of the right to join, finds constitutional sanction 
in general considerations Qf freedom of choice which are not 
without independent value in our society. But it goes with-
out saying that ou1· Constitution does not guarantee any in-
dividual liberty which in practice results in frustration of 
the constitutional rights of others. We have seen that re-
fusal by some employees to join a unioµ deprives others of 
their opportunity to achieve equality of bargaining power 
with employers and thus frustrates the exercise by them of 
their constitutional right to form labor organizations. To 
hold that nevertheless these employees have a constitutional 
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right to refuse to join a labor organization, a right which 
the States may protect against the otherwise lawful conduct 
of union members and employers aimed at inducing them to 
join, is to hold that the Constitution, which guarantees the 
right to effective self-organization as an antidote to slavery, 
subverts that guarantee in the name of the individual work-
er's liberty. 
Of course, if the union membership or non-membership 
of other employees were, like the fact of their race or re..: 
ligion, a facto·r irrelevant to the legitimate interests of the 
union members, it could be ; said that the aetion of union 
members in conditioning their services upon agreement by 
the employer to hire only union members not only need 
52* *not be sanctioned bv· tl1e State but cannot consfitu-
tionally be supported by the exercise of state authority. 
The fact is, l1owever, as we have seen, that the union mem-. 
bership of each person hired is of the most vital concern to 
the legitimate interests of the labor organization of which 
employees are members. Each non-unionist hired is a threat 
to the effectiveness of the organization in dealing collectively 
with the employer; the presence of even one non-unionist in 
a shop reflects itself directly in loss of union power to better 
and maintain wages, hours and working conditions-:-the com ... 
mon rules of employment. 
Nor, from the point of view of the employer, is the agree-
.ment to employ only union members irrelevant to legitimate 
business purposes. In the first place, since employees clearly 
. have a constitutional rigllt to refuse to work with others 
who· are not members of their union, the employer's agree-
ment to hire only union men may be indispensable to tp.c 
securing of an adequate work force. In the second place, 
since employees clearly have a constitutional rig·ht to pur-
chase goods only from tbo8e employers who hire union mem-
bers exclusively, and may exercise that right through the 
union label device, the employer's agreement to hire only 
union members may be necessary to secure an expanded 
market for bis products. Finally, because of the standard 
of competence insisted upon as conditions of membership 
by many labor organizations, employers may desire to enter 
into such agreements as a means of assuring that only com-
petent workers will be employed. , 
On the other hand, the employer who makes union non-
membership a condition of employment, as this Court said 
in the Jones db Lattghlin case., sitpra., is not only interfering 
with the fundamental right of his employees to self-organi-
zation but also is protecting no legitimate interest of hi~ 
own. It is not a part of his right to prevent his employees 
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from achieving equality of bargaining power with him; it 
.is rather an abuse of his power and a denial of the em-
ployee's rig·hts. 
*The "right" to refuse to join a union stands, at best, 
53• on no higher constitutional plane than the "right" of 
workers to bargain individually with their employers. 
Yet that "right", ·as we have seen (see pp. 35-45, su,pra), 
may be extinguished by government as an incident to the pro-
tection of the basic constitutional right of employees to bar-
gain collectively. It is obvious, of course, that decisions like 
that in J. I. Case, Medo and Order of Railroad Telegraphers 
could not have been made if the right of the individual to 
bargain the terms of his employment were deemed consti-
tutionally on a parity with the right of the employees· as a 
group to bargain collectively and bind by -their agreement all 
employees of the employer, including individuals who have 
not authorized the union to negotiate for them. To be com-
pelled to choose between working on terms negotiated by 
another whom the employee· has not designated as his repre-
sentative, or not working in the plant at all, is certainly as 
great a deprivation of freedom as is the compulsion to choose 
between joining the union and not working at the plant, which 
is the ·choice available to employees under closed-shop con-
tracts. · 
3. The State Cannot Create a Right Not to Join a Union Where 
Protection of Bitch Right Involves Denial to Labor 
Organizations of the Right to Insist on Union 
Membership as a Condition of 
Employment 
The analogy between the right to bargain individually and 
the right to work as a non-unionist, and the fundamental 
difference between a right to work as a unionist and the right 
to work as a non-unionist, discussed above, likewise affords 
the answer to the possible claim of the State, that although 
the right to. work as a non-unionist may not have ·a constitu-
tional status, nevertheless it is within state power to create 
such a right and to protect it against infringement. Such 
an argument would mean that those employees who value 
their own bargaining position ""more than that of the 
54• group as a whole could be empowered by law to destroy 
the effective exercise by the entire group of their con-
stitutional right to organize for purposes of collective bargain-
ing. '' The effect is not merely one of minority protection. 
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It is also one of majority prohibition.'' United States of. 
America v. Con,qress of Industrial Organizations, 335 U.·.S. 
106, Mr. Justice Rutledge concurring. See also -DeMille v. 
American Federation of Radio Artists, 187 Pac. (2d) 769 
(Calif. Appeals, 1947), aff'd. 31 Cal. (~d) 137, cert. denied, 
333 U.S. 876; Bowe v. Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 69 N. E. 
(2d) 115. · 
The crux of the matter is that the constitutional right to 
self-organization is premised upon the necessity of unani-. 
mous group action-adherence to the common rule-by work-
ers in negotiating and bargaining with employers concetn-
ing the terms of their employment as the alternative to virtual 
slavery in our society. The implications of that right can~ 
not be understood if the workers in a single shop or industry· 
are viewed solely as individuals, and n-ot as members of ·the 
entire group. In determining whether to join and be repre-
sented by a labor organization, the group must choose whether 
to become organized society whose voice shall be heard through. 
a single representative speaking for all, a society in which. 
all must parti_cipate to obtain the benefits of unified dealing 
with the employer and in which a measure of individual 
liberty must be sacrificed for the welfare of the society, ·or 
whether as among them anarchy shall continue to exist. Once· 
again we revert to the close analogy between the duties of 
workers in an industrial society ~nd the duties of citizens in 
a political society in support of the contention we are here 
advancing. The analogy to the formation of civil govern-
ment by the consent of the participants, but over the objection 
of the dissenters who may escape participation in the society 
only at the price of leaving the territorial jurisdiction of its 
government, is directly applicable.. In the absence of statu-
tory protection of the common rules of the union organi- · 
55• zation,- *the legal power .of an individual not to join a 
union gives the individual the power to destroy the so-
ciety to which he in fact belongs. 
In its opinion, the Nebraska Court said its state statute 
made each individual 
" • .. * free 'to associate with his fellows' in a union en-
tirely upon its merits, or 'to decline to associate with his 
fellows' without imperiling his right either to obtain em-
ployment or to continue therein after having obtained it." 
(Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron ct Metal 
Co., et al., 145 Neb. 507, 31 N. W. (2d) 477.), 
In this dictum, ordinary words reveal one real meaning of· 
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legal terms. An individual employee, by t.aking and holding 
employment, joins a society of his fellow-workers . .He is not, 
by the nature of his relationship, "free to associate or dis-
associate with his fellows." He is, inevitably, inherently a 
fellow of their society. The statutes at bar purport to free 
him of the common rules, of their fair and equal application,. 
in order to protect his individual liberty. But liberty is not 
the right to be free of an organized society. The United States 
Supreme Court has said: 
" • · •. •·the Constitution does not recog'llize an absolute 
and uncontrollable liberty. Liberty in each of its· phases has 
its history and connotation. But the liberty safeguarded is 
liberty in a social organization which requires the protection 
of law against the evils which menace the health, safety,. 
morals and welfare of the people." (West Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, at 391.) 
In Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, at· 523, this Court 
restated the princi pie of liberty in a society : 
'' • • • government cannot exist if the citizen may at will 
use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise 
his freedom of contract to work them harm.'' 
Of course, democratic governments themselves may come 
into being only at the will of a majority of the people. So, 
,a.the infusion of deep rooted democratic concepts into 
56* the right to self-organization may dictate that the right 
to form .industrial government, in which · all employees 
must participate as a condition of employment need extend 
only where a majority of the employees have joined a labor 
organization. But this limitation is without application here, 
for this law applies to prohibit absolutely closed-shop con-
tracts even where all of the employees are members of the 
union. It decrees that for industrial society, unlike our politi-
cal society, there shall never-and under any circumstances-
be recognized the right of the majority to rule. In no in-
stances shall individuals who seek to live and work in in-
dustrial society be deemed to have obligations to other in-
diyiduals in the group or to the group itself. '' The accepted 
principle of majority rule which has become a bulwark, in-
deed perhaps the leading characteristic .of collective activities 
is rejected in favor of atomized individual rule ancl ·action." 
(United States of .America v. Congress of Industrial Organi-
zation, 335 U. S., at 147. Opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge.) 
Claude F. Finney, et als., v. Harley A.. Hawkins 45 
Just as democratic society could not survive in our political 
life under such a rule, so the constitutional right to self-organi-
zation cannot survive it. 
We are here asserting simpiy that no law which abso..:· 
lntely prohibits the making and performance of union-security 
contracts can stand, at. least ,in the absence of a showing, not 
even attempted here, that pressing public necessity demands 
their abolition. We say that the power to enter into such 
contracts may not be abridged by the States, as it has been in 
these cases, on the plea that abolition is necessary to pro-
tect a non-existent right to work as a non-unionist. We saJ· 
that just as a state may not make the right to be a slave a 
cornerstone of its legislative policy, so may it not make. the 
right to work as ~ non-unionist a cornerstone of legislative 
policy. We say that when the state ties the hands of organized 
working men and prevents them from making contracts which 
are essential to the preservation of their organizations and · 
their standard of "'living, it cannot justify its conduct 
57'' on the ground that outlawry is necessary to protect the 
right of other employees to destroy the efficacy of their 
organizations and threaten their standard of living by remain-
ing outside the organization. This is not legislation in the 
public interest-this is an undermining of constitutional guar-
antees. To shield non-unionists from the competition of 
union members which might induce them to join the union, 
is to create a monopoly for servitude in the name of free-
dom. The forces in our society which seek to make the ideal 
of frae and voluntary labor a. reality may not be subjected to· 
such shackles. 
4: The Enactment Cannot Be Justified as Protecting Against 
an Alleged Monopoly Achieved by Union-
Security AgreetJnents 
Closely related to the charge that the union shop invades 
the right to work as .a uon:-uuionist, discussed in the preceding 
section, is the charge that the union shop creates or attempts · 
to create some sort of a monopoly or restraint of trade, 
presumably in job or work opportunities. 
It is apparent that no monopoly or trade restraint in the 
usual or legal sense can be intended because no control over 
a market.in commercial goods could be accomplished by virtue 
of a requirement of union membership as a condition of em-
ployment, and whatever restraint exists is not by producers 
of goods. As used by this Court and heretofore by state 
courts· w h~n referring to the term ''monopoly'' or ' 'restraint 
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of trade", such terms embrace at the *minimum some 
58* relationship to the power by a producer to fix prices or 
control markets of commercial goods. See American To-
bacco Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 106-; Economic Br~ef, .App. 
E, p. 31. Furthermore, labor is not an article or commodity 
of commerce; labor organizations are associations of men 
constituted for purposes. of self-protection, not for making a 
profit. But apart from human values and the distinction be-
tween goods and personal services, there is a truly economic 
distinction between business combinations and unions of work-
men. Business organizations can, and by law should, thrive on 
competition. Competition is based on differences in price, 
quality or other elements of trade. But, as we have seen, 
unions cannot exist without the commo·n rule; in this respect 
they are like carriers, utilities and standard insurers. J. l. 
Case Co. v. N. L. R. B., s'ltpra; Order of R. R. Telegraphers 
v. Railway Express Agency, supra. 
· Accordingly, the proponents of anti-union shops laws who 
assert existence of a monopoly as a justification must refer 
to some other sort of monopoly or restraint of trade than 
that usually employed under the term, and the reference 
must be to any attempt to eliminate competition of non-union 
workers. ·But this obje.ctive we have seen to be th«; natural 
and inevitable objective of any national labor organization-
an objective justified not only on social and economic grounds 
hut also on constitutional grounds. See Apex. Hosiery v. 
Leader, supra. The attempt by unions to place all business 
units in an industry on the same footing, in so far as :wage 
rates are concerned, is universal; however, as observed by 
}Ir. Justice Holmes in Payne Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S. 
459, at 471, such attempt had ."no tendency to produce 
monopoly of manufacture * • * since the more successful it i.s 
the more competitors are introduced into· the trade''. If the 
elimination of competition of non-union workers constitutes 
restraint of trade, or the extent to which it is successful creates 
some sort of monopoly, botµ. of which the State has power to 
prevent, then *for the same reasons similar justifications 
59* would be available to o~tlaw the very principle of self-
. organization and collective bargaining, at least to the 
extent that such organization was successful and extended to 
any appreciable portion of a trade ·or industry. l. J. Case Co. 
v. N. L. R. B., supra; Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Rail-
way Express Agency, su,pra; Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 
supra. What the State of Virginia is really; saying is that it 
does not object to self-organie;ation of employees as long as it 
is not sucMssful and as long as no effective means of accom-
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plishing or maintaining organization are adopted. Certainly, 
as pointed out in the preceding s~ction, such an asserted jus-
tification is objectionable both on the grounds that basic con-
stitutional rights· are thereby subverted and on the grounds 
that no possible public interest could thereby be served. 
5. The Enactment Cannot Be J.ustified as Mere Regulation 
of Contracts . 
The fact that a contract· device is utilized to effectuate 
the desired end-adherence to the common rule--does not 
detract from the fundamental nature of the right here as-
serted. The contract serves merely to formalize . the exercise 
of the constitutional right; it embodies employer recognition 
of the right. Further, such a contract is, in effect, a device 
for assuring that for its term union members -will not be im-
pelled to leave wotk by virtue of the employment of a non-
unionist. Such assurance is, in fact, indispensable to modern 
·collective bargaining, for without it workers could not, with-
out imperiling their organizations, and their bargaining 
power, waive for any fixed period their right to strike. Absent 
such an agreement, an employer who wished to assure con-· 
tinuity of his work force would simply not hire non-unionists. 
Formalization of this practi~e. by agreement provides neces-
sary assurance to workers that their income for a period will 
not be imperiled by the need for leaving work if a non-unionist 
is hired. . 
*It should be noted that the making of an agreement 
60*·-. between an employer and a labor organization governing 
terms and conditions of employment in the enterprise is. 
uot, of itself, an unlawful act. The power to make such agree-
ments is today a necessary part of the right to self-organi-
zation. S-ee H.J. Heinz Co. v. N. L. R. B., supra. The issue in 
these cases, tlien, is not whether union membership may be . 
made a condition of employment by unlawful means, but 
whether union i;nembership, as a condition of· employment, 
may be made unlawful when secured by lawful means. 
It is no answer to all of this to say, as did the courts below, 
that freedom of contract is not absolute, and may be limited 
in the public interest. Here the right to execute and to insist 
upon performance of a contract to employ only union mem-
bers is not valuable mer~ly as an incident to freedom of con-
tract itself. Rather these specific types of contracts are 
products of the right to freedoµi of assembly which is specifi-
cally guaranteed by the Constitution and may not be abridged~ 
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Obviously, many .contractual arrangements are made by per ... 
sons engaged in the exercise pf rights guaranteed by the First 
Amendment. For example, a contract for printing a leaflet is 
indispensable to the exe1·cise o~ the right"; the making of 
such Gontracts cannot be prohibited under the guise of regu-
lating· contracts. 
Further, these statutes cannot be justified as a regulation 
of contracts because they not only prohibit contracts which 
make union membership a condition of employment; they 
also each contain a separate prohibition ''that no person shall 
be denieQ emploY.ment because of non-membership in a union''. 
Hence the statutes necessarily prohibit the operation of a 
union rule ag·ainst working with non-members. *The 
61• refusal of union men to work with non-members neces-
sarily means that the employer who wishes the services 
of union men must refuse to employ non-union workers. If 
- it is not in the contract, the union will notify the employer 
of its rule, and will enforce it by quitting in a body if the 
employer forces a non-union employee upon their society. The 
employer will then choose, and if he discharges the non-union 
employee in order to retain union members, he has made union 
membership a condition of employment. He has, in the wordJ; 
of the statutes, "denied employment to a person because of 
non.membership in a union''. Yet, clearly, his action was the 
direct result of the union members' refusal to work with a 
non.member. Commonwealth v. Hwnt, supra. 
D. Since Fundmnental Rights Findi'llg Protection Uncler the · 
First Amendment ...4.·re II ere Involved, the State May 
Not Support the ProhibUions by a Showiizg of Some . 
Rational Basis in Exercise of Police Power. 
. It is asserted that, in t11e end, the justification for these 
statutes is that the leg·islature decided that it was necessary 
in the public interest, to prohibit union membership as a 
condition of employment. The legislative determination is 
conclusive, it is said, because it is a regulation withjn the 
reserved powers of· the States in our federal system. This 
reserved power includes the great reservoir of police power 
which a state legislature may exercise to protect the public 
interest. The statutes are regarded as regulaJions of con-
flicting private interests in industrial relations and hence 
within ''the power of the State to set limits of permissible 
conflict open to industrial combatants.'' With much em-
phasis, it is noted that similar legislation has been enacted 
in sixteen states by constitutional amendment or statute: ' 
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Arkansas, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, I~a, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Maine; Nebraska, South Dakota;. ~e~-
nessee, Texas., Virginia. Both the North Carolina and Ari.,. 
zona Courts m~ge : 
62* *'' Great weight must be attached to the fact that .so 
many separate jurisdictions· have, within a short spaee 
of time, seen fit to exercise their police power in the aam<t 
manner and for the same purposes. The coinposite wi.11.df 
such a broad cross-section of our country cannot be lightly 
discarded as un.reasonable, arbitrary or capriciomt or lack~ 
ing in substantial relationsl10p to its objective. Since J§{IV~ 
ernment is not an exact science, prevailing public opii:µon 
concerning the evils and the remedy is among the importa11i 
facts deserving consideration; particularly, when the p~blic 
conviction is both deep-seated and wide-spread and has been 
reached after deliberation.'' 
But p.opular sentiment cann?t abridge constitutional rights. 
'' The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to witl:idfaw 
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy; 
to place them beyond the reach of majorHies and officials arid 
to establish them as legal principles to be applied by .,the 
courts. . One's right to life, liberty, and property, to fre~ 
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, .and 
other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they 
depend on the outcome of no elections." (West Virgima v~ 
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, at 638.) 
The passage of these laws in sbdeen States might be im.:. 
pres~ive if the States were a. composite, broad cross-section 
of tlie country, if the statutes were passed after delibera-
tion. But the sixteen States are, however niueh they differ 
in other respects, with respect to labor relations very much 
alike. They are non-industrial states where unions are a 
minority group. The ''deliberation" was an argument. ~f 
prejudices., opinions and fallacious parallelisms. The st~t-
utes are the product of a siriglc common misconception of 
tmiori-employer:..employee relations, namely, that the 11nidn 
"interferes" with the "natural'' relations between employer 
and employees. In this view, it seems quite natural 
63• for the employer the •conditions of employment 
to which all persons seeking or holding employment 
with him must submit. It is his business. But that work-· 
men should impose conditions upon those with whom they 
will spend a working day seems outrageous. That a man. 
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must join a union before he can get a job seems to be an 
arrogation of power by union officials. This conception of 
unions is alarmed by the realization that union power leads 
to uniform working conditions in a given occupati9n or in-
dustry. In this view, the abuse of union power is easily ob-
served; individu~ls are excluded from job opportunities by 
union restrictions upon entry into a craft; persons are forced 
to pay dues to unions; a worker is expelled from a union and 
thereby loses his job. 
For all these aUeg·ed evils, there is a single remedy; out-
law union membership as a condition of employment and 
leave each individual free to seek his own terms and condi-
tions of employment. If h.e wishes to join a union and secure 
common terms, that is his rig·ht; if he does not, and wishes 
to exercise his individual right to work on the hest terms he 
can get, that is also his right. This action, say the state 
courts, does not impair any constitutional rights of unions 
or of union members; ''labor's basi~ rights. to organize into 
a union, bargain collect.ively, Jo strike and peaceably picket 
are not abridged." . 
This judgment of the. state courts is counter to the phil-
osophy and experience of unions which have held and prac-
ticed the belief that union membership as a condition of -em-
ployment is indispensable to the existence of union organiza-
tions. , 
. The appellants assert t.hat fundamental constitutional 
rights have been impaired by the statutes at bar .. The States 
say that the statutes are regulations in the public interest. 
It- is for this Court to decide the issue 
64 •''That the State has power to regulate unions with 
. a view to protecting the public interest [is] * ~ • hardly 
to be doubted. 
"They cannot claim immunity from regulation. Such regu-
lation, however, whether aim~d at fraud or other abuses, 
must not trespass upon the domaim~ set apart for free speech 
· and free assembly.'' (Thomas v, Collins, 323 U. S. 516, at 
532.) 
E. The Prohibition Can Be Supported Only by a. Showing of 
Compelling Public Necessity Under the Clear and Pres-
ent Danger Test; Such a Showing is Not Even .At-
tempfod~ 
Since union· membership a·s a condition of employment is 
indispensable to the rigl1t of workmen to achieve equality 
of bargaining power and to exercise through unions their 
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freedoms of assembly, ti1e statute at bar is clearly uncon-
stitutional. It is not a regulation ·of common·union. member-
ship, but prohibits any form of comm.on membership, The 
fact that '' a closed shop and a closed union'' may lead to 
abuses is not sufficient to jm;tify prohibition. When the ex-
ercise ·of a constitutional right is accompanied by abuses of 
the rig·ht, the legislature may suppress the abuse, but not 
the exercise of the right itselt. Thomas v. Collins,· 323 U. S: 
516,at 547; DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, at 364; 1Jfi1,r~· 
dock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, at 116; Lovell v. Griffin, 
303 U. S. 444, · at 451; Chaplinsky v. New Hamp.t,hire, 315 
U. S. 568, at .573; Schneider v. State, 3()8 U. S. 147,. at .16().; 
161. : 
Free assembly, like free speech, can be curbed only where 
its exercise has created a clear and present danger of ·harm 
to the State. · · 
'' Any attempt to restrict tho·se liberties must ·be .justjfied 
by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or re~ 
motely, but by clear and present danger." (Thomas v~ Col~ 
Zins, 323 U. S. at 530.) 
It must be borne in mind that, since fundamental· rights, 
as distingui.shed from property right., are here involved; 
65• •"Mere legislative preference for one rather than an~ 
other means for combatting .substantive evils, there-
fore,may well prove an inadequate foundation on which to 
rest regulations which are aimed at or in their operation. 
diminish the effective exercise of rights so necessary to the 
maintenance of democratic institutions.'' Thornhill v. Ala-. 
bama, 310 U. S. at 95. See also l.Y est Virginia v. Barnette, 
319 U. S. at 638. 
There is no showing in this case- of any clear arid present 
danger. The theory of the statute is, as we have pointed 
out above, simple: Union membership as a condition of 
employment is not protected by constitutional guarantees in 
any way, and it can be flatly prohibited. In the case at bar 
there was no attempt to prove that the particular union-
membership agreement involved had been in any way oppres-
sive or arbitrary. That the contract here involved is evil is 
imputed to it by the statute. · 
66 11 •we are back to 1840. This is the same charge made 
by the prosecution in Commonwealth v . . Hu11,t, supra. 
Stripped of its verbiage, the charge is that union members, 
having notified the employer that they would not work with 
persons who wer-e not members of their society, secured an 
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agreement from the employer that he would hire only union 
members. 
The .. Massachusetts Co\lrt held 106 years ago that this 
agreement :was lawful on ''principle.'' It is now for this· 
Court to 1say that, in the circumstances of our times, the 
principle i11:volved is a constitutional one. 
,The prQm.i~e of Comrnonwealth v. Hunt was not. kept be-
cause, thoug}}. the principle was conceded, its application in 
specific cases hurt either non-union members or employers, 
and so it was held unlawful. But these decisions were based 
upon. doctrines of master and servant, restrai11t of trade and 
justifiable and non-justifiable tort. These doctrines were 
ignorant of the experience of union men; their premises ex-
cluded the idea of the common rule; and they had to be aban-
doned when legal doctrine accepted the principles of collec-
tive bargaining· and the constitutional status of the right of 
self-organization. · 
T4e decision by Chief Justice Shaw in Com'lnonwealth v. 
Hunt required judicial statesmanship of a very high order. 
He had to relate bis decision to the vital forces in the so-
ciety of his ·time. Nelles, Commonwealth v. Hunt, 32 Col. 
Law Rev. at p. 1159 .. This Court has the same task and ·re-
sponsibility. It must apply the great principles of the Con-
~titution to the developments of a modern society. It must 
intervene in an important conflict of interest between citi-
zens of the United States. It must sav where the line is be-
tween the exercise of private right imd public reg·ulation. 
We do not ask this Court to grant unrestricted liberty of 
action; we do not ask it to render the States impotent to 
correct abuse of rights. We ask this Court to hold only 
that the right of workmen to refuse to work with persons 
who are not members of their union is an *age-old prac-
67* tice of unions and essential to the exercise of their 
fundamental right to form unions; that a state law 
which broadly and flatly prohibits union members from mak-
ing union membership a condition of the common employ-
ment of themselves and others prevents this practice ·and 
abridges the right of workmen to form unions. Such a de-
cision safeg'Uards constitutional liberties, while leaving th~ 
State with ample power to regulate and preven.t any evils 
which may flow from the a btisa of this right. We do not 
ask this Court to establish a new principle or a novel right; 
we ask only for the recognition of constitutional rights that. 
have long been exercised by workmen in their associations 
and assemblies as they sought to establish a common rule 
for the guarantee of equality and law in their everyday af-
fairs. 
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In the practical world the value of membership in an or-
ganization stems largely from the· fact that the benefits 
achieved through association may be and are restricted by 
the group to its members. Where such restriction has been 
deemed to give rise to evils within the appropriate area of 
state control, it has uniformly been held appropriate to 
eliminate the evils only by prying open the doors of mem-
bership to all who wish to join rather than by depriving the 
association of its reason for existence hy prohibiting· it from· 
excluding non-members from its benefits. . Seo .Associated 
Press v. United Sta.tes of .America, 326 U. S. 1. We ask no 
more than that similar concepts be applied in the present 
cases. 
*III. 
Even Assuming That Ri.qhts of a, Less Fundamental N att,re 
Are Here Involved, Nevertheless the Absolute Union-
Becitrity Prohibition llf1tst Fall as Being Dem,onstrably 
Arbitrary, Discriminatory and Without Rational Ra.';is; 
Such Absolute Prohibition of so Important a Right is 
Clearly Exces.<,i1.,e liVhere Reg'ltlation Would Accomplish 
All Possible Object-ives. 
In the preceding section of this brief it has been demon-
strated that the rights aff.ected by the law in question are 
of a fundamental nature going to the very existence of labor · 
organizations and their ability effectively to function on be-
half of their membership. If~ however, it be argued or as .. 
sumed that the rights invaded by the anti-~nion-security law 
involved in the instant case are not fundamental in nature, 
but instead comprise some lesser species of right, as, for 
instance, a bare right to bargain and to enter into contracts 
respecting union security, protected only as would be a prop- · 
erty right under the Fourteenth Amendment, then, neverthe-
less, the law must be stricken as an ·arbitrary and irrational 
deprivation of that right, even under the more .stringent test 
of constitutionality that w·ould them be applicable. 
A. Principles Avplicable to a Determination of JVhetlier 
Legislat-ion Is A rb-itrary or lVitho11,t Rational Basis. 
It is recognized that the burden upon one challenging 
state lcg·islation und~r its police power in the field of prop-
erty rights protected solely under the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amenment or under the contract clause of 
· Article I, Section 10, is a heavy one, and that the State Ji.as 
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greater leeway in imposing regulations and prohibitions 
'when only the Fourteenth Amendment is involved 
69• · •than when is also the· First. See West "Virginia v. 
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624., at 638. 
, In Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, the United-States 
Supreme Court stated the applicable rule as follows: 
"The Fifth Amendment, h1 the field of federal activity, 
and the Fourteenth, as resp~cts state action, do not prohibit 
governmental regulation for the puhlic welfare. They 
merely condition the exertion of the admitted power, by se-
curing that the end shall be accomplished by methods con-
sistent with due process. And the guaranty of due process, 
as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not 
be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means 
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the ob-
ject sought to be attained.'' (291 U. S.·at 525.) 
• * 
w• • • Price control, like any other form of regulation, is 
unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demon-
strably irrelevant to the policy the Legislature is free to 
adopt, and hence an unnecessary and unwarnvnted interfer-
ence with individual liberty.'' (291 U. S. at 539.) (Em-
phasis supplied.) 
The leading case in Virginia on the subject, in which many 
Virginia authorities are discussed., is Reynolds v. Milk C()m-
mission, 163 Va. 957. · 
A similar test is applicable to attempts by the State to 
restrain the more specific. liberty of contract as protected 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. See ·west Coast Hotel 
v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379. Directly applicable because of the 
closer analogy between th~ facts presented is the· case of 
Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relati9ns, 262 U. S. 
522, where the United States Supreme Court struck down a 
state law restricting, through the imposition of compulsory 
arbitration, the right of employers and employees to enter 
into mutually acceptable collective bargaining agreements. 
There, t~e Court stated ( at 534) as follows : 
"These qualifications do not change the essence of the act. 
It curtails the right of the employer, on the one hand, and· 
of the employee, on the other, to contract about his affairs. 
This is part of the liberty of the individual protected by 
the· guaranty of the due process clause of the 14th Amend-
1· 
I 
I 
\ 
I 
I 
I 
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ment.' • • • While there is •no such thing as absolute 
70"" freedom of contract, and it is subject to a variety of 
restraints, they must not be arbitrary or unreasonable.· 
],reedom is the general rule, and restraint the exception. The 
legislative authority to abridge can be justified only by ex-
ceptional circumstances.'' 
That similar considerations are applicable when considering 
possible conflict with the contract clause (Article I, Section' 
10) is seen from-Home Building <t Loan v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S.· 
398, and East New York Savings Bank v. Halm, 326 U.S. 330.-
Running through the foregoing and other decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court, undertaking to define the per-
missible limits of government regulation when rights under 
the Fourteenth Amendment or under the contract clause are 
asserted, are such phrases as ''reasonable", "necessary", 
and ''warranted". Time and again a "rational basis" test' 
is used. See especially the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice 
},rankfurter in West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U. 'S., at p. 646. 
But obviously, judicial opinion concerning the '' reasonable-' 
ness '' of any particular legislation or concerning the existence 
of a "rational basis" could vary as do the predilections ang· 
preconceptions of the individual Justices. Moreover, such 
opinions could very easily embody appraisals of wisdom_ or 
propriety or evaluations of policy, ·matters which the United 
States Supreme Court has constf).Iltly affirmed are not its con-
cern. Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236. It was not many years 
ago that a too facile resort to an opinion concerning ''reason-
ableness'' resulted in abrogation of much legislation which 
a more critical examination would disclose, as it subsequently' 
did disclose, had many rational bases in the serving of public 
interests. Aware of these and other considerations, the 
United States Supreme Court has evidenced an increasing. 
reluctance to strike down legislation as violative of either the 
due process or contract clauses, the Court reading the Con-
stitution to confer on the States a somewhat free hand in 
the exercise of their police power, and leaving to the •demo-
cratic process the correction of abuses of that power. 
71 • See Braden, Umpire to the Federal System, 10 Univer-
sity of Chicago Law Review 27. But that is not to say 
that this Court has abandoned or could abandon its function· 
and duty of determining in each case whether the liberties 
essential to a free society and finding protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment have been unwarrantedly denied; even 
though such liberties may not hav~ the stature of other more 
fundamental liberties more specifically protected under the' 
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First Amendment or elsewhere. It needs no declamation to 
remind that nothing is more dangerous to the genius of our 
institutions than an unrestrained resort to the police power 
justified only by the existence of a vague public interest or 
social convenience. The protection of such rights of the in-
dividual as '' to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; 
to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work 
where he will;i to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; 
to pursue~ an,.y livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose 
to enter 'into ~11 contracts which may be proper, necessary, 
and essential': tb his carrying out to a successful conclusion 
the purposes ·'above mentioned'' (Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 
U. S. 578, at 589) is the principle purpose of the Constitution 
itself, and it is the Constitution alone, as enforced by this 
Court, which stands as a shelter against arbitrary or excessive 
invasion by the State, in the claimed exercise of its police 
power, of those individual liberties and freedoms. Thus, a too 
great reluctance to intervene when the Constitution is in-
voked gives encouragement to statism and is contrary to the 
spirit of a people who did all that was humanly possible to 
secure individual liberties in a written constitution. It must 
ever be remembered that 
'' • * * By the protection of the law human rights are se-
cured; withdraw that protection, and they are at the mercy of 
wicked rulers, or the clamor of an excited people ~ • • . The 
Constitution of the United States is a· law for rulers and 
72* people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the 
shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, 
and under all circumstances." (Ex Parte Milligatn, 71 U. S. 
281.) 
Thus, the task before the Court in the present cases, as 
in others where the Fourteenth Amendment is invoked, is 
to reconcile, under a test of reasonableness or arbitrariness, 
the need for protections of iudividual freedoms, daily be-
coming more precious in this world and age, with the need 
for social experimentation by the State, often found neces-
sary to make those very freedoms more meaningful. How 
best to accomplish so difficult and delicate an · assignment t 
The approach first advocated.by the late, great Justice Bran-
deis, while still a practicing lawyer before this bar, has con-
tributed much to a solution-. Under the promptings of his 
economic briefs in cases involving the constitutionality of 
social legislation, commencing with Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S.· 
412, this Court has evQlved a somewhat more stiict and definite 
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test than is .afforded by the vague phrases of the Fourteenth 
Amendment or by judicial guess as to what is arbitrary or. 
unreasonable. It is now held that any judgment concerning: 
the reasonableness or unreasonableness of any particdlar 
legislation must be an informed judgment based upon as 
})recise aud accurate information as is obtainable concern-
ing existing economic or social conditions involved in and jus-
tifying the attempted exercise of the. police power .. Reason-. 
ableness <?f· legislative regulation or prohibition of consti-: 
tutionally protected dghts accordingly must depend upon an 
examination of all relevant facts and factors, including an· 
examination of the nature of the activity which is being regu-
lated or suppressed, of the impact of such regulation or pro-
hibition upon the public, of the question of whether there. 
are any social or economic conditions requiring intervention 
by the State, and of whether the public interest is in fact 
served by the prohibition. "Legislation cannot be judged 
by theoretical standards. It must be tested by the concrete. · 
conditions which induce it." McKenna, J., in Mutual. 
73~ Loan *Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225, at 233. '' The func-. 
tion of courts .in the application of the Fifth -and Four-: 
teenth Amendments is to determine in each case whether cir, 
cumstances vindicate the challenge regulation as an able exer-
tion of governmental authority or condemn it as contrary or 
discriminatory.'' N ebbia v. New York, 291 U. S., at 536. And 
as further stated in the N ebbia case: 
" • • * regulation valid for one sort of business, or in given 
~ircumstances, may be invalid for another sort, or for the 
same business under other circumstances, because the .reason-
ableness of each regulatiorr depends upon the relevant facts. n 
(291 U. S., at 525.) · 
Justice Brandeis, in his dissent in Adams v. Tanner, 244 
. U. S. 590, at 600, gave _early and excellent expression to the 
applicable principles when he stated: 
"Whether a measure relating to the public welfare is arbi-
trary or unreasonable, whether it has no substantial relation· 
to the end proposed, is obviously not to be determined by 
assumptions or by a p,riori reasoning. The judgment should 
be based upon a consideration of relevant facts, actual or 
. possible-Ex facto jus oritur. That ancient rule must- pre-
vail in order that we may have ·a system of living law. -
''It is necesary to inquire, therefore : What ·was the evil 
which the people of Washington sought to correcU Why was 
Supreme· Uonrt of Appeals of Virginia 
the particular remedy emoodi~d·)H ! th~· statut~. adopted Y And, 
incidentally, what. has ~e.en .the experience, if any, of othe;r. 
states or countries in this 'connection Y' ,· · ~ 
The Nebbia case affords a classic illilstration of the method 
which necessarily must be followed if the· courts are intelli~ 
gently .to ·pass upon the ultunate· questioi i o'f the' r~asonable-
ness of any particular law impairing private· rights. There; 
the Court undertook a detailed study of the grave economic 
situation existingi. in the Stafu of New York in the· milk in~ 
dustry as a l:~sult of the 1980 dep~ession and concllided that as 
an actual factual matter legislative intervention was . neces-
sary even though it involved setting .. price~s in ·an in.!, 
74• dustry in no way dedicated to public use. But only after 
such examination did the Court conclude that, :'. . : · 
"In the l~l]~t of the facts -the order 1appears not to be un-
. 1·easonable or arbitrary;. or ~ithout relation to th_e purpose to 
prevent ruthless· competitio~. from· destroying the wholesale. 
price· structure on which the fa~mer depends for his liveli~ 
hood, and the comiminity for an assured supply of milk.'' (291 
U. S., at 530.) (Emphasis supplied.) 11 ' 
I '• 
·Examination intd · economic facts and circumstances as a 
means of forming· a basis for adequate judgme~t as to reason-
ableness is a necessary prelifninary to sue~· judgment if the 
t1This method :Of appro~ch by inquiry into facts and circu~stances anq 
into specific economic conditions, termed "sociological jurisprudence" by Dean 
Pound, has been described and commented upon in· important law review 
articles. See "Hourij of .Labor ~nd Realism in Constitutional Law," by Felix 
Frankfur£er, 29 Harv. Law Rev. 353; "Judicial Determination of Questions of 
Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of· Legislative Action,'' by Henry 
Wolf Bikle, 38 Harv. Law Rev. 6; "Due Process of Law, Police Power and the 
Supreme Court," by Ray A. Brown, 40 Harv. Law Rev. 943; "Police Power-
Legislation for Health and Personal Safety," by Ray A. Brown, 42 Harv. Law 
Rev. 866; Note, 49 Harv. Law Rev. 631, "The Presentation of Facts ·under~ 
lying the, Constitutionality of Statutes." . 
Justice Brandeis,. in particular, in his gr.eat dissents in cases involving 
social legislation. relied either upon legislative findings or upon sociological 
and economic data to support his .conclusion that the particular legislation 
found justification and rational basis, or a lack thereof, in the existing eco• 
nomic circumstances and conditions. See his dissents.for instance, in J. Burns 
Baking Oo. v. Bryan, 264 U. S. 504; Trua:c v. Oorrigan, 257 U. S. 312; Ne10 
Btate Ics Oo. v. Liebman, 285 U. S. 262. The reasoning and method of ap-
proach set forth in these dissents have now been accepted by the full Court. 
See Nebbia v. New y·ork, $Upra; see also MttZler v. Oregon, supra; McLean v. 
A.rkansas, 211 U. S. 539; Price v: IZiinois, 238 U. S. 446; Bunting v. Oregon, 
243 U .. S.- 426; Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U. S. 242:; Borden's Farm. . 
Products v. Baldwin, 283 U. S. 194, for instances of· the Co~rt's reliance UPOI\ 
~p~ci,fic circumstances and econo:mic .conditions as s~rving to justify the chal-
lenged legislation. A compelling illustration is afforded by Thompson v. Con" 
soHaatea Gas 1Jtilit1es Oon,oration, 300, U. s. 55. · ·1 · 
i 
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exerci~~- bf th~ s·tate "-of· fts .police po~er is ~ot t~ become-=~ 
bootstrap proposition; under any other rule the mere asser-
<tion by the State of a need or necessity for any particular 
legislation would foreclose the question of econstitution-
75• ality. As stated in Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus-. 
trial Relations, ·supra: ·.' 
: . : .. , 
'' ~ * '• If,' as,' in'. effect, 1contended by counsel for the state;; 
th~ common callings are clothed with a public . interest by 
~ mere legislative declaration, which n:ecessarily · authorizes 
full and comprehensive regulation·within legislative di&cr~tion~ 
there must be a revolution in the relation of' goverrµnent to· 
general business. This will be :fonning the public in.tere~t" 
argument into the ground, to use a phrase of Mr. Justice 
·Bradley when characterizing a· similarly extreme contention 
_. e e '.' (262 U. S., at 589). : ·.. . . . · · 
So much for appiicable principles of law. S~ed up, 
they amount simply to. this: Rights u~der e:;isting contracts 
and private liberties and freedoms ·protected under the ·Four-= 
teeth Amendment are subject to restriction if there is an· 
actual, not speculative necessity the ref or in the protection 
of public health; safety, morals or welfare, and if the means 
adopted to accwmplish such purposes are reasonably related 
to the.ends sought. Whether ~here is such a basis must be deter-
mined factually by close examination into many factors. Only 
in this ,vay can judgment on the ultimate question be adequate. 
It is the purpose of the fallowing portion of this · brief to 
demonstrate, in the light of all circumstances, including con-
sideration of the nature and function of union-security agree-
ments in a modern industrial society, that the laws abolishing-
union-security agreements are arbitrary, unreasonable and 
excessive because the law :finds no basis or justification in 
any existing or possibl~ :so~ial (?r· economic conditions re-. 
quiring su_ch drastic intervei;ition by the State; because the 
law serves no possible public interest,. but, on the contrary, 
operatmf fo Jh~ prejudice of the·1mblic· gener~lly an~ serves 
to bene~t only priyate .. rigliti' of·~. limited class; and ·because 
the law is e±9e§lsive in t~at _any. pos_sible obj~ct'. so.11ght"'to be 
ac~i~ye~ ~c·a* b~ a~hieyed by r~gulati9n of the .. ,unipn-shop r~-· 
lationslnp rather than by c01:~1plete _and. unq1:1alified prohi-: 
bition. 
: ~ t. : ~: C . : .. <' 
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76• *B. The Nature of. the Activity Proscribed anil the 
Impact of Such Proscription. 
The :first step in. determining the reasonableness of the 
prohibitions in question is to inquire into the nature of the 
activity prescribed, together with the effect of the legislation-
here complete prohibition-on such activity. Thus, it can be 
· seen whether the extent of the taking is great or small. If 
great, the justifications in public interest should reasonably 
be commensurate on.the principle that one ~oes not sever an 
arm to. save a :fing,er. See Pennsylvooia Coal Co. v. Mahon7 
260 U. S. 393, at.41,3, 414, where the Court, speaking through 
Mr. Justice Holin.~s, stated: 
i . 
. "The extent o(the public interest is shown by that statute 
to be limited * • * . On the other hand, the extent of the 
taking is great.' ' 
The salutary and beneficial functions of union-security 
agreements-not only in respect to labor organizations and 
employees but also in respect to employers and the general 
public-have been previo~sly referred to in this brief. The 
entire discussion in Part II indicates that the principle of 
union security goes to the very core of American unionism. 
It is hardly to be disputed that agreements requiring µnion 
membership as a condition of employment constitute the only 
proven and effective means for working people to obtain and 
insure (1) their collective security and the maintenance of 
their labor unions once organization is achieved; (2) an 
equality of bargaining power as a means of obtaining an 
adequate share of the joint product of capital and labor; and 
(3) the consolidation of gains achieved in collective bargain-
ing and the protection of working standards through elimi-
nation of the cutthroat wage competition of non-union em-
ployees and enforcement of the common rule .. 
In addition to what has been stated in earlier portions 
of this brief, other considerations are here relevant. 
77• for *instance, the union-security agreement as the oue 
means available to labor for consolidating its gains and 
eliminating ruinous wage competition can well be contrasted 
with the many methods available to business managers for 
bringing about price and production control and for consoli-' 
dating a profitable positio11 in an industry or trade once it 
has been achieved. The study attached to the Economic Brief 
herein as Appendix E examines in detail the various tech-
niques available· to and used by business managers in an 
\. 
.J, 
\ 
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eff or to secure collective security for themselves through the, 
regulation or· elimination of price competition and directs at-
tention to five '' influence pres.sures'' and dozens of '' eco-
nomic pressures" used for bringing about price and produc-
tion control, together with seven "consolidation measures'' 
available when such price stability has been achieved, most of 
which pressures and methods have been sanctioned by the 
courts and the legislature~. As against this, organized labor 
has been deprived of its one consolidative technique. See 
.Appendix E, pp.18-24. 
The heavy contribution made by union-se~urity agreements 
to industrial stability and peace is demonstrated at length 
in the Economic Brief. It is there shown that, in addition 
to producing harmonious and productive relationships in many 
industries, union-security agreements have played a funda-
mental role in forestalling wage decreases and in counter-
acting inflationary trends. See Economic Brief, pp. 46 .. 62. 
The Economic Brief further demonstrates that elimination 
of the union-shop institution will inevitably lead to disrup-
tion of previously harmonious relationships and to strife and 
turmoil over broad industrial fronts where labor organizations 
will once more find themselves fighting for their very exist-
ence. 
Finally; it is important to note that the courts have uni-
versally recognized the union-shop principle as an indis-
pensable factor in the process of establishing and protecting 
wage standards and organization itself .. Attached to this 
brief as Appendix Fis a compilation of cases in twenty-
78"' six *states which, either directly or by positive infer-
ence, uphold union-shop agreements. See also Appen~ 
dix E, p. 5, f. u. 7(B). The rationale of these decisions is 
summed up in the Restate1nent of the Law of Torts, pp. 128-
130, 166, 167. . 
It is further significant tlmt the federal Congress, both in 
the origfoal and the amended National Labor Relations .A.ct,12 
and the legislatures of seventeen states specifically authorize· 
union-security agreements.rn Such legislative and judioiaJ 
sanction, at the very least, recognizes the necessity and in-
dispensability of union-security agreements in a modern in-
dustrial society. 
1249 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. Sec. 158(3), 1947), as amended, 29 
U.S. C. A. Sec. 158(a} (3) (Supp. July, 1947). 
ucal. Lab. Code ( Deering, 1943) Sec. 1126 ;. 3 Colo. Stats. Ann. · (Michie, 
Supp., 1946), c. 97, Sec. 94(6) (c) (requires thre~fourths of employees in a 
bargaining unit to vote authority for the execution of the agreement) ; Conn. 
Gen. Stats. (Supp., 19.45), Sec. 937h(5); Del. Laws, 1947, H.B. 212, Sec. 3 (a),· 
2A CCH Lab. Law· Serv. 41905 (1947) (however, an employer can lawfully' 
refuse or agree to execute a union-security agreement); Me. Laws, 1947, c: 
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79• "'This State has eliminated this institution of the 
union shop., and in doing so it is important again to note 
that they have failed to provide any substitute or equivalent 
for the union-security princ.iple, such as, for instance, might 
be afforded by state control as under the Railway Labor Act 
(App. E, pp. 28-29;· Economic Brief, p. 66). While it might 
he argued that the law prevent discrimination against union 
workers (as does- also the National Labor Relations Act in 
interstate industries), the remedies available for such dis-
crimination are not altog·ether Ratisfactory (Economic Brief, 
pp. 44-45 ), and, i.n any event, as we have seen, the primary 
function of union-security agreements is not the elimination 
of opportunity for discrimination, but acl1ieving an equality 
of bargaining power and the elimination of wage competition 
of unorganized employees, wh_ether such competition be felt 
by the direct competition for wages in plants where no ex-
clusive collective· bargaining rights exist or by the gradual 
hut inevitable elimination of the majority status and bar.;. 
gaining power of organizations lmve an exclusive recogni-
tio~ status, but not having· any as~ured means of maintain-
ing that status, such as tlte union shop alone can bring. 
. We are now in a position to make a more exact appraisal 
of the reasonableness of the absolute prohibition of union-
security agreements attempted in tl~e present cases. A right 
or a liberty which has become an irn:;titution in our twentieth 
centnry industrial economy and which has been sanctioned 
by courts and legislatures everywhere lias Fmddenly been out-
lawed, and this without any substitute whatsoever being pro-
25, Se~. 41-A, as added, c. 395, 2A CCH Lab. Law Serv. 43301 (1947) (pro-
hibits the closed shop form of union-security agreements but permits the 
union shop form); Mass. Gen. Laws (1947), c. 150A, Sec. 4, subsec. (3), as 
amended, c. 657, CCH Lab. Law Serv. 43503-2 (1947); Mich. Comp. Laws 
(Mason Cum. Supp. 1940), Sec. 8628-14; Minn. Stats. (Mason, 1941), Sec. 
179.12(3); Mo. Laws 1947, S. B. 79, Sec. 5; N. H. Rev. Laws (1942), c. 212, 
Sec. 21, as amended, Laws 1947, c. 104, Sec. 21, 21-a, 2A CCH Lab. Law Serv. 
44601, 44602 (,1947) (requires two-thirds of employees voting to authorize 
execution of the agreements, but they must be a'.t least a majority of all 
·employees in the bargaining unit); N. J. Rev. Stats. (1946), c. 38, as amended, 
Laws 1947, c. 47 3:nd 75, Secs. 34:13B-2, 2A CCH Lab. Law Serv. 44701, 
44702 (1947); N. Y. Labor Law Art. 20, Sec. 704 (5); Pac. Stats. Ann. (.Purdon 
1941), Sec .• 2H.6(c); R. I. Pub. Laws 1941, c. 1066, Sec. 5, subsec, 5; Utah 
Code Ann·. (1943), Sec. 49-1-16(c); Wis. Stats. (1943), Sec. 111.06(c) 1, as 
amended, Laws 1945, c. 424 (requires two-thirds of employees voting to au-
thorize execution of the agreement, but they must be at least a majority of all 
employees in the bargaining unit; Ala. Acts 1943, No. 298, Sec. 8, p. 256 
(this Ja.w was at first interpreted by the state attorney-general as proscribing 
union-security agreements, see Opinion of Attorney-General, Nov. 20, 1!1.f8, 
2A CCH Lab. Law Serv. 41001-2; but the Alabama Supreme Court has 
recently beld that it proscribes only those agreements achieved through force 
and intimidation while permitting all other agreements. Hotel ancl Restaurant 
Employees .Int'l. Alliance ancl Bartenders' Leagu·e of America v. Greenwoaa, 
30 So. (2d) 696 (Ala. Sup. 1947). 
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vided, or without any exceptions being specified. An insti-
tution going to the very core. of unionism, and which arose 
out of and lms its reason for being in the necessities Qf the 
~ituation, has been destroyed. An important and traditional 
subject matter of collective bargaining has been withdrawn 
from. the ·field of employer-employee negotiations. Em-
ployees have been dep1~cved of their one technique for elimi.; 
nating cutthroat wage competition of non-union employees 
and for con·solidating gains and bargaining strengt~ 
so• while, on the >!tother hand, business managers have been 
permitted to retain many techiques for regulating. 
price and production policies directly aff eeting competition 
between employers and employees. The ability of business 
managers to gain an adequate share of t];ie national income 
has been directly increased, while that of organized em-
ployees has been directly lessened .. A useful and often bene-
ficial method of stabilizing industrial relations has. suddenly 
been withdrawn. Surely, the justifications for ·this depriva-
tion must be compelling, or else there is no institution, no 
activity, which is safe from obliteration by the State in the 
claimed exercise of its police power. What are these justi.: 
fications Y 
C. The Inadequacy of the Claimed Justifications for Com-
plete Prohibit-ion of Tlnion-Shop Ag1·eements." 
To begin with, it. should be noted that this State unlike the 
State of New York in the N ebbia case, s1itpra, did not under-
take a detailed study of the economic conditions arising out 
of or because of the use of union-shop agreements as a means· 
of determining whether legislation was in order. There is 
no record of any leg·islative 11carings or of any ]egislative 
findings concerning the impact of union-security agreements 
upon the public or of conditions affording a basis for the· 
proscriptions in question. In the N ebbia case and other 
similar cases before the United States Supreme Court the 
finding·s of legislative bodies or of investigatory legislative: 
~ommittees were heavily relied upon in :finding justification 
for the particular reg·ulations. 
What was deemed justification for the legislation-what 
are its purposes-can be obtained only from an examina-
tion of the legislation itself and, in particul~r, from an ex-
amination of the title, preamble or declaration of purpose .. 
Further light on this question can be obtained from the 
arguments advanced both by the respective Attorneys Gen. 
eral in support of the legislation and by the sponsors of the 
legislation who appeared in court to argue respecting its 
64 Supreme .Court of Appeals of Virginia 
validity. From these sources the claimed *justi:fica-
81• t~ons can be classified as follows, ( 1) protection of the 
right of individuals to work without joining a union; 
(2) prevention of monopolies; (3) correction of abuses said 
to arise out of the union-shop relationship, su~-h as arbitrary 
expulsions or refusals to admit; ( 4) prevention of Rtrikes 
over union-~eCIJrijy agreements; (5) prevention of unions' 
obtaining nnd11e .power nuder union-security agreements and 
consequently imµBng unreasonable demands. The following 
:portion of the bH.ef will analyze the last three of such claimed 
Justifications and demonstrate their inadequacy; the first 
two claimed justifications have been discussed and disposed 
of earlier in this brief. · 
1. Correctio·n of.Abuses. 
The proponents -0f the anti-union-shop legislation asAert 
that union-shop agreements may and do give rise to abuses 
by··union parties to union-shop agreements, which abuses di-
rectly affect jo~ rights, as, for instance, arbitra:ry expulsions 
from or refusals to admit into membership, or· favoritism in. 
SUP.plying employees when called upon to do so under cer-
tain types of union-sl1op agreements., or other internal prac-
tices which may cause individuals; otherwise · qualified, to 
lose employment opportunities. It is Rl;lid that the preven-
tion of such abuses are assuredly a legitimate object of state 
legislation. · 
To begin with, it is to be noted that the anti-union-shop 
law is not directed at such abuses, but are applicable regard-
less of whether any such abuses do exist .and regardless of 
whe~her unions within the State freely admit all qualified 
applicants to membership. Furthermore, no such abusive 
conditions do as a matter of fact exist in the State, and no 
claim has been made that unions in this State function in-
ternally, under union-shop agreements, in a manner arbi-
trarily to deprive employees of job rights .. 
s2• '"'It is asserted that while such abuses may not exist 
in the State, they do exist ~n ~ther States and may.come 
to exist in this State some time in the future. But the United 
States Supreme Court has held that legislative d~privation 
of rights and liberties protected under the Fourteenth 
Amendment cannot rest merely upon '' fanciful conjecture'' 
(Borden/s Fann Prod'lu:ts v. Baldwin, 283 U. S. 194) and 
cannot be "unsupported by anything of substance" (Liggett 
v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105). Surely, at least a tendency on 
the part of labor org~nizations within the State. to thus abuse 
I 
·, 
,, 
I ' 
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the union.:.shop relatiqnshiJ?. must appear before the State 
can attempt regulation, anil ·even then, as will be demon-
strated in a later portion of this brie.f, the State must deal 
with the abuses themselves rather than the institution under 
which the abuses may arise, unless it can be shown that such 
abuses are a necessary and inevitable result of the institu-
tion and can be dealt with in no way other than by abolish-
ing the institution. Killing the patient *to cure a cold, 
g3e or a possible future cold, has never been considered a 
reasonable method of" approach. That the use of union-
shop agreements does not inevitably result in closed unions 
or in practices of arbitrary admission and expulsion more 
closely corresponds to the available evidence than an opposite . 
conclusion. As stated in the Law Review article attached 
her~to as Appendix E, p. 39: · 
''While there have been instances of abuses of closed 
unions~ there is .no eviclence to _show that the clo_sed union has 
been the inevitable -result of union-security agreements 
or even closely associated with the ag-reements. There is, 
moreover, general evidenc-e to show that workers are freely 
admitted to unions having union-security agreements in .ex-
istence. In the first place, the objective of the union-security 
agreements, as has been frequently observed, is not to limit 
entrance into the union hut rather to increase union mem-
bership. That the objective has been realized is shown by an 
examination of the progress unions have made since legis-
lative sanction was generally given to union-security agree-
ments. In 1933, there were approximately 3,000,000 union 
members. As a result of the various anti-injunction statutes 
and affirmative sanctions of tl1e agre~ments, union member-
ship had increased to approximately 15,000,000 in 1947. Fur-
ther, it is established by various studies that what incidence 
there is of closed unions, it is less in times of prosperity and 
g-reater in periods of eronomic distress when unions may 
seek to protect the jobs of their members. The postwar pe-
riod which presumably led to the passage of the statutory 
bans on uniQU-security agree;rnents was one of increasing 
prm~perity in wl1ich jobs were so plentiful that unions could 
not supply all the workers required by employers. In many 
instances business managers hired whom they could. Some 
unions joined with business managers in apprentice training 
programs in order to increase the supply of trai11:ed workers. 
Finally, the growth of industrial unions as opposed to· craft 
unions in recent years bas operated to facilitate entrance to 
unions by workers of all classes within a plant.'' · 
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8411 •2. Prevention of Strikes .for Union-Hem~rity A,gree-
ments. · 
It is asserted by proponents of legislation outlawing union-
1oourity agreements that such legislation is justified on the 
ground that efforts to secure union-security agreements re-
tmlt in strikes and labor disturbances. Of course, on this 
premise any of the traditional objectives of ·labor org·aniza-
tions, such as shorter hours, or higher wages, could be pro-
aaribed; assuming the legitimacy of the objective, it could 
hardly be within the province of a State to outlaw such ob-
jective on the sole .ground that the seeking of it mig·ht pre .. 
oipitate strikes or other industrial disturbances., at least 
where no adequate substitute for obtaining· or realizing such 
objectives is provided. Wolff Packiti,q Company case, .~·upra. 
Any other view would nullify- the entire right of self-organi-
mation__,a right whose free exercise cannot be previously re-
strained or impaired in the absen_~e of grave and immediate 
public danger_ See Thomas v. Collins and earlier discussions 
l1erein. 
Furthermore, all available economic data indicates that 
union .. security agreements and efforts to obtain them do not 
cause industrial conflict to any degree. Of the 4900 work 
stoppages in 1946, only 2% % bad for- their sole object the 
obtaining of some form of union-security agreement. Durp 
i.ng that period 90% of all collective bargaining agree111,ents 
were renewed without a strike, and this during the greatest 
strike wave in the nation's history. See Economic Brief, 
Appendix E, pp. 35 .. 36; Economic Brief, p. 104. In only three 
of the twenty.nine major strikes of 1946 (which twenty-nine 
accounted for more than three-fourths of the total lost time) 
was union .. security at issue at all, and in these three the 
union shop was only one of the issues. See Economic Brief, 
p. 104. 
. Far from the union .. shop agreement in itself resulting in 
work stoppagea, the available evidence indicates that union .. 
shop agreements act as a preventative against or. a solvent 
for such disturbances. See Economic Bri~f, p>p. 46-53, App 
pendix E, p. 35. 
85• "3. Prevention of Unions Becoming Overpowerfu,l. 
The final justification advanced for the outlawing of union-
security agreements is the argument that such agreements 
make unions too powerful; that they cause-them to make unp 
reasonable· demands, to eng:age in featherbedding practices, 
to restrict production, and the like. Of course, the imme-
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diate answer to this contention is that the real objection of 
those who assert this justification is to unionism itself., to 
the spread of organization, to the enlisting of all employees 
within a plant or within a trade or within an indusfry into 
one or more labor org·aniza.tions. It is hardly within the 
province of a legislature to prejudg·e the reasonableness of 
demands, or to do other than leave the. determination of such 
matters to collective bargaining between the parties. 
In any event, the available evidence does not indicate that 
union-shop agreements in and of themselves inevitably give 
rise to the making of such arbitrary or unreasonable de-
mands as to require their suppression. For instauee, in re-
spect to the charge of featherbedding, there is nothing to 
indicate that such prncticcs are necessarily inherent in, or 
even a correlative incident of union-security agreements. On 
the contrary, common knowledge indicates that there is· no 
such necessary connection. . Thus, it is often asserted that 
the railroad unions engag·e in many featherbedding prac-
tices, and yet there are no closed-shop agreements in the 
railroad industry. 
Further, far from union-security agreements resulting in 
any restriction of. output or any interfere nee with produc-
tion, the weight of the evidence is overwhelming that the 
union-shop does not bring such results but, on the contrary, 
makes for higher efficiency and maximum productivity. See 
Economic Brief, pp. 106-;,108. One aspect of this was ~oted 
by Mr. Justice Jackson in his dissent in the Wallace Oorpo-
f'ation case, 323 U. S., at p. 2(57: 
86• "''' * • • a closed shop is the ultimate goal of most 
union endeavor and not a few employers have found it 
a stabilizer of labor relations by putting out of their shops 
men who were antagonistic to the dominant ulnions, thus 
ending strife for domination." 
D. Total Prohibition Rather Than Re.g'ldation Is Excessive 
om,d, .Arbitrary. 
. The discussion in the preceding section has indicated that, 
as a practical matter, there are no actual abuses or even 
abuses reasonably to be feared in the foreseeable future, which 
could serve as justification for the outlawing of union-security 
agreements _in the State. However, even if it be assumed that 
abuses or abusive conditions of the type hereinbefore dis~ 
cussed are reasonably to be feared, and that protection against 
suoh possible future abuses is a legitimate ftinotio~ of the 
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State fo the exercise of its police power, nevertheless it is 
incumbent upon the State to deal with such possible abuses 
as such rather than to outlaw the institution or the activity out 
of which the abuses may arise, particularly where the activity 
or the institution itself is not inherently harmful but, on the 
contrary, serves many salutary, indeed, indispensable, func.-
tions. There is possibly no industry, no activity, no occu-
pation, which does not give rise to or afford opportunity for 
abuses; if the mere presence or possibility of such abuses 
afforded justification for prescription o.f the activity, few, 
if any, of our institutions would .be safe from destruction by 
the State. Even if the matter of union-security involved only 
a question of contract-making power, it is clear that fraud, op-
portunities for abuse and actual abuse occur under all types 
of contractual relationships. Thus, for instance, overreach-
ing is vei"Y possible under various types of insurance con-
tracts, but it would hardly be proper for the State to deal 
with this possible abuse by prohibiting the making of all in-
surance contracts. As this Court stated in Liggett v. Bald-
ridge, 278 U. S., at 113, '' A State cannot under· the guise 
of protecting the public, arbitrarily *interfere with pri-
87* vate business or prohibit lawful occupations or impose 
unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions upon them.'' 
In other cases this Court has indicated that where it is 
possible to secure a legitimate objective, without impairing · 
essential rights or principles, or without imposing hardships 
in disproportion to possible benefits, the State must so pro-
ceed. House v. Mayes, 219 u~ S. 270; see also Tolliver v. Bliz-
zard, 143 Ky. 773, 137 S. W. 509. 
It has not been argued, nor could it very well be argued,. 
that each and every one of the claimed abusive conditions 
or other evils said to arise put of the union-shop relation-
ship could not be reached by some method other than out-
right prohibition of the institution itself. Federa1 and state 
legislatures have already indicated at least three methods of 
controlling the relationship without destroying it. Some States 
regulate the mode of using union-security agreements, as by 
req~iring authorization of a given percentage. of employees 
as a condition to the execution of an &greement. See Economie 
:Brief, · Appendix E, p. 41, f. n .. 179. Some States regulate 
th~ form of the agreement, as, for instance, the Taft-Hartley 
Act and the laws of Maine, which prohibit full closed-shop 
agreements but permit union-shop agreements. See Eco-
nomic Brief, Appendix E, p. 42, f. n. 180. And some regulate 
the functioning of unions under union-shop agreements, as,. 
for instance, by regulating admissions and expulsions. See 
Claude F. Finney, et als., v. Harley A. Hawkins ~9 
Economic Brief, Appendix E, p~ 42, f. n. 1_82-186. In Massa-
chusetts, the State Labor Relations Act provides that a con-
tract which makes union membership a condition of employ-
ment is legal but adds that if a union denies to any employee. 
eligibility to full membership and voting rights, such contract 
shall not be applicable to him. The statute also provides. 
that if discrimination in employment occurs as the result of1 
application of a closed-shop agreement that an employee may, 
have recourse to the State Labor Relations Board for a hear;.; · 
ing, in addition to such remedies as may be available within 
*the union. _ (Chap. 150A, Section 4, sub-section (6), 
ss• Massachusetts State Labor Relations Act.) 
1 . In a number of cases the United States Supreme Court 
has indicated that an absolute prohibition, as opposed to regu-
lation; of a particular activity or ocGupation was a denial of 
due process where it appeared that the taking was very great 
ancl the evil sought to be remedied was incommensurate, and 
that the evils could be avoided by legislation short of pro-. 
hibition. In connection with the thesis advanced in this. por-
tion of the brief, the following language of the Court in 
Adams v. Tawner, 244 U. S. 590, at 594, is applicable, even 
though this Court may_ not agree with the ultimate holding in 
the case: 
'' Because abuses may, and probably do, grow up in connec-: 
tion with this business, is adequate reason for hedgh1g it 
about by proper regulations. But this is not enough to justify 
destruction of one's right to follow a distinctly .useful calling 
in an upright way. Certainly there is no profession, possibly 
no business, which does not offer peculiar opportunities for 
reprehensive practices; and as to every one of them, no doubt, 
some can be found quite ready earnestly to maintain that 
its suppression would be in the public interest. Skillfully; 
directed agitation might also bright about apparent con-· 
demnation of any one of them by the public. Happily for 
all, the fundamental guaranties of the Constitution cannot be: 
freely submerged if and whenever some ostensible justification, 
is advanced and the police power invoked.'' 
That case involved a question of whether ;due process was 
infringed by an outright-prohibition rather than a regulation. 
of private employment agencies in the State of Washington. 
"While the majority held that such prohibition was excessive, 
Mr. Justice Brandies, with whom Justice Holmes and Clarke 
concurred;· dissented on the grounds that available economic 
material supported "a conviction that the evils of. private 
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agencies were inherent and ineradicable''; that these evils 
were very great and the problem confronting the people of 
· · , Washington because •of the operations of private em-
~9• ployment agencies '' was far mo~e comprehensive ~nd· 
· · fundamental than that of protectmg workers applying 
to the private agencies". In his dissent, Mr. Justice Brandeis 
µn.dertook a thorough survey of the nature of private em-
ployment agencies and problems which arose thereunder and 
found as a fact that the. attendall;t evils were- great and the 
institution of private employment agencies not a particularly 
useful or indispensable one. 
With this approach and with the ultimate conclusion reached 
in ··Justice Brandeis' dissent we are in accord. Appellants 
do not contend that, merely because an activity or occuP.ation 
~ not inherently evil, · it cannot be prohibited · but must be 
regulated, or even that prohibition is inconsistent with due 
pr<>bess where t4e same end result might conceivably be 
reached by regulation:. Whether prohibition is reasonable 
cleJ>ends upon a number of factors, the most important of 
which are, first, the nature of the subject matter being pro-
hibited, and, second, the nature of the evils which the State 
seeks to prevent. If, as in the present case, the activity in 
question is a fundamental one serving many salutary -and 
· indispensable purposes, the total prohibition· of which would 
have adverse repercussions not only upon a large segment of 
i;~e public, but also upon the entire economy of the State; aiid 
if, as in the present case, both the evils reasonably to be feared 
~nd·'the interests to be p·rotected are slight or imaginary, then 
reasonable men could hardly differ on the proposition that 
prohibition would be excessive and arbitrary when regulation: 
could accomplish the desired result. 
· A case similar in nature to Ada,m,s v. Ta;n;ner, supra, is D. E. 
Weaver v. Palmer Brothers, 270 U. S. 402. There, the United 
Stj),tes Supreme Court found an absolute prohibition of the use 
of ~hoddy in the making of comforters to be arbitrary where 
regulation would have served the legislative purpose of elimi-
nating a health hazard. Although Mr. Justice Holmes dis-
. sented along with Justices Brandeis and Stone, he •im-
90• ·plied that, were not the evils great, and were it. possible 
· to distinguish the end products of good and bad manu-
facturing· techniques, he might question the absolute pro-
l'tibition. In Ootting v. Oodalrd, 183 U. S. 79, this Court noted 
that'"limitations is not the equivalent of confiscation." 
'· ·-·: . 
The principle that total prohibition of an activity or occu-
pation not mal,,u,m, in se is excessive where regulation would 
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suffice is accepted not only by this Court but throughout the , 
States. See Freund, "The Police Power", Sec. 62. See, in 
particular, People-v. Weiner, 271 Ill. 74, 110 N. E. 870; People 
v. Ringe, 197 N. Y. 143, 90.N. E. 451, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 528, 
18 Ann. Oas. 474; Marymont v. Nevada State Banking Board, 
33 Nev. 333, 111 Pac. 295, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 477, Ann .. Oas. 
1914A, 162. Indeed, at least two (North Carolina and Ne-
braska) of the three courts upholding similar laws have in-
dicated strong agreement with the rule; in view of the force-
able language in the following decisions, their reluctance or 
refusal even to comment on this particular arg-ument, pressed 
both in brief and orally, is somewhat surprising. In No-rtli' 
Carolin(), v. Harris, 216 N. C. 746, 6 S. E. (2d) 854, 128 A. L. R. 
658, the North Carolina Snpreme Court said: ·· 
''Referring to industrial trades, it is said in the article on 
Constitutional Law, 11 Am. Jur. 1048: 'As to them, the power 
of regulation is comparatively slight, when they are conduc~ed · 
and carried on upon private property and private means.' In 
such cases the lawmaking body is usually relegated to restric-
tionf:! more distinctly regulative rather than prohibitive. The 
principle justifying requirements of personal fitness as a 
tion to pertinent constitutional guaranties of personal libertY, 
condition for engaging in an occupation is a narrow excep~· 
which cannot be enlarged beyond its proper scope without 
such violence to their purpose as would be subyersive of· 
the freedom which has beeµ· universally attributed to thi 
American system. . 
"It follows that there is a well recognized gap between the· 
regulation of a business or occupation and •restrictions 
91 flt preventing persons f rO'ln engaging in them to wh.ick 
courts must pay ca,reful attention. ·· 
"There is nothing in government more dangeroits to liberty. 
and rights of the individual than a too ready resort to the po-
lice power. It is a $Uff icient ref erenae to history to recall that 
these restraints 1were the ou,tcome of an appreciation of tha~ 
fact, born of experience. They are categorically addressed 
to that issue. They are the product of an individualistic age, 
and there is little room to doubt their intended scope and 
purpose as affecting decision in the instant case. Resort to 
the police power to exclude persons from an ordinary calling, 
finding justification only by the existence of a vagu~ public· 
interest, often amounting to n:o more than a doubtful social 
convenience, is collectivistic in principle, destructive to the 
historic values of these guaranties, and contrary to the genius 
of the people who did al,l that was humanly possible to secure. 
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them in a written constitutio1i. We believe that they were.in-
. tended to give to the individual a larger endowment of per-
sonal liberty than could be othe.rwise guaranteed; a greater 
opportunity for initiative, and the acquisition of. those in-
terests which make for responsible· citizenship.'' (Emphasis 
supplied.} · · 
· In Webber v. City· of Scotsbluff, 141 Neb .. 363, 3 N. W. (2d) 
635, the Nebra~k3:. Supreme Court stated: 
. "That the City of Scots bluff had the power to enact an 
ordinance regulating auction sales is not questioned. This 
power is statutory. Comp. St.1929, sec.16-238. The question 
is not the lack of power to enact, but whether or not the 
enactment places arbitray a1J1,d U1J1,reasonable restrictions on the · 
conduct of lawful business, whether or not it is class legis-
lation, whether or not it is a prohibition instead of a regu-
lation, whether or not it is in violation of the guaranties of 
the Constitution of N ebi'aska, and whether or not it is violativ,1 
of the Foitrtemith. Amendment to the Federal Constitution .. 
• • $ 
"The right to regular auction sales is found in the police 
power, and the regulatory provisions of an •ordinance 
92e under the police power must have some relation to the 
public health, safety or welfare • * * If they do not bear 
such relation they are void as an invasion of the property 
rights of persons affected by their enforcement. * • * 
'' Assuming that these regulatory provisio'Jis do have som.e 
relatio1i to publiG liealtli, safety or welfare? it. seems clear 
that th<3y arbitrarily and wnreasonably inter/ ere with private 
business a;nd impose unreasonable (J!IZd unnecessary restric-
tions on auction sales and for that reason may 1not be upheld 
• • ~ . In the sense of the approach by the City of Scotsbluff 
to auction sales, the ordinance here is in its essence in terms 
restrictive rather than regulatory. 
· "We conclude, therefore, that the provisions of the ordi-
nance in question to which attention has been directed are 
unreasonable and arbitrary, that they are, as applied to the. 
business of selling at auction, 'restrictive rather than reg·ula-
tory, and that the entire ordinance creates an arbitrary, illegal 
and unreasonable classification. The ordinance is, therefore,. 
in its entirety Ufl.Co1istitutional ·a-nd void .. n (Emphasis sup-
plied.) · 
vVbile it is true that the States have great discretion both 
in the choice of subjects of legislative regulation and in the 
• ~ I 
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means of accomplishing desired ends, still some·restraint.must 
exist if individual freedoms are to survive. The principle 
long ago expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes in the Mahon case~ 
260 U. S., at 414, that total prohibition might be excessfve 
where '' The extent of the public intere~t is ahown by· the 
statute to be limited i:. * ., [ and] on the other hand the extent 
of the taking is great'' is a sound one; to follow it does not 
involve. any real interef erence with legislative prerogatives, 
while, on the other hand, a degree of protection for indi-
vidual liberties is thereby accorded as against ill-considered 
legislation sometimes resulting from the "clamor of an ex~ 
cited .people" or from mass hysteria and passing public 
frenzies often all too easily induced by a hostile and undis-
criminating press. 
93* *E. Discriminatory Aspects of Prohibition. 
1. In General. 
Final evidence of the irrationality and unreasonableness of 
any outright prohibition on the making of union-security; 
agreements, as well as of possible violations of the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, is seen in the 
c;Iiscriminations and inequities thereby produced. One result 
of discrimination has already been noted, namely, the fact 
that while, on the one hand, organized labor is deprived of its 
one consolidative technique, business managers are left witht 
at least seven such techniques having direct relationship to 
their dealings with organized labor. See Economic Brief, 
Appendix E, p. 29. Assuredly, the scales have been made to 
weigh heavily and unreasonably on the side of management 
as a result of depriving workers of the right to enter into 
union-security arrangements, and· the ability of workers to 
compete with business managers in gaining an adequate share 
of the national income has been materially lessened. . 
Similarly, the ability of organized employees to compete 
with unorganized employees for fair wages has been reduced 
if not destroyed. Surely, the State has lent its weight and 
support to one class of competitor and against another in 
the econoniic struggle and competition between workers not 
only for jobs but for jobs which pay an adequate wage. It 
has sided with those workers who believe they can best bar-
gain with their employer individually in majestic, if poverty-· 
stricken, aloofness from their fellow workers, and against'. 
those workers who, heeding the lessons of the centuries,. be.,., 
lieve that '' a single employee is helpless in dealing with a:if 
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employer • • • and that union is essential to give laborers 
opportunity to deal on an equality with their employer." 
(National Labor Relations Board v. Jones ct Lau,ghlin Steel . 
Corporation, supra. It has thrown its weight on the side of 
the "free rider'' who, though perfectly willing to· accept all 
the benefits of collective bargaining acl1ieved only through 
the struggle •and sacrifice of his fellow workers who 
94• are union members, is unwilling to contribute to the costs 
of such benefits.14 
Since under any law outlawing the union-security principle 
the State can be interested only in benefiting a particular 
class of private persons, namely, non-unionists or those claim-
ing an unqualified right to work without joining with their 
fellow workers in a labor organization, and not the public in 
general, the _holding of this Court in Tr:eigle v. Acme Home-
stead Association, 297 U. S. 189, is applicable. There, this 
Court held that legislation restricting rights protected under 
the Fourteenth Amendment or under the contract clause must 
be enacted for a purpose reasonably connected with protecting 
public interest as distinguished from a pu~pose of protecting 
purely private rights. In that case the State of Louisiana 
had attempted to alter contracts between building and loan 
associations and their members, by penalizing members with-
drawing from the association for the benefit of those who re-:-
mained. In deciding that the due process clause had been 
violated,. this Court, in a unanimous opinion, stated as fol-
lows: .. 
'' 
0 
• • We recognize that these associations, like banks 
and public service companies, are subject to a degree of regu-
lation which would be unnecessary and unreasonable in the 
ease of a purely private corporation. B'ltt laws to'll,ching bitild-
ing and loam, associations, like those affecting banks or utility 
companies, must be confined to purposes reasonably corvnected 
with the public interest as distinguished from purely private 
rights. The legislature has no greater power to interfere with 
the private contracts of such corporations, *or the vested 
95• rights of their stockholders as such, under the pretext 
of.. public ne~essity, than it would have to ~ttempt th~ 
uJn American Federation of Labor v. Watson, et aZ., 60 Fed. Supp. 1010 
{later reversed by the United States 'Supreme Court in 327 U. S. 582), a 
Florida three-judge District Court attempted to answer the "free rider" argu-
ment and its obvious analogy to the requirement that all in a community pay taxes to support the comm.unity by asserting that under our tax system there 
are also many "free rid1ars." Such an answer overlooJ{s the obvious fact that 
_taxes are required of all who, like employees receiving wages achieved through 
collective bargaining, have an ability to pay and are particularly required of 
those obtaining special benefits. · 
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same ends in the case of a private corporation. Though the 
obligations of contracts ,nust yield to a proper exercise of the 
police power, and vested rights cannot inhibit the proper exer-
tion of the power, it must be exercised for an end 'luhick is in 
fact pu-0lic and the means adopted must be reasonably adapted, 
to the accmnpli,shment of that end and must not be arbitrary 
or oppressive. 
'' .As we have pointed out, the questioned sections deal only 
with private rights, and are not adapted to the legitimate 
end of conserving or equitably administering the _assets in the 
interest of all members. They deprive withdrawing members 
of a solvent asso_eiation of existing contract rights, for the 
benefit of those who remain. We hold the challenged pro-
visions impair the obligation of the appellant's contract and 
arbitrarily deprive him of vested property rights without due 
process of law." (297 U. S., at 197.) (Emphasis supplied.) 
There is also involved in this law, over and above the fore-
going inequities, a particularly insidious form of confisca-
tion. Under federal law labor organizations which repre-
sent a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargain-
ing unit are under obligation to represent equally all em-
ployees in the bargaining unit. Steele v. Louist'ille ct Nash-
ville RJJ. Co., supra. Such an organization has imposed upon 
it the duty of extending its services impartially to all who 
comprise the industrial society for which it speaks and acts. 
But the costs of industrial self-government, like the costs of· 
political government, are not small. The costs to the labor 
organization of obtaining wage increases and other improve-
ments of working conditions~ the expense of. servicing an 
agreement already entered into, of adjusting grievances, of 
maintaining stewards and business representatives, are con-
siderable, and the process of coliective bargaining itself in-
volves financial outlay, as, for instance, the hiring of eco-
nomists for research work, the hiring of lawyers for 
96• leg·al advice, and the paying of •compensation for the · 
loss of time occasioned to employees acting as bargain-
ing committees. Yet unions are denied the right to seek, 
throug·h closed-shop agreements, to require all who benefit 
from collective action to· contribute to the costs. thereof. 
The implications of the Steele case denote another species 
of discrimination. It can truthfully be said that by virtue 
of their obligation to serve equally all within the bargaining 
unit, federal law has imposed upon labor organizations, ob-:-
ligations akin to those of governmental bodies, public utilities 
or common carriers. It could hardly be asserted that a law 
requiring utilities or common carriers to extend their s~rv-
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ices to some .customers on gratuitous basis, while requiring 
the remaining and similarly situated customers to carry all 
of the costs of maintaining the service, would be constitu-
tional. Wherever comparable attempts have been made., the 
courts have promptly struck them down as. unconstitutional .. 
Numerous cases on this point are set forth in the footnote 
to the general rule stated in 43 .American Jurispr'Udence 683 
to ,_be as follows: 
'' As a· general rule a public utility cannot discriminate 
unjustly in its rates to consumers similarly situated or of 
the same class for the same service or kind of service." 
See, in particular, Cotting v. Godard, 183 U. S., at page 86,. 
wherein it is .stated as follows:. 
97$ *'' 'From what has thus been said it is not to be in-
ferred that this power of limitation or regulation is 
itself without limit. This power to regulate is not a power 
to destroy, and limitation is not the equivalent of confisca-
tion. Under pretense of reg11lati11g· fares and freights the 
State cannot require a railroad corporation to carry per-
sons or property without reward; neither can it do that 
which ~n law amounts to a taking· of private property for 
public use without just compensation or without due process 
of law.'" · 
See also Louisville & Nasliville R.R. Co. v. Railroa(l Com-
mission, 19 Fed .. 679, where it was held that a statute g·iving 
a railroad commission the power, for undisclosed rf\ason and 
withou~ accountability to anyone, to giv~ better rates to one 
corporation than another was unconstitutional. And see 
Salisbury & Spencer R. R. Co. v. Southern Power Co., 179 
N. C. 18, 101 S. E. 593, 12 A. L. R. 304, where it was held 
that an electric power utility cannot discriminate in charge 
or service between the several members of the ~lass desiring 
or utilizing its service. 
The discussion under Section III of this brief indicates at 
a minimum the following:. 
Since the· absolute prohibitions against the making of 
union-security agreements are demonstrably arbitrary and 
discriminatory, since no real public interest is in fact tliere-
by served but only the interests of a private few, and since 
the extent of the deprivation is entirely incommensurate 
with the evils reasonably to be feared and such eviJs could 
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readily have been reached by regulation rather than 
9g• *prohibition, the anti-union-security law in question 
violates the Fourteenth .Amendment and must be 
stricken down even though rights of a less fundamental ha!-
ture than those discussed in Section II are here involved. 
Nebbia v. New York, supra; Trei,qle v. Acme Homestead, 
supra; Adams v. Tanner, supra. There is ·.simply no ra.. 
tional basis in the protection of any public, as distinguished . 
from private, interest for the total prohibition here imposed; 
if the justifications advanced are deemed sufficient, then 
there is no traditional activity or institution in our society 
which similarly cannot be proscribed. The Constitution con-
templates that State interference with individual liberties be 
kept at a minimum. While organized labor is the first to 
appreciate the need for social experimentation hy the State, 
such need cannot justify a wanton destruction of deeply-
rooted institutions at any time the police power is ostensibly 
invoked. 
99• •CONCLUDING STATEMENT AND PRAYER. 
Few cases since Thornhill 's have had implications affect-
ing the American Labor movement as deeply as the case at 
bar. This case will determine the extent of state preroga-
tive not only ts> remove traditional subject matters from the 
field of collective bargaining, but also to proscribe, uncondi-
tionally, an institution coeval with trade unionism itself and 
without which institution, absent factors of state protection, 
organized labor must inevitably disintegrate into debility. 
The prohibitions of the enactment herein involve far more 
tban the regulation of labor unions which the United States 
Supreme Court indicated was permissive in the Tho'Yrtas 
case; rather they trespass upon, in a very real and practica( 
manner, the domains set apart for free assembly as exer-
cised by workingmen in the conduct of their everyday af-
fairs. It is respectfully urged, upon the authorities and ar-
guments presented above, that this court declare the anti-
union-security prohibitions herein invalid as contravening the 
state and federal Constitutions. 
For the reasons assigned, your petitioners pray that a 
writ of error and supersedeas may be awarded your peti-
tioners to the said judgment of the Circuit Court of the 
County of Elizabeth City, Virginia, that the same may be 
reviewed and reversed and that final judgment may be en-
tered up for your petitioner.sin this .Court. 
Counsel for petitioners adopt this petition as their brief 
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and· aver that a copy thereof was duly delivered to Mr. F. 
Lee Ford, opposing counsel in the trial court on the 27th day 
of October, 1948. ' , 
100• •counsel for petitioners desire to state orally their 
reasons for reviewing the judgment complained of and 
pray opportunity of the Court to so do. This petition is be-
ing filed in the Clerk's Office of the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia., at Richmond. · 
Respectfully submitted, 
BEECHER E. STALLARD, 
J. ALBERT WOLL, 
HERBERT S. THATCHER, 
JAMES A. GLENN, 
Counsel for Claude F. Finney, Min-
nie B. Flint, and Newport News 
Building and Construction Trades 
Council, an Unincorporated associa-
tion, petitioners. 
I, the undersigned, art attorney at law, practicing· in the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, am respectfully of 
t.he opinion that the judgment complained of in the foregoing 
petition is erroneous and that the same should be reviewed 
and reversed. 
CHARLES W. CROWDER. 
Richmond, Va. 
• Received October 27, 1948. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
Nov. 23, 1948. Writ of error and S'Upersedeas awarded by 
the court. Bond $600. 
M. B. W. 
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RECORD 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of Elizabeth City County, 
Virginia. 
Be it remembered that heretofore., to-wit: on the 6th day 
of February, 1948, came Harley A. Hawkins, plaintiff, by 
F. Lee Ford, his attorney, and filed his notice of motion for 
judgment against Claude F. Finney, :M:in~e B. Flint and 
N ewpoFt News Building and Construction Trades Council, an 
unincorporated association, defendants, which notice of mo-
tion for judgment is in words and figures, as follows to-wit: 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court for the County of Elizabeth City. 
Harley A. Hawkins, Plaintiff, 
'V. 
Claude F. Finney, Minnie B. Flint and N~wport News Build.l 
ing and Construction Trades Council, an unincorporated 
association, Defendants 
NOTICE OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
To: Claude F. Finney 
Elizabeth City County 
Virginia 
To : Minnie B. Flint 
7 40 31st Street 
Newport News, Virginia 
To: Newport News Building and Construction Trades 
· Council 
2901 Jefferson A venue 
Newport News, Virginia 
You., and each of you, are her~by no,ti:fied that on the 20th 
day of February, 1948, at 10:00 o'clock A. M., or as soon 
thereafter \as I may be heard, at the· Court house in Elizabeth 
City County, Virginia, I will move the Circuit Court of 
Elizabeth City County, Hampton, Virginia, for a judgment 
against you in the sum of Three Hundred_ Fifty Dollars 
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( $350.00) for damages suffered by me growing 
page 2A } directly out of and because of the wrongful and 
unlawful acts of you and each of you toward and 
against me in this, to-wit: 
That you, the said Claude F. Finney and the said :Minnie 
B. Flint, during the months of September and October, 1947, 
and for sometime prior thereto, were partners engaged in 
the business of printing and running and operating a print 
shop known as Brickey Print Shop, located at 2615 Kecoug·h-
tan Road, Elizabeth City County, Virginia; that you., the 
said Minne B. Flint, although a partner, were at all times 
acting by and through your agent and employee in the con-
du_ct- of said partnership business, he being Clyde J. Flint~ 
I, the said Harley A. Ha"o/ldns, was an employee from week 
to week of you · a.nd each of you, engaged as a pressman in 
said Brickey Print Shop, located as aforesaid; that some-
time in the month of September, 1947, while I was working 
for you and each of you as aforesaid in said County, yon, the 
said Claude F. Finney, acting for and on behalf of yourself 
and your said partner, orally inquired of me if I was a mem-
ber of any printer's or pressman's labor union or any other. 
labor union, to which inquiry I orally answered that I was 
not a member of any labor union or labor organization ; 
thereupon, you, the said Claude F. Finney,, acting· as afore-
said, stated to me that you and your aforesaid partner! act-
ing as a partnership, had contra(.lted ·with the said Newport 
News Building and Construction Trades Council, a labor or-
ganization, whereby you the said Claude F. Finney and the 
said Minnie B. Flint, partners, trading and doin~ business 
as the Brickey Print Shop, were to print and circulate a P.Ub-
lication known as '' The Virginia and Peninsula 
page 3A } Building Trade Journal". You further stated 
that for better and more harmonious relations 
with the employees of you, the said Claude F. Finney and 
Minnie B. Flint, trading as aforesaid, and for more efficient 
production, had agreed to ancl with the said Newport News 
Building and Construction Trades Council to employ union 
labor only in your said business Imown as Brickey Print 
Shop, as aforesaid. 
You, the said Claude F. Finney and the said Minnie B .. 
Flint, partners, trading as aforesaid, acting in concert with 
the defendant, the said Newport News Building and Con-
struction Trades Council, a labor organization engaged in 
representing employees for the purpose of collective· bar-
gaining, did in fact enter into an agreement, contrary to and 
in violation of the stat11;te of Virginia, hereinafter set forth; 
; 
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which said agreement is dated on or about the 31st dav of 
July, 1947; whic.h said agreement is to be effective for" one 
year; which said agreement, among other things, provides 
as follows : ·· 
"None but members i~ continu~us good standing of Local 
Unions of the American Federation of Labor shall be em .. 
ployed by the Brickey Print Shop on all of its operations.'' 
· Thereupon, you,. the said Claude F. Finney, acting as afore-
said, requested, demanded and directed that I immediately 
make application to become a member of the printer's or 
pressman's labor union or some other appropriate labor 
union, organization, and I thereupon, refused said request, 
demand and direction and stated that I would not make ap-
plication nor become a member of any labor union or organi-
zation. And you, the said Claude F. Finney, acting for your-
self and for your aforesaid partner, thereupon, insisted that 
I join some labor union or failing to do so, that you, the said 
Claude F: Finney, acting as aforesaid, would dis-
page 4A ~ charge me from my said employme:p.t in Elizabeth 
City County. .. On or about October 10, 1947, at 
a time when I had failed and refused to join any labor union 
or labor organization, requested and demanded of me, as 
aforesaid, you, the said Claude F. Finney, acting for yourself 
and for your aforesaid.partner, and in concert with said New-
port News Building and Construction Trades Council, dis-
missed and discharged me froni my employment as aforesaid 
at the said Brickey Print Shop, Elizabeth City County, Vir-
gfoia, because of my refusal to join any labor union or or-
ganization, and your said action in requesting and demand-
ing that I join a laboi~ union or organization and dismissing 
and discharging me from services as your employee as afore-
said, caused me to suffer damages in the sum .of Three Hun-
dred Fifty Dollars ($350.00) as aforesaid and such denial and 
deprivation of employment' as aforesaid_ by you, and said 
Building· Trades Council, acting at all times in concert wi~h 
you as aforesaid were in violation of the Act of the General 
Assembly of Virginia, approved January 21, 1947, in extra 
session of General Assembly, which said act is as follows: · 
'' An ACT to declare the public ,policy of Virginia with re-
~pect to membership or non-membership in labor organiza! 
tions as affecting the right to work; to make unlawful and 
to prohibit combinations or ag·reements which require mem-
berspip in labor organizations as a condition of employment; 
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to provide that membership in or payment of money to any 
labor organization shall not be necessary for employment; 
and to authorize suits for damages for violations of certain 
pr~visions ~hereof. 
APPROVED JANUARY 21, 1947. 
· Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia:. 
1. Section 1. It is hereby declared to be the public policy 
of Virginia that the right of p~rsons to work shall· not be 
denied or abridged on account of membership or_noii='iiiem-
. bership in any labor unfon or labor organization. 
page 5A ~ Section 2. Any. agreement or combination be-
tween any employer and any labor union or labor 
organization whereby person~t members of such union or 
organization shall be denied the right to work for said em-
ployer, or whereby such membership is made a condition of 
employment or continuation of employment by such em .. 
ployer, or whereby any such- union or organization acquires 
an employment monopoly in any enterprise, is hereby de .. 
olared to be against public policy and an illegal combination 
or conspiracy. 
Section 3. No person shall be required by an. employer to 
become or remain a member of any labor ·union or labor or. 
ganization as a condition of employment or continuation of 
employment by ·such employer. · · 
Section 4. No person shall be required by an employer to 
abstain or refrain from membership in any labor union or 
labor organization as a condition of employment or continua- , 
tion of employment. 
Seotion 5. No employer shall require any person, as a con-
dition of employment or continuation of employment, to pay 
any dues, fees or other charges of any kind to any labor union 
or labor organization. 
Section 6. Any person who may be denied employment or 
be ·deprived of continuation of his employm~nt in violation 
of sections three, four or five or of one or more of such sec-
tions, shall be entitled to recover from such employer and 
from any other person, firm, corporation or association act-
ing in concert with him by appropriate action in the Courts 
of this Commonwealth such damages as he may have sustained 
by reason of. such denial or deprivation of employment. 
Section 7. The provisions of this act shall not apply to any 
lawful contract in force on the effective date hereof but they 
shall apply in all respects to contracts entered into thereafter 
and to any renewal or extension of an existing contract. 
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Section 8. If any one or more sections, clauses, sentences, 
or parts of this act shall for any reason be questioned in any 
court, and shall be adjudged unconstitutional or invalid, such 
judgment shall not affect, impair or invalidate the remaining 
provisions thereof but shall be confined in its operation to the 
specific provisions to be held unconstitutional or invalid, and 
the inapplicability or invalidity of any section, clause, 'or-pro .. 
vision .of this act in any one or more instances or circum .. 
stances shall not be taken to affect or prejudice in any way 
• its applicability or validity in any other instance." . (Acts of 
.Assembly, 1947, Extra Session, P. 12). · 
You may appear at such date and time and place, all as 
aforesaid, at which time and place I will ask judgment as 
afore said and you may do such things as are necessary to pro-
tect your interest. 
F'. LEE. FORD, 
Atty. for the Plaintiff. 
. H.A.RLEYi A. HAWKINS 
By ·F. LEE FORD 
His Attorney~ 
page 6A} Upon the back which appear the following words 
and fig-ures, to-wit : 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of Elizabeth County. 
Harley A. Hawkins, Plaintiff 
v. 
Claude F. Finney, Minnie B. Flint and Newport News Build-
ing and Construction Trades Council, an unincorporated 
association, Defendants. 
ijOTIOE OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
Rec'd. 2-6-48 at 9:00 A. M. R. E. Wilson, Clerk by Diana 
C. Lockwood, Dep. Olk. 
·Writ tax $1.00 
· Deposit 5·.00. 
$6.00 Paid 2/17 /48 by F. Lee Ford, p. q. R. E. 
Wilson, Clerk, by Diana O. 
Lockwood, Dep. Clk 
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, Feb. 6th, 1948. Notice of motion returned executed, Feb .. 
4th, 1948, by .Sgt. City of Newport News, Va. 
. Feb. 17th, 1948.. Writ tax and deposit paid and cause duly 
docketed for he~ring Feb. 20th, 1948, the day to which it is 
returnable to court. 
. No party requiring a jury all matters were submitted to the 
court without a jury. Judgment of the Court is the plaintiff 
recover from the defendants the sum of $330.00 with interest 
from this date and his costs. 
7/14/48. 
F. A. K., Judge. 
page 7 A } And on another day, to-wit: 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the County of Elizabeth City 
Harley A. Hawkins, Plaintiff 
v. . 
Claude ·F. ;Finney, Minnie B. Flint, a~d Newport News Build-
ing Trades Council, an unincorporated association, De-
-· . fendants .. 
DEMURRER. 
The demurrer of Claude F. Finney, Minnie B. Flint and 
Newport News Building · Trades Council,. an unincoi·porated 
association, defendants, to the Notice of Motion for Judgment 
of Harley A. Hawkins, filed in this action. 
_ The said defendants say that the Notice of Motion for 
Judgment of Harley .A. Hawkins is insufficient in law and as 
grounds of aemurrer assign the following: 
1. The alleged law prevents any employer or labor organi-
zation including the defendants herein, from entering into or 
r_enewing m"!,ltually agreeable collective bargaining agree-
ments containing union shop or·union security provisions or 
requiring employees, as in the present case, to become and 
remain a member of a labor organization as a condition. for 
employment, and thereby deprives labor organizations and , 
their members and employers, including the defendants l1erc-
in, of property rights and liabilities, iu particular, the right 
~nd liberty freely to contract and the liberty of an employer,. 
including the defendant employers herein, to conduct their 
• 
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own business and to select their own employees free from :-µn~ 
due interference by the state, all in violation of Article 1, Sec-
tion 11· of'the Constitution of Virginia, and of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.; -. 
page SA~ · The alleg·ed law is arbitrary, unreasonable and 
excessive. and in violation of the constitutional 
guarantees as aforesaid against the impairment of the obliga-
tion of and freedom to enter into contracts as protected um-
der the State and Federal Constitutions as aforesaid. : 
2. The alleged law constitutes class legislation and is dis- · 
criminatory and therefore, is void under Article 1, Sections 
1 and 11 of the Virginia Constitution and under the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
3. The alleged law impairs and -previously restrains the 
exercise by the union defendants of their civil rig·hts of as-
sembly and speech, all in violation of Article 1, Sections 1, 11; 
and 12 of the Virginia Constitution, and of the First and 
·Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. ·. 
BEECHER E. ST.ALLARD 
HERBERTS.THATCHER 
736 Bowen Building, 
Washington 5, D.. C. 
Counsel for defendants. 
Upon the back which appear the following words and 
figures, to-wit: 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the County of Elizabeth City 1! • 
Harley A. Hawkins, Plaintiff 
v. 
Claude F. Finney, Minnie B. Flint, and Newport News Build-
ing Trades Council, an unincorp9rated association, De-
fendants. · 
DEMURRER. 
· Filed in the Clerk's Office Feby. 23, 1948. R. E. Wilson, 
Clerk, by S. M. Gibson, 
Dep. Olk. 
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page 9A ~ And at another day, to-wit: 
Oircuit Court of the County of Elizabeth City, Virginia, on 
Saturday the ·first day of May, in the year of our Lord, one 
~ousand nine ·hundred ~nd forty-eight. · 
• • • 
Harley A. Hawkins 
v . 
." Olaude F. Finney, Minnie B. Flint and Newport News Build-
ing and Construction Trades Council. 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT . 
. This day came the parties by their attorneys and counsel 
having heretofore argued a demurrer filed by the defendants, 
which has been maturely considered by the Court; the Court 
doth render a written opinion and over-rule the demurrer of 
the defendants. 
Whereupon, the defendants by counsel noted their excep-
tions for the reasons previously stated. 
And the Court doth continue the further bearing of this 
noµce of motion until the June Term 1948 of this Court. 
lOA } And at another day, to-wit: 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court o~ the County of Elizabeth City 
. Harley A. Hawkins, Plaintiff 
v. 
Claude F. Finney, Minnie B. Flint and Newport News Build .. 
ing and Construction Trades Council, an unincorporated 
association, Defendants. 
PLEA OF NOT GUILTY. 
The said defendants, Claude F .. Finney, Minnie B. Flint, 
and Newport News ·Building and Construction Trades Coun-
cil, an unincorporated association, by their attorney, come and 
say tlm.t they are not guilty of the premises in this action laid 
to their charge, in manner and form as the plaintiff hath com-
plained. And of this the said defendants put themselves upon 
th~ country. · · 
BEECHER.E. S'XALL~RD, p. q. 
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Upon the back which appear the following words and 
figures, to-wit: 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the County or Elizabeth City 
Harley A. Hawkins, Plaintiff 
v. . 
Claude F. Finney, et als., Defendants. 
Recorded in Clerk's office May 27, 1948. 
R. E, WILSON, Clerk 
By S. M. GIBSON, Dep. Clk. 
page llA} And at another day, to .. wit: 
Virginia: 
· In the Circuit Court of the County of Eliizabeth City 
Harley A. Hawkins, Plaintiff 
v. 
. 1 
Claude F. Finney, Minnie B. Flint, and Newport News Build-
ing Trades Council, an unincorporated asso~iation, De-
fendants. 
MOTION TO STRIKE THE EVIDENCE. 
Counsel for all the defendants wishes to move that all the 
evidence in this case, be stricken out and final judgment be 
entered in behalf of all the defendants for the following rea .. 
sons: 
1. The alleged law under which the plaintiff sues prevents 
any employer or labor organization, including the defendants 
herein, from entering into or renewing mutually agreeable 
collective bargaining agreements containing union shop or 
union security provisions or requiring employees, as m. the 
present case, to become and remain a member of a labor or-
·ganization as a condition of employmeJ'.!.t, and thereby de-
prives labor organizations and their members and employers, 
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including the defendants herein, of property rights and 
liberties, in particular, the right and liberty freely to contract 
and the liberty of an employer, inclu.ding the defendant em-
ployers herein, to conduct their own business and to select 
their own employees free from undue interference by the 
state, ·all in violation of Article 1, Section 11 of the Constitu-
tion of Virginia, and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 
The alleged law under which the plaintiff sues is arbitrary., 
unreasonable and excessive · and is in violation of the consti-
·tntional guarantees as aforesaid against the impairment of 
the obligation of and freedom to enter into con-
page 12A ~ tracts as protected under the State and Federal 
Constitutions as aforesaid. 
2. The aIIeged law under which the plaintiff sues consti-
tutes class legislation and is discriminatory and therefore, is 
void under Article 1, Sections 1 and 11 of the Virginia Con-
stitution and under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. 
3. The alleged law under which the plaintiff sues impairs 
and previo11sly restrains the exercise by the defendants of 
their civil rights of assembly and speech,.all in violation of 
Article 1, Sections 1, 11 and 12 of the Virginia Constitution,. 
and of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution. 
BEECHER E. STALLARD 
Counsel for Claude F. Finney, Minnie 
B. Flint and Newport News Building 
Trades Council, an unincorporated as-
sociation, Defendants . 
.Upon the back which. appear the following words and 
~gure,s, to-wit: 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the County of Elizabeth City 
~arley A. Hawkins, Plaintiff 
v. 
9Iaude F. Finney, et als., Defendants . 
. Fi.led 7/14/48 F. A. K. Judge. 
Claude F: Finney, et als., v. ·Hµ.rley A. Hawkins 
MOTION TO STRIKE THE EVIDENCE. 
page 13A r .And on the same day, to-wit: · .\ 
~9 
\ 
. Circuit Court of the County of Elizabeth City, Virginia, on 
Wednesday the fourteenth day of July,. in the year of our 
Lord, one thousand. nine hundred and forty-eight . 
* • 
Harley A. Hawkins, Plaintiff 
~ i 
Claude F. Finney, Minnie B. Flint, and Newport News Build-
ing Trades Council, an unincorporated association, De-
fendants. 
This day came again the parties, by their attorneys, and 
argument being heard upon the defendant's "motion to strike 
out plainti:ff 's evidence, and enter up judgment for def end-. 
ants", which motion was·filed on the 14th day of July, 1948. 
Upon consideration whereof, the court doth overrule -said 
·motion to which action of the Court the defendants, by their · 
counsel, excepted upon the grounds. set out in said motion.· 
. 
page 14A ~ And on the same day, to-wit: 
Circuit Court of the County of Elizabeth City, Virginia, on 
Wednesday the fourteenth day of July, in the year of our 
Lord, one thousand nine hundred and forty-eight. .· 1 
• • 
Harley A. Hawkins, Plaintiff 
'I 
v. '~ 
Claude F. Finney, Minnie B. Flint, and Newport News .Build-
ing Trades Council, an unincorporated association, De-
fendants. 
ORDER AWARDING JUDGMENT. 
This day came the plaintiff by counsel, and the defendants·; 
by counsel, and counsel for the plaintiff moved for judgment 
in accordance with his notice of said motion, which has been 
returned duly exec.uted to the defendants and also submitted 
· testimony to prove the allegations set out in his notice of mor 
tion, and both plaintiff and defendants having waived trial 
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by a jury, the whole matter of law and fact were determined 
by the court. · 
And it is adjudged and ordered that the plaintiff, Harley 
A. Hawkins, do recover of a.nd have judgment against the 
said defendants, Claude F. Finney, Minnie B. Flint and New- ' 
port News Building Trades Council, an unincorporated as-
sociation, jointly and severally in the sum of $330, with in-
terest thereon from the 14th day of July, 1948, and his cost 
by him about this action in his behalf expended, to which rul-
ing and action of the court the defendants by their attorney 
excepted anq movQd to set aside said judgment and enter up 
.. final judgment for the def e*dants for the following reasons: 
1. The alleged law under which the plaintiff sues prevents 
any employer or labor organization, including the defendants 
herein, from entering into or r~newing mutually agreeable 
collective bargaining agreements containing union shop or 
union security· provisions or requiring em-
page 15A ~ ployees, as in the present case, to become and re-
main a member of a labor organization as a con-
dition of employment, and hereby deprives labor organiza-
. tions and their members and employers, including the defend-
ants herein, of property rights and liberties, in particular, 
the right and liberty freely to contract and the liberty of an 
employer, including the defendant employers herein, to con-
duct their own busines and to select their own employees free 
from undue interference by the State, all in violation of Arti-
cle 1, Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia, and of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to· the United States Constitution. 
The alleged law under which the plaintiff sues is arbitrary, 
unreasonable and excessive and is in violation of the consti-
tutional guarantees as aforesaid against the impairment of 
the obligation of and freedom to enter into contracts as pro-
tected under the State and Federal Constitutions as afore-
said. 
2. The alleged law under which the plaintiff su£!s constitutes 
class legislation and is discriminatory and therefore, is void, 
under Article 1, Section 1 and 11 of the Virginia Constitution 
and under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 
3. The alleged law nnder which the plaintiff sues impairs 
and previously restrains the exercise by the defendants of 
their civil rights of assembly and speech, all in violation of 
Article 1,. Sections 1, 11, and i2 of the Virginia constitution, · 
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and of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution. 
This day came again the parties by their respective attor· 
neys and the court having materially considered the de-
fendants' motion to set aside the judgment of the court and 
to enter up final judgment for the defendants, doth overrule 
the same, to which ruling and action of the court def'endant1 
. by their attorney excepted for the reasons stated· 
page 16A } above. . 
Upon the trial of this action the defendants 
having excepted to summary rulings of the court given against 
them on its motion, leave is given to them to file their bills · 
of certificates of exceptions at any time within the period 
prescribed by law, and the defendants intimating their inten-
tion to apply to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
for a writ of error· and supersedeas to the judgment· herein 
pronounced, on their motion it is orcJiered that execution 
upon this judgment be suspended for a period of ninety daya, 
from this day upon condition that within :fifteen days from . 
this date the said defendants or some one for them,. enter 
into a bond in the penalty of Five Hundred Dollars before the 
clerk of this court with surety approved by said clerk and 
conditioned according to law. 
page 17 A ~ Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the County of Elizabeth City. 
Harley A. Hawkins, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Claude F. Finney, Minnie B. Flint,. and Newport News Build-
ing Trades Council, an unincorporated association, Defend-
ants. 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT. 
Counsel for the defendants moves the court to set aside its 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff in this case as being con-
trary to the law and evidenc~ and enter up final judgment 
for the defendants for the following reasons: 
1. The alleged law under which'the plaintiff sues prevents 
any employer or labor organization, including the defendants 
herein, from entering into or renewing mutually agreeable col- · 
lective bargaining agreements containing union shop or union 
security provisions or requiring employees, as in the present 
case, to become and remain a member of a labor organization 
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as a condition of employm~nt, and thereby deprives labor 
organizations and their members and employers, including the 
defendants herein, of property rights and liberties, in par-
ticular, the right and liberty freely to contract and the liberty 
of an employer, including the derendant employers herein, 
to conduct their own business and to select their own em-
ployees free from undue interference by the state, all in vio-
lation of Article 1, Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia, 
and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution. 
The alleged law .under which the plaintiff,sues is arbitrary,. 
unreasonable and excessive and is in violation of the constitu-
tional guarantees as afore said against the impairment of the 
Qbligation of .and freedom to enter into contracts as protected 
under the State and Federal Constitutions as aforesaid. 
2. The alleged law under which the plaintiff 
page 18A ~ sues constitutes class legislation and is discrimi-
natory and the ref ore, is void under Article 1, 
Sections 1 and 11 of the Virginia Constitution and under 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion . 
. -3. The alleged law under which the plaintiff sues impairs 
and previously restrains the exercise by the defendants of 
their civil rights of _assembly and speech, all in violation of 
Article 1, Sections 1, 11 and 12 of the Virginia Constitution, 
and of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution. · 
BEECHER E. STALLARD. 
for Claude F. Finney, Minnie B. Flint 
and Newport News Building Trades 
Council, an unincorporated associ-
ation. 
Upon the back which appear the following words and 
figures, to-wit : 
Virginia: 
. In th.e Circuit Co_urt of the County of Elizabeth City. 
Harley A. Hawkins·, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Claude F. Finney, et als., Defendants. 
Filed 7 /14/ 48. 
F. A. K. Judge. 
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MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT. 
page 19A ~ And at another day, to-wit: 
Circuit Court of the County of Elizabeth City, Virginia, ;on 
Saturday the fourteenth day of August, in the year of our 
Lord, one thousand nine hundred and forty-eight . 
• • • • • • 
Harley A. Hawkins, Plaintiff, 
~ . 
Claude F. Finney, Minnie B. Flint, and Newport News Build-
ing and Construction Trades Council, an unincorporated 
associat~on, Defendants. · 
I 
This day came the parties, by their attorneys, and the de-
fendants, by their attorneys having. tendered to the co~rt. 
their certificate authenticating the stenographic report of all 
the testimony, defendants' motions, opinion of the court and 
plaintiff's exhibit No. 1, and agreement of counsel covering 
same, and certificate of Exceptions No. 1 and other incidents 
of the trial of this case, which we.re received by the court, 
signed, sealed and ordered to be made a part of the record 
in this case, which is accordingly done. 
The Court then lodged with the clerk the authentic.ated 
record of the testimony, defendants' motions, opinion of the 
court and plaintiff's exhibit No. 1, and agreement of counsel 
concerning same, and certificate' of exception No. 1, and oth!er 
incidents of the trial of this case, which were placed in· the 
hands of the Court on the 14th day. of August, 1948, withii 
the time prescribed by law and which were this day authenti~ 
cated by the Court. 
Upon the back of which appears the following words -and 
:figures, to-wit: . -1 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the County of Elizabeth City; 
Harley A. Hawkins, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Claude F. Finney, et als., Defendants. . • 
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page · 19B } I ask for this :· 
BEECHER E. STALLARD, p. d. 
I have seen. 
F. LEE FORD, P. Q. 
Enter 8/14/48. 
F. A. K. Judge. 
20A ~ ,Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the County of Elizabeth City. 
Harley A. Hawkins, Plaintiff, 
'l). . 
· Claude F. Finney, Minnie B. Flint and Newport News Build-
1 ing and Constr:uction Trades Council, an unincorporated 
· association, Defendant~. 
: AUTHENTICATION OF THE STENOGRAPHIC 
RECORD OF THE TESTIMONY AND OTHER 
INCIDENTS OF THE TRIAL UNDER 
RULE 21 OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA. 
I, Frank A. Kearney, Judge of the Circuit Court of the 
County of Elizabeth City, Virginia, who presided over the 
trial in the case of Harley A. Hawkins v. Claude F. Finney, 
Minnie B. Flint and Newport News Building and Construc-
tion Trades Council, an unincorporated association, tried in 
the said court in Hampton, Virginia, on July 14, 1948, do 
hereby certify that the following is an accurate and authen-
ticate stenographic report of the testimony given by Harley 
A. Hawkins and Claude F. Finney, and motions made ·by 
counsel for the defendants to strike out all the evideJ}ce in 
this ~ase and enter up :final judgment for the defendants, 
and also to set aside a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in 
this case as being contrary to the law and evidence, and enter 
up final judgment for the defendants, and plainti:ff 's Exhibit 
No. 1, which is an exact copy of the original exhibit intro-
duced by the plaintiff in this case, and counsel having agreed 
to certify the copy in this certificate, the original and copy 
having been initialed by me for the purpose of identification, 
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and a copy of a written opinion by the court, 
page 21A }·which has been made a part of the record in·this 
. case, by proper certi:fica te of exception -and other 
incidents of the trial of the above styled action. 
I do further certify that the attorney for the plaintiff -had 
reasonable notice in writing given by counsel for the defend-
ants of the time and place when·the report of the testim~ny,: 
motions, exception, exhibit, written opinion and other foci~: ·· 
dents of the trial would be tendered' and presented· to the un-
dersigned for signature and authentication, and that the said 
report was presented to me on .the 14th day of August, 1948, 
within less than sixty days after entry of the final judgment· 
in said action. · 
Given under my hand this 14th day of August, 1948. 
page 22A } Virginia : 
FRANK A. KEARNEY, 
Judge of the Circuit Court of the 
County of Elizabeth City. 
In the Circuit Court of the County of Elizabeth City. 
Harley A. Ha..wkins, Plaintiff, 
v. . 
Claude F. Finney, Minnie B. Flint, and Newport News Build-
ing and Construction Trades CouncJI, an unincorporated· 
association, Defendants. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTION NO. !. 
Be it remembered that on the 1st day of May, 1948, the 
court handed down a written opinion overruling a demurrer 
which had been filed by the defendants in this action, and the 
opinion of the court is set out as follows : · 
'' This action was brought under the right given in Chapter" 
2 of the 1947 Acts of the Extra Session of the General As-
sembly of Virginia, and known as 'The Right to ·work' ·or 
'Anti-Close Shop Act'. The defendants have filed a de:-
murrer to the plaintiff's action and the ·decision on the· de-
murrer involves, a determination of the constitutionality of 
the Act. · 
'' The Court has neither the duty or the right to consider 
or· judge the wisdom of this legislation or its practicability: 
The function of the Court is to ascertain whether the Act 
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offends the ·Constitution of the State of Virginia or the Con-
stitution of the United States. 
page 23A } "It is the contention of the defendants as set 
up in the demurrer that the Act is violative of 
Article ·1, Sections 1, 11 and 12 of the Virginia Constitution 
and is in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
of the United States Constitution. It is charged: 
''1. That the Act arbitrarily and unreasonably impairs the 
right of employers and unions of freedom of contract. 
: "2. The Act constitutes class legislation and is discrimi-
natoFy,;_denying unions and union membe1·s the equal protec-
tion of-the law. 
'' 3. ~fie· said Act impairs and restrains the exercise of 
civil rights, guaranteed under both the Constitution of Vir-
ginia and the Constitution of the United States. 
,·,The Legislature. of Virginia has unlimited authority to 
enact laws, except where prohibited by the State or Federal 
Constitution. , 
'' In this instance the justification or right to enact the 
legislation in dispute must be found under what has been 
judicially termed the police power of the State.' This is one 
of the powers impliedly reserved to the State by the Tenth 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United· States. 
'' Recognizing then that the right and liberty to contract 
are not absolute and unyielding, but are subject to being 
limited and restricted in the interest of the State 
page 24A } and welfare of its people, the question for con-
sideration is: Was the police power of the State, 
by the enactment of the legislation of Chapter 2 of the Acts 
of 1947, so unreasonably, arbitrarily and capriciously exer-
cised as to be unconstitutional and of no effect Y 
'' Relations between employer and employee have been 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court to be sub-
ject for legislative legislation under the State police powers 
in numerous cases, some of which are: · 
'' Thortr,hill v • .Alabama, 310 U. S. 88. 
"Carpenter.s, Et. Union v. Ritter's Care, 315 U. S. 722. 
"West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 .. 
"National Labor Relation Board v. Jones~ Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U. S. 1. 
"Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relation Board. 
313 u. s. 177. · 
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'' Twelve States, including Virginia, have enacted statutes 
similar to the one here in question. They are, with the dates 
of the enactment, as follows: 
Delaware, 1947 
Georgia, 1947 
Iowa, 1947 
Louisiana, 1934 
Maryland, 1939 
Maine, 1947 
North Carolina, 1947 
North Dakota, 1947 
South Dakota, 1945 
Teimessee, 1947 
Texas, 1947 
,Vii'ginia, 1947 
I , ..
page 25A} "Five States have adopted Constitution~ 
Amendments putting this law into effect. They 
are with the dates of the adoption: 
Arizona, 1945 
Florida, 1944 
Arkansas, 1944 
Nebraska, 1946 
South Dakota, 1947 
(It will be noted that South Dakota enacted a statute in 19~. 
and then in 1947 adopted the Constitutional Amendment.) 
'' The validity of the North Carolina statute has been. up-
held in the decision by the Supreme Court of the State ren-
dered on the 19th day of December, 1947, in the case of State 
v. Whittaker, et als., reported in 45 S. E. (2nd) 860. · 
"The validity of the Constitutional Amendment adopted 
by the State of Arizona was up-held by the Supreme Court_ 
of that State in the case of Anierican Ferleration of Labor, 
et als., v. America,n, Sa.sh & Door Co., et als., case No. 5028. 
A case involving the validity of the Constitutional Amend-
ment adopted by Florida went to the Supreme Court of the 
United States. American Federation of Labor; Metal Trades 
Department, A. F. of L., Florida State Federation of Labor, 
et al., Appellants, v. J. Tom Watson, an Attorney GeneroJ 
of the State of Florida, et al., 327 U. S. 582, 90 Law Ed. 873., 
In that case the Supreme Court, over the dissent of J nstice,-
Murphy, refused to pass on the constitutionality of this 
Amendment to the Florida Constitution on the grounds that 
the Courts of that State should have first oppor-
page 26A ~ tunity to construe the amendment. The Supreme 
Court held that the Federal Courts should re-
frain from passing on the validity until the amendment has 
been aidlwritively construed by the State courts. 
'' As far as this Court has been able to ascertain the con-
Supreme. Court of Appeals of Virginia 
stitutionality of the Virginia statute has never been pa$sed 
on··1c>r submitted to any other Court of record in this State.' 
"In addition to the favorable decisions of the Supreme 
Courts of Arizona and North Carolina, the validity of 
statutes similar to the one in Virginia has been up-held by 
lower courts in Nebraska in the case of ·Lincoln P.ederal 
Lab.or Union v. Northwestern Iron <I; Metal Co., etc., and by 
·a three judge Federal District Court fo~ the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida in the case of .A.. F. ~ L., et als., v. W ats'on, et 
als., 60 Federal Supp. 1010 (this is the case that was reversed 
by the Supreme Court of the United States on jurisdictional 
grounds). . 
"No ocase has been brought to the attention of the Court 
which has held a statute similar to the one under considera-· 
tion unconstitutional. 
'' The Court has serious doubts as to the constitutionality 
of this Act. There have .been abuses under union-security 
relationships, such as arbitrary expulsions or arbitrary re-
fusals to admit into membership, unreasonable membership 
requirements or other requisites infringing on the right to 
obtain or retain employment. Such abuses it appears to the 
Court should be reached or remedied by legislation spec~:fi-
cally directed against such abuses or evils without resorting. 
:_ to the extreme of complete prohibition. 
page 27 A r '' Fraud, opportunities f Of abuse and actual 
ab;use occur under all types of ordinary contrac-
{ual relationships, but it would not be proper to pro'tect 
against such possible abuses by outlawing the yery m~king 
of the agreement under any and all circumstances. It would 
s~em that the desired results might have been obtained by 
less drastic action. 
In' considering the constitutionality of the statute, however, 
every presumpti~n is to be indulged in favor of its validity, 
and it is the duty of the courts to sustain an Act of the Legis-
lature where, its constitutionality may be merely a matter 
of doubt. The Act should not be declared unconstitutional, 
unle~s it is beyond r~asona.ble doubt. · 
"State v. Harris, 216 N. C. 746. 
'' Bridges v. City of Charlotte, 221 N. C. 472. 
,·,In view of the great number of states which have seen 
fit to consider such legislation appropriate and necessary 
and giving due consideration to the decisions of the Courts 
that have previously considered this same matter and ·up-
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held its validity, it is the conclusion· of the Court at this time, 
to up-hold the constitutionality of t~s Act. 
'' Respectfully, 
/signed/ FRANK A. KEARNEY, Judge.'' 
'' Hampton, Virginia 
'' May 1, 1948. 
page 28A} The defendants desiring to make this opinion 
· a part of the record in this case, tender this their 
Bill of Exceptions No. 1 and pray that the same· may. be. 
signed, sealed and made a part of the record in this casej 
which is accordingly done on this 14th day of August, 1948, 
within the time prescribed by law and after due and reason-
able notice in writing to counsel for the plaintiff as required 
by law. 
FRANK A. KEARNEY, Judge. 
page 3 } All witnesses were duly sworn. 
Mr. Ford: If the court please, I would like to edit a brie~ 
that the act of the General Assembly, set forth in the Notice 
of Motion in fttll, was approved on January 1, 1947 an~ was 
in effect on or before July 31, 1947. 
Mr. Stallard: Counsel agrees that was the law. 
Court: I don't think there's any question about that fact. 
The Court can take judicial cognizance of that fact. I'd 
rather have it this way. 
HARLEY A. HAWKINS. 
called as a witness in his own behalf, being duly sworn testi~ 
fled as follows : · 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Ford: 
Q. You are Harley A. Hawkins T 
A. That's· right. 
Q. Where do you live? 
A. Cavalier Courts, Hampton. . 
Q. Cavalter Courts, Elizabeth City County. Where is· thatT 
By Langley Field somewhere Y 
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. A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. You are th~ plaintiff in this action against Mr. Finney 
and Mrs. Flint and the Newport News Building and Con-
struction Trades Council 1 
A. That's right. · 
Q .. -.Mr. H~wkins, were you once employed by the Brickey 
. · ·Ptjnt Shop! 
page 4 ~ . A. Yes. 
. Q. Where is that located f 
A. In Keco.ughtan Road, near Wythe. 
. Q. Jn Elizabeth City County Y 
A. Right. 
Q. Is that the. shop that was operated by Mr .. Finney 3.D:d 
Mrs. Flint at the time you were employed there1 
· A. That's right .. 
Q. Do you remember approximately when you went t(j 
work for those. people Y . 
A. In the month of January. 
Q. What year Y 
A. 1947. 
Q. Were you at that time a member of any labor union t 
A. No. , 
Q. During the time that you were working there, :Mr. 
Hawkins, did Mr. Finney or any other owner or representa-
tive of the owner of the Brickey Print Shop approach you 
concerning or requesting you to join the labor union 7 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you remember approximately when that was Y 
A. Well, it was some time in September. I don't know 
· exactly the date. Some time in September. 
Q. September, 1947? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 5 } Q. Who was it that ,;ipproached you 'l 
A. Mr. Finney. 
Q. What did Mr. Finney have to say to you at that time 
concerning your joining a labor_ unionJ 
A. He said he had a contract to publish a labor journal .. 
Q. Contract with who, if he said Y · 
A. With the local labor unions. I don't know exactly which 
ones they were. He said I would have to join a union because 
they required all union labor on that particular job. 
Q. What· particular job are. you speaking of1 · 
A. The labor journal .. 
Q. And that was some time in September of 1947T 
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A. Some time in September. . 
Q. Had any work been done that you know of on the labor 
journal at the time that this conversation took placet 
· A. Not in the shop. . 
Q. You mean· not where you were working! 
A. Not where I was working. 
Q. What kind of work did you do for themT 
A. Press work, running presses. 
Q. Running presses? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do any other kind of work for them 7 
'A. I did binding work. 
. •, 
:~ . 
· Q. Press work and binding work T 
page 6} A. Yes. 
Q. What did you tell Mr. Finney, if anything, 
when he stated to you that you would have to become a mem~ 
ber of the labor unionf . 
A. I told him I didn't think that I had to. · I told him I 
never belonged to one and furthermore they didn't have. a 
local here and I didn't see that it was necessary that I join 
it. . 
Q. Diel Mr. Finney or Mr. Flint or Mrs. Flint request you 
at any subsequent time to j.oin a union T ·· 
A. All together, it was three times he asked me if I bad. 
joined or was I going to join. 
Q. Had you joined or were you going to join. Had you 
joined f 
A. No, I hadn't. 
Q. Had you made any attempt at that time to join Y 
A. No, I hadn't. 
Q. Do you remember· approximately the last time they' 
made this request of yo·u 1 · ·: 
4-. It was approximately the first part of the week of the 
week ending October 10, so I would say. · · 
Q. October 10 or 117 
A. The 10th; the date I got fired. That was on Friday 
and Saturday was the 11th. · · : 
Q. So· you say that you were dismissed from service on 
the 10th day of OctoberY · 
page 7 ~ A. 10th day of October. 
Q. Who dismissed you? 
A. Mr. Finney. i: 
Q. Was he then either a partner of or in charge of the 
Brickey Print Shop? · · ·, 
102 · Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia · · \ 
Harley .A. Hawkins. 
A. Yes. 
·~ Q. 'And in what county aid that occur? 
A. Elizabeth City County. 
Q. Did you know anything about any contract that the · 
Brickey Print Shop may have had with anyone else except 
. what you were· told? 
A. I didn't see any contract. Rumors was · all I heard. 
' Q. You were just told Y · 
A. Just told. 
Q. What were your average wages, including straight and 
overtime, at the time that you were dismissed from the serv-
ice of Brickey Prlnt Shop? · . 
A. Averaged over ninety a week. It was $91.00 and some 
few cents a week prior to the week that I got fired and I only 
worked five days the week I ·got fired; it was $78.00 and some 
few cents. . 
Q. Had you, worked the full six days of the week that you 
were fired, your earnings would have been how much T 
A. Well, at least $90.00 or more. 
· Q. What work was the Brickey Print Shop do-
page 8 } ing at that time that required you to work so much 
over time? · 
A. We were rushed with sever.al different orders that had 
a dead line.. They had to get them out at a certain time or 
lose them. 
Q. What were -they, for example, some of them if you can 
recall? 
A. This labor journal was one. 
Q. How much of a job was that T · 
A. Well, it was $900.00 some dollars, the price. It had 
been quite a bit of work to it. · 
Q. What else? 
A. "Your Navy" magazine. We had a contract to get 
that out by a certain date. We hacl to get that out by acer-
tain date and I think we also had the Langley Field paper 
and the Buckroe High School paper and a four page half 
tone job for the Hastings' Institute. 
Q .. Half tone job. Is that a special kind? · 
A. Run on enamel stock and special ink and special proc .. 
ess. You can't run it like you would an ordinary job .. 
Q. Does that require more time! 
A. More time and more knowledge. 
Q. These jobs that you speak of., were they rush jobs Y 
A. All that l have mentioned were rush jobs. 
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. Q. What- other work did they have 7 
page 9 } A. Regular line of work, letterheads ~i;id state-
. ments, laundry tickets and usual run of printing 
shop work.. There was a lot of them. : -· 
Q. Were they then getting out a weekly newspaper?· 
A. Elizabeth City County Home News. 
Q. What other weekly paper were they publishing either 
for themselves or .anyone else Y 
A. The Langley Field paper, ''Tailspinner'' and the·Buck-
roe Junior High School paper, "Beachcomber." 
Q. Mr. Hawkins, how long were you out of employment ap-
proximately Y 
A. Four weeks· lacking two days, I think, to the best· of 
my knowledge. 
Q. During that time, did you make any effort to seek em-
ployment in your line of work? 
A. Yes, I did in the print shops. 
Q. That's what I mean, in your line of work. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who did you seek work from T 
A. I went to the Franklin Printing Company on 25th.-
Street and the Carr Printing Company down in Hampton 
and the Tidewater .Printing Company. None-of them seemed 
to need any help except one of them wanted me to go in 
partnership. I didn't have- any money. 
Q. Were you able to do thatT 
page 10 } A. I wasn't. 
Q. Did you want to do it Y 
A. Not particularly. 
Q. And·you tell this· court that you were not able to get 
work at those three? 
A. I was not. 
Q.· Established printing shops? 
A. That's right. · -
Q. You say you were out of work for four weeks 1 
A. Lacking two days. 
Q. Lacking two days Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the last full week that you made there, yon drew 
bow much money? 
A. $91.00 and some few· cents. I don't know exactly the·. 
cents. 
Q. Where are you working nowt 
A. Newport News Forms Company. 
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CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Stal~ard: 
Q. You state that you were making a little oYer $90~00 a 
week.. How-~~ch have you actually lost in dollars and cents! 
A. Approxillllately $330.00 .. 
Q. Have :you· figured that upY 
A. T1iat 's the best of my figuring, approximately $330.00 • 
. Q. Wha:~ 9idJ you do after you were discharged Y 
· ·A'. I tried to get a job the first thing .. 
page 11 } Q .. Did you join the union i · 
A. Yes, before I went back to work I did .. 
. Q. Where did you join· the union Y 
A. In Richmond. 
Q. Richmond, Virginia Y 
A. Yes. 
· . Q. How long was it after you were discharged Y 
A.· I don't know. I went up there .twice to join. They 
didn't take me in the first time. I had to go back ag·ain~ I 
went up there I'd say about a week after I was discharged 
and then two weeks later-I think it was around two weeks 
iater, I had to go back again. '11hey called a special meeting 
and took me in at that special meeting. . 
Q. You say you've lost $300.00 and some dollars hut just 
how many dollars have you lost Y · 
A. That's in labor, $330.00. 
Q. How many thirty dollars? Can you tell me exactly t 
A. The way I figure, it was $331..00 .. 
Q. Have you figured it out before you came hereY 
· A. That's the way I figured it out. · 
Q. The defendants here only discharged you because you 
wouldn't join a labor union Y 
A. That's the only reason they gave me. 
Q. Actually, didn't you go back to work for the 
page 12 } defendants after you joined the union I 
A. Yes, after I joined the union .. 
Q. Why aren't you working there nowt 
A. Well, ,it didn't seem like the atmosphere was suitable 
eo I just decided it would be better for me and all padies 
concerned if I would get 3:.nother job so I just looked around 
until I heard about this job where I got now. I quit and 
went up there. · 
Q. How long hav.e you been working at the place you are 
working nowY 
ClalJd@ r~ ~J!~Y, P.Utl§:, V: Rin:l@Y A: ll1wldns · ,~ 
lfarl~JJ J~ l! fJW~iP§. 
,A. 4f~µ~q ~jght pr- Jl!P~ IDf:mth~: l ~f:)-ql~p.?t ~ilY ftnt -~yre 
~J.il~tJY~ , 
Q. Are you earning as much up there as you were ~t the 
other place? 
A. I am now, approximately the same. 
Q. Vv ere you earlling: A~ fflll~:P. w!l~q ygµ left Y 
i~ N@: 
Examined by the Court: 
Q: Do I undersiil~fl t4~t Aft~r ycm fam~d the union you 
went back to work for Mr. Finney? -· 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. As soon as you had jpffl@9, tP~fl 4~ tqq~ Y~ll q~~k' · 
A. That's what he told me, that if I jom~il t4~ ooi~:q, µe 
l!~~q~µ m~ llqt. Wijq}fln!~ WPrk ~t3 §.l.lY flPrn lj~~~ l JqiB~d 
th~ llll!P.Jl• . " . 
pa,g~ 1~ ~ Q. A.fie¥ Y911 jpin@g tl:l~ uqjo!1-i 1-l@ g~v.~ ygy tii~k 
the job? · 
A. I went back to him and showed him ffl.Y <!ilFff §JlG. ;lie 
g,iv~ ffif3 P&P}{ ill~ fall~ 
Q: ¥ ~ll ~~~ ~ P.Phlt@r Y 
~. J}r{?~~IJH!~~ . • 
Q. y OU never belong~{! tP ~Jli Ufilft¥. llntil Y:Pl! jgiD@fl m 
Richmond after they discharged yqµ. 7 . · 
A. That's right. 
RE-DIRECT E4A¥JN-4.':fJQN: 
By Mr. Ford: 
Q. What other kind of work qi9: y.gu Pf:l: I t~1\J1~ JPU 
said- . 
A. I'm in the bindery department of Newport News Fqrµis 
(),QB!P.~~y! . . 
Q. Yon do bindery work and pressman work 1 
A. I was doing both tP9~ -
Court: How do you arrive at the figure of $330.007 
A. I figured the week before I left qp.q P!@¥f9W~ Wf3~~§ 
before that, I was making at least $91.00 every week. That 
Wij~ f pr. ~it <!111~ f!llQ )Vlieµ I l@ft J }lt!f:l !>~im t}l~r~ t8 tit~ §H9.P 
~@¥~rnl tim~§ aµq they wtir~ W€>1*i~g njgM f!!!~ ~§tnf4!f§ 
·,iml §undijy~. 'llb~Y wg~k~µ §~tijfqijf§ ~~g §fill! .lJ:f!:I· · 
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Court: To your own knowledge they had work there that 
w~u~d have permitted you to make as much as the last week! 
A. More if I wanted to work there. 
page 14 ~ CLAUDE F. FINNEY, 
called by the plaintiff as· an adverse witness, be-
ing duly sworn. testified as follows : 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By ·Mr. Ford: 
Q. You are Mr. Claude Finney Y 
A. That !s right. 
Q. You were in the court and heard Mr. Hawkins testify 
that you were a partner and helping· in the operation of the 
B~ickey Print Shop at the time that he was working there. 
Is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. I'll hand you a paper which purports to be a: copy of 
an agreement and ask you what it is (hands witness paper) Y 
. A. It's part of the c.ontract, the regular contract for the 
Building Trades Journal that I signed. 
Q. Is that a copy of iU 
A. That's right. , 
Q., Do you have the original in your possession Y 
A. I don't have it with me. 
Q. But this is a copy Y 
A. That's a copy. 
Q. You know it to be so7 
A. I do .. 
Mr. Ford: We offer this in evidence, if your Honor please 
as an exhibit. 
· Court: Any objections Y 
page- 15 ~ Mr. Stallard: No objections. 
The contract was received in evidence and marked Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 1. · 
· Mr. Ford: If the court please, I wish to call your atten-
tion to the fact that in the stipulation in the beginning con-
cerning the effective date of the statute, the contract-in the 
first paragraph has the date of it as July 31, 1947, after that 
became e:ff ective. 
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Court: · After that became effective. 
Q. Mr. Finney, Mr. Hawkins has testified that you had 
several conversations with him beginning some time in Sep-
tember of last year, 1947. Is that correct? · · · 
A. That's correct. , . 
Q. Did you say anything to him about him joining a labor 
union! l 
A. I asked him to join it two or three times. 
Q. Did you tell him anything about' this contract f 
A. I told him I had a contract with the labor· journal to 
print that journal and if he didn't join, that I'd- have to let 
him go because the contract calls for all union help. · 
Q. Did you let ·him go Y . · 
A. I did. 
Q. He has stated that he was dismisse~ from yonr service 
on the tenth day of October, 1947. You know whether that's. 
correct or not f 
page 16 ~ A. That sounds correct. I could tell by look:-
ing at the book. I don't just know· off" hand. ·. I 
think that's the date though. 
' ' 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Stallard: · 
Q. You state that the contract handed you by Mr. Ford 
was part of the contract. Do you have an additional con-
tract? 
A. No~ not an additional contract of that but the fact is 
the balance of what I received at that time called for a cer-
tain type of paper, ink and all of that sort of thing and this 
refers solely· labor usually. 
Q. All of them were signed at-the same time! 
A. That's right. 
Q. Was Hawkins' work satisfactory to you Y 
A .. Yes, it was very satisfactory. I hated like the dicke~ 
to let him go. I feel, in my own mind, that he's one of the 
best, if not the best printer around here, pressman I'm talk-
~~~ . 
Q. Why did you sign that contract, which has been intro-
duced and you have identified, between your c9mpany and 
the Newport News Building Trades Council Y 
Mr. Ford: Mr. Stallard, is he your witness now! I don't. 
rn, §tmr~m~ Qtnwt ftf ABn@fll~ @f ~r@M11 
maud~ 11'~ E~nn~H: 
know the materiality gf why: b,Q d!d! ~l!@ c~mtnwt i~ tb@re .. 
He signed it. It speaks for itseft·· 
~OJJft: l t~ }W 1fi ~llt.itl@fl tq ~~f wilf Jl~ ~!~ec;l it• 
A. w~n~ tlw f@l!SfJ}! l !?!S~~Q H i§ l?~~~U§@ i~ 
page 17 i brouglrt. us more business. T!l~t w~s <nut~ ~ job 
·far: B; §llPP ll~r §xg~!l i§ W@ W~~@ apfl ~ f~lt ~~ wq~ld 
be additional business if we could get that out too. WJm~ J 
meant to say~Jtt!lQ'ViP.:g tl.!§t ~~P ili@F@ WP~!~ :mm~ibly 9@ a 
lot mor~ ijf th~ ~ff.me ·tYIJ@ §f W~! · "\f l!!@h: we ~Au4}. µ~~ to 
fff~~t ~4va~t~g~. · 
, : q: :ijqw :rn~!lY @!llp.!@ye~~ ~~ f 9~ lii!f@ in f gµr. P!?g~ A.f 
busmess Y • 
A. At_.that time I just can't retq~fflb@r, pff Pt\-R4~ pd §RY 
five or six if not more than that. 
'1ff!lll ; l§ yop.r: P.P9\ µ,er~ 1 
At I tmly h~'f~ ju~t ~ b~p~ pf !J!!!l~ and pne, of ¥~t. :ijaw~ 
pllEl: ~ ~@Q~§ tbl\t. BP t.4flt!f3 !n ~F@ .ill @e ~91?., big books. 
Court: You think you had five or six at that time 1 
A. I judge I did. I don't remember for sure. 
Q. You say you have Mr. Hawkins' pay:rnH H~~~~, 
A: ¥~~' I "d~-: 
Q. Y mi 4t~n) prci~t aJJything f gr- t~ . ~t~t~ gf Vinii:niff. 
or for any medical estabhshmenU Was it all local 1 
.1\.~ }rqr Ili'fl@S~~riJY: J (lgn?t r@m~mber, WP.et}?.~r we P.ad 
~ff¥ &t.~i~ wAr~ 9F ~gt tmt it'~ P9~~il:}l~·. W@ fli4 ~ myfHl lilt 
@f ·Jopi\l w~r-l~t 'r4~t WI!~ Pt!¥ ~UP.P: }}µ~!IW~~!' If w~ tlkl Iuw~ 
outside work, it possibly was a s~ilJ:i jgg. ! 9.~µ't r~!ll~~~~r 
though. -
Mf-: s~~ll~f9: If yp1pr J.Jo:q(!)! plpas~, t!ie ~e-
l)Agft ).a }. fend~~t~ will ~u>t IHlt ~m ~iiy ~tjgenc~· pecaµse 
: · tpey ~P.P.-ld ~qt r~ftite ~ny ~@§t~ony ~y~n. 
. l w~µJµ l~~ tp !ll?-k~ ~ :m9U~~' if ··timt l§ ~11 · t~ gv.jflefiP~r 
.W strike out the evidence and submit to you ~y wr~U~n "Q.lA~ 
*W.ll ~t11tiJlg t~ YP.µ JllY i!W~~ gfQY:tJ:4B: · 
~r~ St~u,n~d t4er~µp~µ ~µb~itt~g hl;; IPQUQ!! to §trilt:@ t4~ 
. ~vid~nce which r~ntl ~~ f ~How~: 
' 
ff (Jqµnsel fpr, ~n ~lie a~,~JlP~Pt~ w~~n~~ fg mQy~ thEJ:~ all 
the evidence in this case, be stricken out and final judgment 
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entered in behalf of all the defendants for the 1ollowing 
reasons: 
1. The alleged law under which the plaintiff sues prevents 
any employer or labor organization, including the defend-
ants herein, from entering into or renewing mutually agree-
able collective bargaining ag~·eenumts containing union shop 
or union security provisions or requiring employees., as in 
the present case, to become and remain a member of a labor 
· organization as a condition of employment, and thereby de-. 
prives labor organizations anq. their members and employers, 
including the defendants herein, of property rights and liber-
ties, in particular, the right and liberty freely to contract 
and the liberty of an employer, including the defendant ~-
ployers herein, to conduct their own business and to seleQt 
their own employees free from undue interference by th~ 
state, all in violation of Article 1, Section 11 of the Consti~ 
tution of Virginia, and of the 14th amendment tp 
page 19 ~ the United States Constitution. . : 
. . The alleged law under which the plaintiff su~ 
is arbitrary, unreasonable and excessive and is in viol1:1.tion · 
of the constitutional guarantees ~s aforesaid against the im-
pairment of the obligation of and freedom to enter into con-:-
tracts as protected under the State and Federal Constitur 
. tions as aforesaid. . .1 
2. The alleged law under which the plaintiff sues consti~ 
tutes class legislation and is discriminatory and therefore, 
is void under Article 1, Sections 1 and 11 of the Virginia 
Constitution and under the 14th amendment of the United 
States Constitution. · :; . 
3. The alleged law under which the plaintiff sues impairs 
and previously restrains the exercise by the defendants of 
their civil rights of assembly and speech, all in violatiQn-._p,f 
Article 1, Sections 1, 11, and 12 of the Virginia Coustitution, 
and of the first and 14th amendments to the United States 
Constitution." . ·1 : 
.. 
Court: I passed on these grounds in the motion when I 
passed on your demurrer. These same grounds are assigne~ 
in the demurrer that was fil~d in this case. I passed on-tl;u:it 
in my opinion in the matter today. Is it the same as it.was 
at that time? There is one question I want to-question .Mr~ 
Finney. ( To Mr. Finney) Wba t connection does Mrs. Min~ 
~ie ·B. Flint have with this organization 7 . ;_., 1 
· ue .:,.· Supreme .Cpurt of .Appeals of Virginia 
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'page· 20 ~ A. She w.as the employer., actual partner. 
Court: She was a partner at the time of this agreement f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Cour.t: And was a partner at the time this man was dis-
charged 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. S(allard: Could I submit an order in this case over-
ruling my motion? 
Court: Yes, sir, I formally overrule the motion and then 
if you have the ~otion, I '11 see it. I mark the motion filed 
and then I'll enter this order overruling the motion. That 
brings us down to the judgment and under the evidence in 
this case, unless you have something further to say at this 
time, under the evidence in this case the, plaintiff is entitled 
to judgment against all the defendants for the sum of 
$330.00. . . 
Mr. Stallard: If your Honor please, I would like to file 
another written . motion, to set aside your judgment for the 
reasons just stated. I want to save the point. 
Mr. Stallard then submitted his written motion to set aside 
the judgment which read as follows: 
''Counsel for the defendants moves the court to set aside 
the judgment in favor of the plaintiff in this case as being 
contrary to the law and evidence and enter up final judgment 
for the defendants for the following reasons: 
page 21 ~ "1. The alleged law under which the plaintiff 
sues prevents any employer or labor organization, 
including the defendants herein, from entering into or re-
newing mutually agreeable collective bargaining agreements 
containing union shop or union security provisions or re-
quiring employees,. as in the present case, to become and re-
main a member of a labor organization as a condition of em-
ployment, and thereby deprives lab~r organizations and 
their members and employers, including. the defendants here-
in, of property rights and, liberty, in particular, the right 
and liberty freely to contract and the liberty of an employer, 
including the defendant employers, herein, to conduct their 
own business and to select their own employees free from 
Claude F. Finney, et als., ·v. Harley A. Hawkins 
I 
111 
undue interfei:ence by the state., all in violation of Article 1, 
Section 11 of the Constitution ·of Virginia, and of the 14th 
:amendment to the United States Constitution . 
. ,., The alleg-ed law under which the plaintiff sues is arbi-. 
trary, unreasonable and excessive and is in violation of the 
constitutional guarantees as afore said against the impair-
ment of the obligation of the freedom to enter into cQ;ritracts 
as protected under the State and Federal Constitutions as 
· aforesaid. · · . 
'' 2. The alleged law under which the plaintiff sues con-
stitutes class legislation and is discriminatory and therefore, 
is void under Article 1, Sections l and 11 of the Virginia Con-
stitution and under the 14th amendment of the 
page 22} United States Constitution. 
''3. The alleged law, under which the plaintiff 
sues i.rripairs and previ_ously restrains the exercise by the 
defendants of their civil rights of assembly and speech, all 
in violation of Article 1, Sections 1, 11, and 12 of_ the Virginia 
Constitution, and of the :first and 14th amendments. to the 
United States Constitution." · 
Court: .All right. The notation I. made in regard to th~ 
judgment is as follows: ''No party requiring a jury, all mat-
ters were submited to the court without a jury. The judg-
ment of the court is this plaintiff· recover from the defend-
ants the sum of $330.00 with interest from this date and his 
cost.'' 
Mr. Stallard: Your Honor, could I submit an order which 
may not be exactly the way .you might want it entered~ I 
take no pride in authorship. You can chang·e that order 
ar~:mnd anyway you want to. · I want to save the point. 
Court: Have you seen a copy of this order? · 
Mr. Ford: Yes, sir. 
Court: It looks all right to me. Have you got any ob-
jections to it Y 
Mr. Ford: No, sir. I think the statement of exceptions 
may not be necessary. · 
Court: I don't either. They can't do any harm. Counsel 
wants them · so I '11 put them in there. 
page 23A} It is· stipulated and agreed between counsel 
for the plaintiff and the defendants that the fol~ 
lowing is a copy of an agreement of conditions of employ.:. 
ment entered into· by the Newport News Building and Con-
struction Trades Council and the Brickey Print Shop on the 
31st day of July, 1947: · 
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'' For the purpose of mutual understanding and in order 
to maintain harmonious relations, it is agreed by the New-
port News Building and Construction Trades Council and 
the Brickey Print Shop, on this 31st day of July, 1947, the 
following labor policy shall be established. 
"None but members in continuous good standing of local 
unions of the American Federation of Labor shall be em-
ployed -by the Brickey Print Shop on all of its operations. 
This agreement shall remain in full force and effect for 
one year. fr9m d;3te hereof and. shall continue· to renew itself 
.£or one year. p:eriods unless sixty (60) days written notice 
shall have b~p given prior to the expiration date of either 
party of its .. ~;$ire to change or modify said ag·reement. 
. . "~ . 
BRICKEY PRINT SHOP 
(s) CLAUDE F. FINNEY 
Manager 
!. 
"NEWPORT NEWS BUILDING 
A.ND CONSTRUCTION TRADES 
COUNCIL 
(s) WILLIAM E. TENCH· 
'President 
(s) J. J .. SMITH, JR. 
Secretary 
{Plaintiff Exh. 1) 
, Dated this 14th day of Au~st., 1948 .. 
F.·LEE FORD, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
BEECHER E. STALLARD, 
Attorney for Defendants .. 
I Frank A. Kearney, Judge of the Circuit Court of Eliza-
beth City County, Virginia, wherein the above action was 
pending do certify that cotlllsel have entered into a stipula-
tion as set out above, concerning exhibit filed in 
pa:ge 24A ~ this action, and the original exhibit and copy 
have been initialed by me for the purpose of 
identification .. 
FRANK A. KEARNEY, 
Judge. 
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page 25A ~ I, Frank A. Kearney, Judge- of the· .Cilicnit 
. Court of Elizabeth City County, Virginia, '.WhO 
presided over the Trial in the case of Harley A. Hawkins v. 
Claude F. Finney, Minnie B. Flint and Newport News Build-
ing and Construction Trades Council, an unincorporat~.d · as-
sociation, tried in the said court in Hampton Virginia, on 
July 14, 1948., do hereby certify that here ends an accurate 
an4 authentic stenographic report of the testimony given 
by Harley A. Hawkins and Claude F. Finney, and motions 
made by counsel for the defendants to strike out all the evi-
dence in this case and enter up final judgment for the de-
fendants, and also to set aside a judgment in favor of the: 
plaintiff in this case as being contrary to the law and evi-' 
dence, and enter up .final judgment for the defendants, and 
plaintiff's exhibit No. 1, which is an exact copy of the origi-
nal exhibit introduced by the plaintiff in. this case, and coun-
sel having agreed to certify the copy in· this certificate, the 
9riginal. and copy havi~g been initialed by me for the pl}r-
pose of identification, and a copy of a written opinion: by 
the court, which has been made a pai-t of the record in this 
case, by proper certificate of exception and other in~idents 
of the trial of the above styled action. 
page 26A ~ I do further certify that the attorney for the 
· plaintiff had reasonable notice in writing given 
by counsel for the defendants of the time a~d place when the 
report of the testimony, motions, exception, exhibit, written 
opinion and other incidents of the trial would be tendered 
and presented to the undersigned for signature and authen-. 
tication, and that the said report was presented to me·on the 
14th day of August, 1~48, within less than sixty days after 
entry of the final judgment in said action. · 
Given under my hand this 14th day of August, 1948.-
FR.A.NK A. KEARNEY~ 
Judge of the Circuit Court of the County 
of Elizabeth City. 
page 27A ~ CLERK'C CE,RTIFICATE. 
I, R. E. Wilson, Cletk of the Circuit Court of Elizabet}J. 
City County, Virginia, do hereby certify that the foregoing 
is a perfect transcript of the record of the notice of motion 
for judg·ment heretofore pending in this Court between Har-
ley A. Hawkins, plaintiff and Claude F. Finney, Mmilie 'B: 
Flint and Newport News Building and Construction Trades 
Council, an unincorporated association, defendants, as the 
same 110w appears from the original papers and re~ords on 
file in my office. 
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I fiirther certify that the notice required by law to be given 
by. the appellant to appellee, upon application made to me 
for a transcript of the record has been duly given; is filed· 
amorig · the original papers in this office. 
· Given under my hand this 14th day of August, A. D. 1948. 
R. E. WILSON, 
Clerk of Circuit Court of Elizabeth City 
County, Virginia 
by S. M. GIBSON, 
Deputy Clerk. 
,, . EXHIBIT NO. 1. . , 
COPY 
AGREEMENT 
CONDITIONS OF E]\.fPLOYMENT 
For the purpose of mutual understanding and in order to 
maintain harmonious relationship, it is agreed by the New-
port News Building and Construction Trades Council and 
the Brickey Print Shop, on this 31st day of July, 1947, the 
following labor policy shall be established: 
None but members in continuous good standing of Local 
Unions of the American Federation of Labor shall be em-
ployed by the Brickey Print Shop on all .of its operations. 
This agreement shall remain in full force and effect for 
one year from date hereof and shall continue to renew itself 
for one year periods unless sixty ( 60) days written notice 
shall have been given prior to the expiration date by either 
party of its desire to change or modify said agreement. 
NEWPORT NEWS BUILDING & CON-
STRUCTION TRADES COUNCIL 
WM. E. TENCH, SR. (Signed) 
President 
J. J. SMITH., JR. (Signed) 
Secretary 
BRICKEY PRINT SHOP 
CLAUDE F. FINNEY (Signed) 
President Mgr. 
Sec~etary 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. -O. 
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